Assessing the efficacy of the AU sanctions policies with regard to unconstitutional changes in government : the examples of Guinea and Madagascar by Mkhize, Siphiwe
1 
 
ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE AU SANCTIONS POLICIES WITH REGARD 
TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT: THE EXAMPLES OF 
GUINEA AND MADAGASCAR 
 
 
SIPHIWE MKHIZE 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
In the subject 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
At the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: DR. THABISI HOEANE 
CO-SUPERVISOR: DR. PHIL F.G. MTIMKULU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
                                                         DECLARATION 
                                                                                      Student Number: 4566-852-3  
 
I, Siphiwe Mkhize, declare that the dissertation: “Assessing the Efficacy of the AU Sanctions 
Policies with Regard to Unconstitutional Changes in Government: the examples of Guinea and 
Madagascar”, is my own work and that all the sources that I have used and quoted have been 
indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
                                                               Abstract  
Unconstitutional changes, especially coups d’états, have undoubtedly eroded peace and security 
in many parts of the African continent. These occurrences have also stunted the development of 
democracy in some African states. The African Union (AU), supported by sub-regional bodies, 
addresses this problem by imposing sanctions on the regimes that acquire power through coups 
with the aim of restoring political order. However, this sanctions policy has produced mixed 
results. In some cases, these sanctions managed to succeed in achieving their objectives (Guinea) 
while in other instances sanctions failed to achieve their objectives (Madagascar). It is therefore 
imperative to inquire into the circumstances and assess the conditions under which the AU 
sanctions policies failed and succeeded in restoring political order to states that experience coups 
d’états.  
Key Terms:  African Union, sanctions, unconstitutional changes, coups, Guinea, Madagascar, 
SADC, ECOWAS    
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1. Overview of the chapter  
This chapter serves as an introduction to this dissertation, and comprises six sections. The first 
section discusses the background; the second states the aims of the dissertation; section three 
describes the research questions; section four focuses on the theoretical framework while section 
five discusses the methodology employed in this study and the last section presents the structure 
of the dissertation. 
 
1.1 Background   
The continuing occurrence of coups that depose democratically elected governments is a major 
challenge facing African countries.  Essentially, these coups undermine the principle that the will 
of the people is the basis of the authority of elected governments. Between 1962 and 1990, 
African states experienced 74 coups, while 11 coups occurred in African countries between 2003 
and 2009, making it possible to describe this as an on-going phenomenon (McGowan quoted in 
Nkosi, 2011:2).  
Souare (2009:3) notes that coups are the major cause of insecurity and instability in Africa with 
the capacity to fuel violent conflict, including civil wars. A typical instance of this would be 
when, in 1997, insurgents from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) overthrew the 
democratically elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone. This 
coup occurred against the background of a civil war that lasted for eleven years (1991-2002), 
claiming the lives of 75 000 people
1
. The United Nations (UN) condemned the coup and 
punished the West African state by imposing sanctions in the form of an arms embargo and 
travel bans on the leaders of the RUF.  
The situation in Sierra Leone also raised concerns amongst African leaders. The continental 
body, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), spoke out against the rebel movement 
                                                          
1
UN News Centre. 2010. Security Council lifts Sanctions against Sierra Leone. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID.  
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responsible for carrying out the coup (Pan African News, 26 May 1997). Moreover, the OAU 
also called on African countries to refrain from recognizing the new government of the West 
African state. The Secretary General of the OAU at that time, Salim Ahmed Salim, described the 
situation as a setback for Africa’s development (Pan African News, 26 May1997). 
In 1999, the OAU convened the Thirty Sixth Ordinary Session of the African Heads of State and 
Government to respond to the matter in a meeting held in Togo’s capital, Lomé, on the 10th of 
July 2000. On this occasion, African leaders adopted a declaration known as the Framework for 
an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes in Government. Engel (2010:7) explains that the 
Framework rejects any form of unconstitutional change in government and furthermore, offers 
more insight regarding the types of situations considered as unconstitutional changes. These 
would include intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government and 
replacement of democratically elected governments by armed insurgent movements. The 
Framework also defined a coup as a situation of an unconstitutional change in government by a 
military coup d’état overthrowing a democratically elected government. It is important to 
distinguish between a military coup d’état, which is executed rapidly, from other forms of 
unconstitutional changes such as interventions by mercenaries and insurgents, which are carried 
out over a long period. Other unconstitutional change includes the refusal by an incumbent 
government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections (OAU, 
2000). 
Importantly, the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes in Government 
also set forth punitive measures for dealing with regimes that carried out these unconstitutional 
acts. These measures include the suspension of “the usurping government from the OAU policy 
structures, implementation of targeted sanctions, in the form of visa denials and freezing of 
foreign bank accounts, on perpetrators of coups, if they do not cooperate with efforts aimed at 
restoring constitutional order in the country after six months” (OAU, 2000).  
In 2002, the OAU transformed itself into the African Union (AU). The AU continued the 
commitment of imposing sanctions against regimes that acquire power through coups. Article 30 
of the Constitutive Act of the AU states, any regime “that comes into power through 
unconstitutional means shall be prohibited from participating in any structures and activities of 
the AU” (AU, 2002). 
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January 2007 saw the adoption of the Continental Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance by the member states of the AU. The Charter added to the four categories 
recognized in the said Declaration by including a fifth item: the “manipulation or amendment of 
the constitution or legal instrument” for the purposes of addressing the problem prolonging the 
term of office of the illegal regime (AU, 2007). 
Vines (2013:92) comments that since its inception, the AU has managed to impose sanctions 
against nine member states that experienced coups: the Central African Republic (CAR) (2003 
and 2013), Togo (2005), the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Comoros (2007), 
Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Ivory Coast (2010), Mali (2012) and Guinea-Bissau (2012). 
Some of these were military coups
2
.  One of these, occurred in Mali in 2012 and was instigated 
by the highest echelons of the national army after they accused the civilian government of failing 
to support the soldiers in their struggle against Tuareg insurgents; while the coup that occurred in 
the Islamic Republic of Mauritania in 2005 occurred after the military had accused veteran 
President Maaouiya Ould Taya of being a brutal dictator who had no concern for human rights. 
In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the military staged a coup on 12 April 2012 against the regime of 
Carlos Gomes whom they accused of conspiring with Angola to curtail the power of the military 
(International Crisis Group, 2012:6).   
 
1.2 Aims 
The focus of this study is to assess the efficacy of the AU’s sanctions policy, utilising as case 
studies the coups in Guinea and Madagascar, by evaluating the sanction policies put in place by 
the AU as considered against the stated objectives of these policies. This will entail an 
investigation of why AU sanction policies were successful in Guinea and yet failed in 
Madagascar. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 In 1999, the military in Ivory Coast overthrew President Henry Konan Bedie whom they viewed as authoritarian 
and corrupt (Rametsi, 2006:11).    
15 
 
1.3 Research questions  
The following research questions have guided the dissertation: 
 What were the role of actors and organisations, particularly Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) and international organisations, in shaping the AU sanctions 
regime? 
 What are the factors that led to the failures of the AU sanctions policy in Madagascar? 
 What are the factors that led to the success of the AU sanctions policy in Guinea? 
 
1.4 Theoretical framework  
The theory of Collective Security has largely informed this dissertation. Collective Security has a 
rich history. Its roots can be traced back to the 18
th
 century during the so-called “Period of 
Enlightenment”, with the former made popular by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. In 
the 1700s, Kant wrote the philosophical treatise, Perpetual Peace, in which he argued for the 
creation of an international organisation that would aid cooperation amongst different states. 
Essentially, Kant believed that the creation of such institutions would control conflict and 
promote peace amongst states (Doyle, 2006:21). In the 20
th
 century, the idea of Collective 
Security was popularised by the American Statesman Woodrow Wilson. Wilson, a staunch 
believer in the idea of Collective Security, was instrumental in forming the League of Nations in 
1918, after the end of World War I. In the speech that he gave at the Peace Conference on 14 
February 1919, Wilson highlighted the importance of international organisations: 
Throughout this instrument [the League Covenant] we are depending primarily and chiefly upon 
one great force, and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world - the cleansing and 
clarifying and compelling influences of publicity… so that those things that are destroyed by 
rogue behaviour may be properly destroyed by the overwhelming of the universal expression of 
the condemnation of the world (Kissinger, 1994:52).      
Krause (2004:44) explains that Collective Security is mainly concerned with containing rogue 
behaviour emanating from deviant states. The containment of these rogue regimes becomes 
possible when nation-states establish an international social contract whereby they agree to 
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surrender their sovereignty to multilateral institutions charged with the responsibility of defining 
breaches of security and directing the collective response against a nation that has violated 
international norms and practices.    
The theory of Collective Security postulates that states that act collectively to deter rogue 
elements who threaten global peace is the best way to preserve order in the international political 
system. As Henry Kissinger (1994:52), a former US State Secretary, put it, “the basic premise of 
Collective Security is that all nations view every threat to security in the same way and be 
prepared to run the same risks in resisting it”. Kegley and Wittkopf (2004:510) add to this 
explanation by stating that Collective Security refers to an international or “regional security 
regime agreed upon by member states”. In other words, Collective Security rests on the 
assumption that an act of aggression by any state will be met by a collective response from the 
(other) affected states.  
Collective Security rests on the premise that global politics may be just and fair if states 
cooperate to limit the possibilities of war. Unlike the Balance of Power theory, which holds that 
order and stability are best preserved when military power is equally distributed across nation 
states, the theory of Collective Security agitates for the creation of supranational entities such as 
the UN, the European Union (EU) and the AU to guarantee peace and tranquillity (Burchill, 
2002:47). 
Moreover, advocates of the Collective Security persuasion dismiss the Realist perception that 
war is a permanent feature of International Relations. They propose that states should react 
collectively to any situation that may lead to an outbreak of war and hold the following 
assumptions as postulated by Kegley and Wittkopf (2004:540): 
 International organisations such as the UN, the AU and the EU should retaliate against 
any aggression or any attempt to establish hegemony, not just those acts that threaten 
specific states  
 The international community should involve all member states to stop the aggressor  
 International organisations should create institutions that will identify threats to security.                           
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In practice, the idea of Collective Security has found concrete expression in the UN. Article 1 of 
the UN Charter echoes the policy of Collective Security because it states that the purposes of the 
UN are:  
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace (UN, 1945). 
The UN Security Council (UNSC), which institutes collective sanctions against deviant states, is 
designed according to the theory of Collective Security
3
. The council is made up of 15 out of the 
192 current member states of the UN and its primary mandate is to “determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Macqueen, 2006:26). 
Moreover, the idea of cooperation, a critical tenant of Collective Security, is a well-established 
feature of the UN. Article 48 of the UN Charter states that: 
 The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance 
of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United 
Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 
 Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly 
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members 
(UN, 1945). 
More importantly, the political infrastructure that governs the UN sanctions regime is built on 
the idea of Collective Security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter, entitled “Action with Respect to 
threats to Peace and Disputes”, authorizes the UN Security Council to define the breaches of 
peace and to define the appropriate responses of the global community, ranging from diplomatic 
pressure, to sanctions, to the use of force (Barkin, 2006:66). Furthermore, Article 41 of the said 
UN Charter enumerates the types of sanctions to be imposed on a state that transgresses 
international law. These include “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of 
                                                          
3
 It should be noted that this is not absolute because there are five permanent seats and 10 non-permanent seats that 
normally rotate amongst states.   
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diplomatic relations” (UN, 1945). By imposing sanctions, the Security Council exercises its 
“extensive normative powers directed at regulating the member states contribution to the 
collective action” (Gazzini, 2005:15).  
The African Union (AU) also subscribes to the idea of Collective Security as evidenced in the 
preamble of the Constitutive Act of the AU which states:  
We as the African heads of states are inspired by the noble ideals which guided the founding 
fathers of our continental organisations and generations of Pan-Africanist in their determination 
to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African 
states (AU, 2002). 
Similarly, the AU has followed in the footsteps of the UN in creating agencies that direct a 
collective response against elements that interrupt peace and security on the African continent. 
Article 5 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides for the creation of the Peace and 
Security Council, composed of 15 of the 52 member states of the African Union (AU, 2002 and 
Kemp, 2010:43). Additionally, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) describes the PSC as a collective and security “early-warning” structure 
that facilitates “timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations” on the continent of 
Africa (Peace and Security Council, 2002).         
The AU sanctions regime is also designed according to the principles of Collective Security. For 
instance, in the event of a coup, the Regional Economic Community (REC), “where the crisis has 
occurred”, is expected to play a proactive role. As mentioned in the Framework for an OAU 
Response to Unconstitutional Changes in Government, the Chairperson of the REC and the 
Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) should “urge for consistency of action at a 
bilateral, inter-state, sub-regional and international level” (OAU, 2000). This implies that the 
Chairman of the REC will notify the PSC about the events of an unconstitutional change that has 
occurred in the region. The PSC will then consider the information before imposing targeted 
sanctions such as travel bans and financial sanctions upon those who instituted the coup 
(Erikson, 2010:37).   
The political institutions that manage serious crises such as wars, genocide and crimes against 
humanity, is rooted in the idea of Collective Security. For example, in an instance where a 
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regime commits crimes against humanity, the PSC abstains from imposing targeted sanctions; 
instead, the PSC employs diplomatic sanctions which suspend the country from the structures of 
the AU. In order to enforce this initiative as a collective venture, the PSC liaises with the REC 
and other actors such as the UN Secretariat and its various branches. After the PSC has adopted 
the sanctions, the AU Commission “would normally send a special envoy to the region” who is 
charged with the responsibility of examining the overall situation in the country of concern and 
“pursue a diplomatic approach and consider what will be done next” (Eriksson, 2010:37). It may 
thus be stated that this theory is relevant for this dissertation in that it will provide insight on how 
the AU collaborates with other actors in implementing its sanctions policies.  
 
1.5 Methodology 
There are two research methods which dominate the study of political studies and social science 
and are quantitative and qualitative in nature. Marvasti (2004:8) explains that a quantitative 
research method “involves the use of methodological techniques that represent empirical 
evidence in numerical categories such as statistics, surveys and experiments”. In the field of 
social sciences, quantitative research methods are in the main, used in the subjects of 
Psychology, Economics, Sociology and Political Science (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:49). This 
study did not employ a qualitative research method due to its time consuming nature and because 
the researcher is required to collaborate with others.    
The qualitative research method differs from the quantitative research method in that it involves 
the “studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials, case studies, interviews, 
artefacts, historical and cultural texts”4. Furthermore, Babbie and Mouton (2001:49) state that the 
emphasis on qualitative research falls on the methods of observation, interviewing and analysis 
of documents gathered from primary and secondary sources such as books, journals, newspaper 
articles and internet sources. As this study is rooted in a qualitative research method, research 
largely involved the use of primary data in the form of speeches and AU documents relating to 
the particular subject. Additionally, the study made use of secondary data consisting of literature 
                                                          
4
Denzin and  Lincoln, 2005. The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research. 
http//www.media.mit.edu/kbrennan/mas790/Denzin  
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gathered from academic journals, books, the internet, newspapers and magazines. Information 
about the OAU was gathered from internet sources, journal articles and the website of the AU.  
 
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into six chapters.   
Chapter one introduces the research topic. This is followed by a background of the study, the 
aims of the study, research questions, theoretical framework and the methodology employed in 
collecting the data. 
Chapter two addresses and defines the concept of sanctions. In addition the various types of 
sanctions employed are investigated, as are the purposes of these sanctions. Lastly, the changing 
nature of sanctions which address the dynamic political changes that occurred after the end of the 
Cold War is examined. 
Chapter three contextualizes and maps out the phenomenon of coups in Africa and also presents 
an outline of the OAU and AU sanctions policies. 
Chapter four discusses the successes of the AU sanction policy in relation to the objectives set 
out in the Communiqué of the ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit of 2009, with special reference 
to Guinea, demonstrating the way in which the AU sanction policy managed to restore its policy 
objectives. 
Chapter five discusses the pitfalls of the AU sanction policy in relation to the policy objectives of 
the Maputo Declaration and the SADC Roadmap.  Special reference is made to Madagascar, 
demonstrating the way in which the AU sanction policy failed in implementing its policy 
directives. 
Chapter six, as the concluding chapter, gives an overview of the key findings made by the study. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualising sanctions  
2. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the conceptual basis for the dissertation. The first section defines the 
concept of sanctions, while the second section presents an outline of the various forms of 
sanctions applied by international, continental and independent states against rogue regimes. The 
third section discusses the purposes of sanctions and the fourth section investigates the evolution 
of sanctions, in order to indicate the dynamic political changes imposed by the end of the Cold 
War on the sanctions environment.    
 
2.1 Defining sanctions  
Farral (2007:7) defines sanctions as “measures which seek to coerce a state into behaving in a 
particular manner”. Geldenhuys (1990:20-21) enriches this definition by stating that sanctions 
refer to unilateral and international punitive measures in “the diplomatic, military and socio-
cultural fields against a state that violates international peace”. Primarily, it is the intention that 
sanctions in international relations are applied to discourage any rogue behaviour that may 
threaten international peace. For example, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
Resolution 1160 on 31 March 1998, imposing an arms embargo on the government of 
Yugoslavia. This arms embargo was intended to end state-perpetrated violence instigated by 
Yugoslav authorities against the state of Kosovo (International Crisis Group, 2000:1). 
Sanctions have been in existence since the days of antiquity. Reference to them date back to the 
classical period of ancient Greece (in 492 BC) “when the Greek city state of Aegina took non-
coercive military action against Athens by seizing an Athenian ship and holding its passengers 
hostage” (Collins, 2009:4). Sanctions were once again used in 432 BC when Athens cut off 
trading ties with the “city state of Megara” following the kidnapping of three Athenian women 
by Megaran bandits (Collins, 2009:4). 
Maritime blockades, which were common in medieval times, were mainly used as an instrument 
of coercing the Italian city states into behaving in a particular manner. For example, in 1270 
Venice imposed commercial blockades against Bologna in order to coerce it into purchasing 
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wheat from Venice rather than from Ravenna, its traditional trading partner. In the 14
th
 century, 
sanctions in the form of trade boycotts were used by an association of trading cities in Northern 
Europe known as the Hanseatic League, against the Russian city-state of Novgorod. Sanctions in 
the Middle Ages were used to disrupt economic exchanges between the “sender governments 
and the targeted state” (Farral, 2007:46).  
In the 18
th
 century, intense conflict situations also incurred sanctions. During the Napoleonic 
Wars, Britain used economic blockades against France to cut off food supplies and to destroy the 
trade network that provided the French soldiers with ammunition. However, Britain’s policy was 
met with limited success as France continued to sustain her military adventures through her 
economy, which supplied soldiers with food and military equipment (Alexander, 2009: 13). 
Sanctions may be imposed either unilaterally or multilaterally. Nyun (2008:455) explains that 
unilateral sanctions are independently imposed by one state against another. One prominent 
example of unilateral sanctions occurred in 2002 when the Australian government imposed 
sanctions in the form of travel restrictions on President Robert Mugabe and the top officials of 
the Zimbabwean government. The sanctions were imposed after the government implemented a 
land seizure policy that saw the forceful removal of white Zimbabwean citizens from their farms, 
which was accomplished by human rights abuses such as assaults and murder
5
. 
Multilateral sanctions on the other hand are those imposed by more than one state against one 
state and usually are applied collectively by regional and international organisations such as the 
UN against a state that threatens regional norms and international practices. Bapat and Morgan 
(2009: 175) argue that most policy makers prefer multilateral sanctions to unilateral sanctions 
because collective sanctions impose greater threats if the targeted state does not comply with 
demands of the international community. It is assumed that threats by many states would place  a 
more persuasive pressure on a rogue state to change its policies An example would be the 
European Union’s (EU’s) imposition, restricting military equipment being supplied to Nigeria 
after the West African state experienced a military coup in 1993 (Kreutz, 2005:32). 
 
                                                          
5
 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs. 2002. Zimbabwe Targeted Sanctions Regime. 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_sanctions/zimbabwe.  
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2.2. Typology of sanctions 
Most analysts and scholars have grouped sanctions into three categories: economic, political and 
smart sanctions. Economic and political sanctions are comprehensive in the sense that they 
sanction the entire population. On the other hand, smart sanctions are narrow because they 
specifically target the political leaders and individuals who support the policies of a rogue state. 
These sanctions are explored in detail, below.  
 
2.2.1 Economic sanctions   
Economic sanctions are used to “describe a sanction regime that seeks to prevent the flow to and 
from a target of all goods, precious commodities and products” (Farral, 2007:107). Thus, 
economic sanctions are very broad as they encompass a wide range of measures that restrict 
economic trade. Multilateral institutions and independent states imposing economic sanctions 
can refuse to sell goods or purchase goods from the targeted state (Deponte and Garfield, 
2000:1). Apart from restricting the import and export of commodities, economic sanctions may 
also suspend financial transactions and freeze national assets held abroad. In practice, 
comprehensive economic sanctions are intended to reduce the target’s income “in order to reduce 
the ability to carry out policies” which are contrary to international norms practices (Farral, 
2007:107). Below are some of the examples of economic sanctions that have been employed 
against rogue states. 
Arms embargo are commonly known as arms sanctions and are defined as a sanctions regime 
that prohibits the sale of weapons to a targeted state (Hafbauer et al., 2007: 139). The UN 
imposes two types of such embargos: voluntary and mandatory. A voluntary arms embargo 
occurs when the UNSC resolution calls on all member states of the UN to stop supplying the 
targeted state and rebel movements with military equipment, arms, ammunition and military 
services. Voluntary sanctions are “symbolic because states are only requested to stop supplying 
weapons to rogue states” (Strandow and Wallensteen, 2007: 1).  
A mandatory arms embargo on the other hand is invoked when the UNSC resolution “decides 
that all member states shall prohibit the sale of military equipment, ammunition and military 
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services” to a targeted state and insurgent groups (Strandow and Wallensteen, 2007: 1). 
Furthermore, mandatory arms sanctions also request member states to implement a general and 
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons (Strandow and Wallensteen, 2007:1). A 
mandatory arms embargo “legally obliges member states” to enforce the terms and conditions of 
this embargo (Strandow and Wallensteen, 2007: 1). This clause is captured in Article 2(5) of 
Chapter 1 of the UN Charter which states that member states are to “refrain from giving 
assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventative or enforcement action” (UN, 
1945:12). The international community closely monitors mandatory arms embargoes. This 
means that the member states of the UN are required to report on the steps they have taken to 
meet the obligations of the mandatory embargo. States that do not comply with these obligations 
are usually penalized (this comes in the form of paying fines) by the global body. In 2003, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1493. In the main, the resolution 
imposed a mandatory arms embargo on the rebel movements, such as the Rally for Congolese 
Democracy (RCG-Goma) and the Mai Mai, operating in the eastern part of the DRC and 
demanded the following:   
That all States and in particular those in the region, including the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, ensure that no direct or indirect assistance, especially military or financial assistance, is 
given to the movements and armed groups present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012:1).  
Continental organisations such as the AU may impose an arms embargo on a targeted regime. 
For example, on 20 February 2005, the AU imposed a mandatory arms embargo on Togo after 
Faure Gnassinbe assumed power through unconstitutional means (Communiqué of Twenty-Fifth 
Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 2005). In effect, this meant that member states had to 
adhere to the policy of not supplying arms to Togo (AU, 2005).      
Mineral sanctions refer to a sanctions regime that forbids the targeted state from exporting the 
minerals that it produces. Furthermore, such sanctions also prohibit the export of the services or 
equipment connected with the extraction of the minerals to the targeted state (Farral, 2007:118). 
Mineral sanctions include the diamond sanctions that are applied against a diamond producing 
state. For example, in 2003 the UNSC passed Resolution 1521, which barred Charles Taylor’s 
regime in Liberia from trading in diamonds. The resolution was passed, as it was believed that 
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Taylor’s government used conflict diamonds to sponsor the RUF (a rebel movement that waged 
a civil war against the government of Sierra Leone) (Renner, 2002:22)
6
. 
Luxury goods sanctions refers to a sanctions regime that seeks to prevent the sale, supply and 
transfer of luxury goods to a targeted state. The UNSC has only applied such sanctions against 
the government of North Korea in 2006
7
. This occurred after North Korea announced its 
intentions to test a nuclear device. However, the UNSC resolution 1718 did not stipulate the 
kinds of luxury goods that were to be prohibited from entering North Korea. Instead, it gave each 
of its member states discretion to choose the kinds of these goods that were to be banned from 
the communist state. For example, the Unites States government imposed the following ban on 
luxury goods to North Korea: cognac, iPods, plasma televisions, Rolex watches, yachts and 
racing cars (Reuters, 19 March 2013).          
 
2.2.2 Political sanctions  
Farral (2007:123) defines political sanctions “as actions that seek to interrupt the target’s 
relations with the “external world in areas apart from basic trade”. In contrast to economic 
sanctions, which are tangible because they disrupt trade, political sanctions are intangible in the 
sense that they are intended to crush the moral psyche of a targeted nation. The types of political 
sanction are examined below.  
Diplomatic sanctions are defined as political actions that seek to disturb the official relations 
between a targeted nation and the external world. Essentially, such sanctions normally come in 
the form of limiting or cancelling high-government visits of the targeted state and expelling 
diplomatic missions from the targeted state. In some cases, these sanctions mainly take the form 
of suspending the rogue regime from the policy structures of international and regional 
organisations (Farral, 2007:123).  For instance,  cases of diplomatic  sanctions were witnessed in 
2011 after the regional bloc of the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) 
suspended Ivory Coast from its policy structures. This came after the incumbent head of state, 
                                                          
6
   Diamond sanctions are applied against states and insurgent movements that trade in diamonds to sponsor violent 
campaigns such as inter or intra-state conflicts.   
7
 UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006). http://www.un.org/documents/sc/rec/2006/cres2006htm  
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Laurent Gbagbo, refused to hand over power to Alassane Ouattara who had won in the national 
elections (BBC News, 8 December 2010). In another example, in 2012, ECOWAS expelled Mali 
from its policy structures after the military seized power from the civilian government 
(Guardian, 11 January 2012).  
Aviation sanctions prohibit flights from entering a targeted state; their purpose being to reduce 
easy access to international contacts for particular actors. The UNSC has experimented with 
aviation sanctions on a number of occasions. For example, in 1962 the UNSC passed Resolution 
1761, which called on all its member states to “refuse lending and passage facilities to aircraft 
belonging to the South African government” (Griffiths, 1989: 250).  
Sporting sanctions prohibit the population of a targeted state from participating in any 
international sporting event. For example, in 1964 the International Olympic Committee banned 
South Africa from participating in the Olympic Games because of the Apartheid laws that were 
enacted by the National Party in 1948 (BBC News, 18 August 1964). Again, in 1977, the 
Commonwealth of Nations adopted the Gleneagles Agreement, which urged its members to 
discourage contact between their sportsmen and sporting organisations, teams or individuals 
from South Africa (ANC, 1977). Subsequently, in 1992 the Union of European Football 
Federation Associations (UEFA) and the International Tennis Federation (ITF) imposed sporting 
sanctions on Yugoslavia after the former Soviet republic persecuted Muslim civilians in the 
former republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The International Tennis Federation banned Yugoslav 
tennis players from participating in the Davies and Federation Cups, while the Union of 
European Football Association (UEFA) banned the Yugoslav national soccer team from 
participating in the 1992 European Championship (Los Angeles Times, 1 June 1992). 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Smart sanctions  
Eriksson (2011:25) defines smart sanctions as collective or unilateral measures that apply 
coercive pressure to targeted individuals and entities while minimizing unintended social and 
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economic consequences for the vulnerable population. Drezner (2003:107) amplifies this when 
he explains that smart sanctions are specifically designed to cause harm to the regime of the 
targeted state, and are not aimed at harming innocent civilians. These sanctions differ from 
economic sanctions and political sanctions in two ways. Firstly, they specifically target and 
penalise the political elite who carry out policies that are contrary to international standards. 
Secondly, smart sanctions try to minimize the cost of human suffering by “exempting specific 
commodities such as food and medical supplies” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 73).  Two examples 
of this type of sanction are identified below. 
Travel sanctions, which are also known as travel bans, refer to measures that seek to prohibit or 
inhibit the “ability of individuals associated with the target of the sanction regime” to travel 
internationally (Farral, 2007: 124). Eriksson (2011: 31) states that targeted sanctions have been 
developed to cause a symbolic sense of isolation from the international process in order to 
“delegitimise the targets’ claims to authority”. In 2009, the AU suspended Madagascar from its 
structures and imposed travel sanctions on the political regime of Andry Rajolina after he ousted 
democratically elected leader Marc Ravalomanana in a military coup. Eventually, AU sanctions 
managed to delegitimise Rajolina’s claim to power as he was not allowed to participate in or 
attend any policy conference which was hosted by the continental body (AU, 2009).      
An asset freeze entails confiscating the private property and international bank accounts of those 
who have been isolated by the international community. These measures are intended to deprive 
particular entities, such as business entities or political actors in a targeted regime, of their assets 
or property. Furthermore, these types of sanctions are “enacted to undermine the activities of the 
target or irritate the target by naming and shaming it in a symbolic” manner (Eriksson, 2011:28).           
 
 
 
2.3 The purposes of sanctions 
Sanctions are utilised by governments, global and regional organisations to achieve 
“international political goals, such as influencing the domestic policies of a targeted state” 
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(McGillivray and Stam, 2004:158). Davis and Engerman (2003:1) contend that sanctions are 
designed to compel a state to conform to international norms and practices. This section 
discusses the specific purposes of sanctions.   
Hafbauer et al (2007:52) identify six purposes of sanctions. Firstly, Western states, especially the 
USA, use sanctions as a tool for changing the regime of the targeted state. During the Cold War, 
most states such as the USA used their regime change efforts as part of their “geopolitical 
battles” which were aimed at gaining spheres of influence. For example, the US and her allies 
imposed a series of sanctions aimed at destabilizing the left-leaning leaders of Cuba and 
Venezuela in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War, Western states have abandoned the strategy of 
imposing sanctions on the basis of a state’s ideological orientation. Currently, the most frequent 
goal of using sanctions is changing the regime of a targeted state to force it to democratise
8
. 
Hafbauer et al (2007:53) point out that democratisation has become a critical goal for the US and 
the European Union (EU). These cases are illustrated by their efforts at using sanctions to 
“broadly improve human rights and forcing autocratic regimes in Haiti, Burma and sub-Saharan 
Africa to hold elections” (Hafbauer et al., 2007:53).   
Secondly, Western states have used sanctions as an instrument to “impair the military potential 
of a targeted state” (Hafbauer et al., 2007:53). The immediate purpose of doing so would be to 
diminish the given state’s potential power. Since the 1960s, the United States and other members 
of the UNSC such as France and Britain have applied sanctions against “states that seek to 
acquire the technology of producing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) such as nuclear and 
biological weapons” (Hafbauer et al., 2007:53). In 1979, the US government imposed economic 
sanctions on North Korea after the government announced its ambitions in developing WMDs. 
In another instance, in 1979, the US Congress imposed an arms embargo on Iran following the 
Islamic revolution. Amuzegar (1997:1) points out that the intention behind the embargo against 
the Islamic state of Iran was intended to curtail Iran’s ability to acquire sophisticated technology 
that would allow it to produce WMDs.  
                                                          
8
  Oechslin. 2010. Targeting Autocrats: Economic Sanctions and Regime Change. 
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/neudc/papers/paper_69.pdf   
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Thirdly, Western states have used sanctions to disrupt the military ambitions of a targeted state. 
Usually, the classic rationale offered for using sanctions in this instance was to preserve 
international peace by forcing an aggressive state to abandon its military ventures (Hafbauer et 
al., 2007:69). This occurred in 1998 when the US imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan after 
the two states tested nuclear devices; the reason given being that sanctions against India and 
Pakistan were intended to halt their military ventures by stopping the sale of military equipment 
military services and technology
9
.  
Fourthly, Western governments have used sanctions as a form of coercive diplomacy. According 
to Kegley and Wittkopf (1999: 563) coercive diplomacy refers to “threats or the actual use of 
force” to persuade an international actor to desist from undertaking any action which may 
threaten global security.   Alterman (2003:277) adds to this definition by revealing another goal 
of coercive diplomacy. According to him, coercive diplomacy also seeks to persuade an 
opponent to undo an action already carried out.  For example, in 1990, the United States used 
coercive diplomacy for the purposes of forcing Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait 
(Alterman, 2003:277).    
Fifthly, international organisations such as the UN have used sanctions for the purposes of 
discouraging states from sponsoring terrorist organisations. In this regard, sanctions are intended 
to isolate nations that harbour and sponsor terrorist groups. In 1992, the UNSC imposed an arms 
embargo on Libya after the North African state supplied the hijackers of Pan Am Flight 103 with 
military equipment (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013:1). North Korea is 
another state believed to have supported international terrorism. It is alleged that the communist 
state provided a safe haven for the Japanese Communist League-Red Army faction members 
who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese flight en route to North Korea in 1970. North 
Korea was implicated in another terror scandal involving the selling of weapons to a Philippine 
militant Islamic group called the Maro Islamic Liberation Front
10
.  
                                                          
9
   Report for Congress. 2003. North Korea: Economic Sanctions. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31696.pdf  
 http://www.fcp.state.gov/documents/organisations/6202.pdf 
10
  US Department of State. 2001.Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism. 
http://www.state.gov/.2441.htm 
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However, the United States (US) reacted aggressively towards these kinds of acts. In 1979, the 
US imposed trade sanctions which saw North Korea forfeit most of its trade and foreign aid. The 
US government also barred the sale of ammunition and military equipment to the communist 
government of North Korea
11
.  
Finally, sanctions may be imposed for the purposes of containing intra or inter-state conflict. 
Chesterman and Pouligny (2002:1) contend that arms sanctions-embargoes that prohibit the 
transfer of arms to a targeted state remain the most frequently imposed form of sanctions to 
contain violent conflicts. The overriding intention of an arms embargo, passed by the UNSC 
under Resolution 733 in 1992, was aimed at containing the escalation of violence in Somalia 
after the country was plunged into a violent civil war involving rival clans from the North and 
the South (United Nations Sanctions Secretariat, 1999:11).  Efforts at putting an end to the 
conflict were clearly expressed in paragraph five of the resolution, which urged that:  
All states for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement 
a general and complete embargo on all deliveries, weapons and military equipment to Somalia 
(UN, 1992).  
 
2.4 The evolution of sanctions in the post-Cold War era  
Hafbauer et al (2007:69) identify the elements that changed the international sanctions regime: 
the end of the Cold War, impact of globalisation on the tools of economic sanctions, the 
emergence of new security threats such as ethnic conflicts in Africa and terrorist attacks, the rise 
of new targets, the emergence of NGOs that monitor the impact of sanctions on targeted states 
and NGOs that call on the international community to sanction states that violate internal norms.   
During the Cold War, the United Nations’ role in defending international norms was constrained 
by US-Soviet rivalry. This rivalry was underlined by the fact that the two superpowers at that 
time, the USA, a capitalist state and the USSR, a communist state, held competing ideologies. 
This limited the prospects of UNSC members being able to agree to act collectively to resolve 
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  Lee and Choi. 2007. North Korea: Economic Sanctions and US Department of Treasury Actions 1955-September 
2007. http://www.nck.org/resources/NCK_Economic_Sanctions_Current 
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issues relating to global peace.  However, this changed when the Cold War ended in 1990. That 
is, the end of the Cold War freed the UN from the ideological tensions that had existed between 
Communism and Capitalism, thereby allowing multilateral institutions to intervene more 
aggressively in international affairs (Hafbauer, et al., 2007:69).  
In the past two decades, the UN has conducted a much higher level of sanctions activity. It has 
imposed sanctions against Iraq (1990), Yugoslavia (1991, 1992 and 1993), Libya (1992), 
Somalia (1992), Liberia (1992, 2011), Nigeria (1994), Cambodia (1992), Haiti (1993), UNITA 
(Uniao Nacional para Independencia Totla de Angola  in 1993, 1997 and 1998), Rwanda (1994), 
Sudan (1996), Sierra Leone (1997 and 2000), Afghanistan (1999), Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000) 
(Cortright and Lopez, 2000:1).  
Globalisation, which led to the “growing integration of economies and societies around the 
world”, dramatically, altered the international sanctions regime (Goyal, 2006:1). In some 
instances, globalisation replaced old players, i.e. the UN, with new actors. Increasingly, regional 
organisations such as the AU and the European Union (EU) began imposing sanctions against 
regimes that violated international norms and practices.  
More importantly, these regional bodies called for the diplomatic isolation of leaders who failed 
to relinquish power after losing an election. For instance, in 2010 the EU imposed financial 
sanctions, in the form of freezing of foreign assets and bank accounts, against the former Ivorian 
President Lauren Gbagbo, his key family members and three of his top aides after he refused to 
relinquish power following his defeat in the country’s national general elections.12 
In Africa, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as SADC and ECOWAS have become 
active players that shape the AU’s sanction regime. These two RECs have the authority to 
terminate the membership of governments that obtain power through coups. The ECOWAS 
Protocol relating to Democracy and Good Governance is one of many statutes that allow states in 
West Africa to sanction unconstitutional regimes. The Protocol subscribes to the notion of “zero 
tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means” (ECOWAS, 2001).  
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 VOA News. 2010. EU Imposes Sanctions on Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo. http://www.voanews.com/..../eu..sanctions-
on-ivorycoast.   
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There is consensus that globalisation has contributed towards making economic sanctions a less 
popular tool for coercing deviant states. Thakur (2000:2) points out the impact of globalisation 
by stating that economic sanctions have become less popular because of the humanitarian crisis 
they created in Iraq and Haiti. According to Thakur (2002:2) the most popular current tool for 
coercing deviant states consists of smart sanctions, which put direct pressure on the political elite 
that govern the targeted state. Smart sanctions normally involve actions such as “the freezing of 
foreign assets belonging” to the leadership collective of the targeted regime, “withholding the 
credits and loans, prohibiting investments” and restricting the travel of the targeted leaders by 
denying them visas (Weiss, 1999:503).  
Another reason that might explain the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the Cold War 
was the rise of new security threats. Weiss (1999:499) points out that these included socio-
political threats such as the abuse of human rights, genocide and internal conflicts. Subsequently, 
the international community has applied sanctions against states and parties that commit these 
acts. In 1998, the UNSC passed Resolution 1173, which applied targeted sanctions (affecting 
arms, and other related materials such as petroleum and diamonds) against UNITA after it failed 
to abandon the armed struggle
13
. 
In addition, the UN also acted decisively against states that perpetuated mass killings. In the case 
of Rwanda, where radical Hutus killed close to one million Tutsis in 1994, the UN condemned 
the mass killings and applied an arms embargo against the Hutu-led government and the 
neighbouring states that may have supplied the Rwandan authorities with weapons
14
. 
Hafbauer et al (2007:131) note that the emergence of new security threats has led independent 
states and international organisations to sanction new targets. Before the Cold War ended, the 
Soviet Union and her allies were targets of Western sanctions. In the 1970s and 1980s, there 
were at least nine cases of Western sanctions against states in Eastern Europe. However, this 
number has diminished since the end of the Cold War. The old Soviet states were only subject to 
“six sanction initiatives” (Hafbauer et al., 2007:131). Russia, a former Soviet state, was the main 
state that spearheaded some of these sanctions initiatives. The former superpower imposed 
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sanctions against its former allies; this after the media exposed the abuse of Russian minorities in 
Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia (Hafbauer et al., 2007:131).  
The bombing of the US embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Centre in New York on the 11 September 2001 proved that non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups and insurgent movements are able to violate international norms and practices. 
Hence on the 28
th
 of September 2001, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1373, which urged all states 
to “prevent and suppress the financing of all terrorist acts”15.  Under this resolution, member 
states of the UN were obliged to impose smart sanctions, in the form of freezing the financial 
assets of any group that sought to disrupt international peace by threatening to use violence 
against a nation state. 
The other notable change is the geographic shift in the sanctions episodes, especially the rise of 
new sanctions targeting African states. Hafbauer et al (2007:11) observe that “the geographical 
shift of the international sanction regime reflects greater willingness” by the international 
community to act against elements of bad governance and human rights abuses in the continent. 
Since the 1990s, the UN has applied sanctions against seven African governments accused of 
bad governance and human rights abuses: Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, 
Angola and Rwanda. The post-Cold War sanctions regime has also seen the international 
community react aggressively against regimes that continued to support a state or actors who 
were sanctioned by the UN. Liberia’s role as the primary supply base for the RUF rebels, who 
were sanctioned by the UN, in Sierra Leone prompted the UNSC to impose a diamond embargo, 
travel sanctions and an arms embargo against the administration of Charles Taylor (Cortright and 
Lopes 2002:1).          
Some independent research units such as the Peterson Institute of International Economics have 
become critical players that shape the policy of international sanctions. Cortright and Lopez 
(2002:16) observe that these independent research units play a critical role in assessing the 
progress made by UN sanctions against targeted states. In addition, the two authors insist that 
issue based organisations and “operational NGOs pre-assess the conditions in sanctioned 
environments and engage in the monitoring and verification of humanitarian, economic and 
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political conditions on the ground during the sanctions episodes” (Cortright and Lopez, 2002:16). 
Furthermore, these organisations also monitor the success and failures of international sanctions 
applied against deviant states. For example, organisations such as the Washington-based 
International Institute of Economics (IIE) and the International Peace Academy have conducted 
their own independent research on the achievements of both multilateral and unilateral sanctions  
Their findings insist that only 5% of the international sanctions imposed on targeted states were 
successful. According to the IEE report, sanctions fail because “it is difficult to secure universal 
participation in embargoes”. Furthermore, it is also difficult to monitor the compliance of states 
that have agreed to participate (Cortright and Lopez 2002:16). The post-Cold War sanctions 
regime has also seen the rise of global NGO’s who lobby the international community to 
sanction states that disregard international norms and practices. The Palestinian Filmmakers 
Association is one of the many examples of an international NGO that has mobilized the 
international community to impose cultural sanctions, in the form of measures aimed at 
prohibiting cultural relations between the target and the external world. In 2006, the association 
signed an open letter calling on the United Nations to boycott “cultural and artistic institutions” 
in Israel who refused to take a stand against the Israeli occupation in Gaza
16
.      
 
2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter set out the conceptual framework of this dissertation by defining sanctions and 
discussing their various manifestations and applications. Furthermore, this chapter also addressed 
the purposes of the sanctions and it was found that Western governments use sanctions as an 
instrument to deter the military ambitions of a targeted state. In other instances, Western states 
are seen to use sanctions as an instrument to stop targeted governments from acquiring the 
technology required to produce WMDs such as biological weapons and nuclear weapons. This 
chapter also presented a discussion of the evolution of sanctions after the Cold War Era. In this, 
it was found that the end of the ideological rivalry between the East and the West allowed the 
international community to play a proactive role in international affairs. This led to an increase in 
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the number of states which were sanctioned by the UN. Globalisation facilitated the rise of new 
actors that include continental bodies such as the EU and the AU.  
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Chapter 3: An outline: coups in Africa and the sanctions policies of the OAU 
and AU  
 
3. Introduction 
For the past five decades, many civilian governments in Africa have been victims of coups 
d’états. Most of these coups have been carried out by a wide variety of actors.  Some of them 
were instigated by rebel movements who were discontented with the way in which the incumbent 
regime was governing society. For example, on 26 January 1986, the rebel movement known as 
the National Resistance Army (NRA) overthrew the regime of Tiko Okele in Uganda after it 
accused government of violating human rights (Fouché, 2003:74). 
In some instances, mercenaries employed by foreign governments to overthrow a legitimate 
regime may have carried out theses coups. For instance, on 3 August 1975 the French 
government supported mercenaries Bob Deanard and Jacques Fouccart to overthrow President 
Ahmed Abdalla of the Comoros and replace him with Said Mohamed Jaffar (Anyangwe, 
2010:69). It is often the case that coups have been spearheaded by the military who seek to 
remove an unfavourable leader
17
. Perpetrators who carry out coups have one thing in common: 
they seek to transform the political system by deposing old forms of authority and replacing 
them with new methods of governing society.  
This chapter attempts to present an outline of coups in Africa and discuss the policies of the 
OAU and AU sanction regime. The first part of this chapter defines the concept of coups, while 
the second part examines the theories that explain the occurrence of coups.  The third section 
presents a record of coups in Africa.  The fourth part introduces the OAU and AU sanction 
policies, while section five discusses the sanction policies of the OAU in detail. The final section 
discusses the sanction policies of the AU in detail.    
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 The reasons for instituting coups vary and others may not be genuine. Also, coups may also be caused by the 
personal ambition of army generals, tribalism and regionalism.   
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3.1 Defining coups  
The term coup was borrowed from the French language in the 17
th
 century and literally means a 
“stroke of state or a sudden change at the summit of a state” (Souare 2009:2). The notion of 
coups has been widely associated with the illegal overthrow of government or seizure of state 
power, “through actual threatened or actual use of violence by individuals of the respective 
government” (Miller and King, 2005:28). Some of the most prominent techniques used by 
belligerents to carry out coups include the capturing of key political institutions such as the 
police headquarters, military offices, presidential palace, television and radio stations (O’Kane, 
1987:22).  
Coups differ from other forms of political violence such as revolutions. Whereas revolutions are 
mass-based and take a long time to depose the incumbent government, coups are typically 
executed within a matter of hours and should not take more than a few days. Violence or the 
threat of violence must be present in the acts of those wanting to overthrow a legitimate 
government. For a coup to be successful the incumbent regime must be deposed and be replaced 
by the leaders of the coup or by the individuals they designate (David, 1987:8).   
Coups are classed in five categories: a veto coup; a reform coup; a guardian coup; a palace coup 
and a putsch (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011:97: Basong, 2005:7). Veto coups occur when members of 
the military stage a coup to limit public participation in politics with the aim of removing elected 
governments. In these instances, the military suppresses large-scale opposition and popular 
movements. Therefore, such coups aim at suppressing the popular will of the people. Huntington 
(quoted in Ezrow and Frantz, 2011:97) writes that Veto coups have a tendency of producing 
totalitarian regimes characterised by high levels of repression. Two examples of Veto coups 
follow: the first one took place in Chile in 1974 when the army, led by General Augusto Pinochet 
overthrew the socialist regime of President Salvador Allende. Immediately after seizing power 
from the civilian government, the military engaged in acts of repression characterised by murder 
and torture and an estimated 2000 people died; most of them working class people who were 
active in politics during Allende’s reign (Steenland, 2006:15). The second example, in Africa of, 
a Veto Coup occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1965 after the army 
General, Mobutu Sese Seko, overthrew the democratically elected government of Moise 
Tshombe. After instituting the coup, Mobuto created a one party state that engaged in acts of 
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repression. These were characterised by a culture of human rights abuses that included torture 
and murder (Kabemba, 2011:88).  
Reform coups, also known as breakthrough coups, occur in cases where the members of the 
army overthrow an oligarchy, a power structure where political power is in the hands of a small 
wealthy elite. The wealthy elite are mainly landlords, the upper clergy, military officers and the 
ruling class. Huntington (quoted in Dominguez, 2001:221) explains that in a breakthrough coup, 
the middle class forms a coalition with the younger army officers to depose the oligarchy and 
extend political participation. Essentially, this coalition aims to implement social and economic 
reform. For example, the 1952 Reform coup that occurred in Egypt was instituted for the 
purposes of replacing private sector-led growth with state-led growth or industrialisation. These 
changes were witnessed after the coup leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, came to power. Under 
Nasser’s rule, the “public sector was developed to be the main engine of growth and was 
responsible for attracting investment and creating employment” (Allisa, 2007:2). Furthermore, 
the regime of Abdul Nasser went on to channel money into infrastructure development, social 
services and land reform. 
Another reform coup occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, during 1984 in Burkina Faso when army 
Captain Blaise Compaoré overthrew President Dr Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo and replaced him 
with Thomas Sankara. Immediately after assuming power, Sankara implemented social and 
economic reforms that focused on preventing famine through land reform, prioritized education 
with a nation-wide literacy campaign and promoting public health vaccinating 2.5 million infants 
against yellow fever and measles. Sankara also changed the name of his state from Upper Volta 
to Burkina Faso (Anyangwe, 2010:66).   
Guardian coups, often described by political commentators as “musical chairs”, are characterised 
by the intervention of the military in politics to preserve the status quo. Guardian coups are 
brought about by the failure of the incumbent regime to govern effectively. The toleration of 
large scale corruption by the civilian government also prompts the occurrence of guardian coups 
(David, 1987:14). According to Ezrow and Frantz (2011:98), “coup stagers” are usually older 
army officers who want to purify the existing order. An example of such a coup in Africa 
occurred in Benin in 1963 when the regime of President Hubert Maga was deposed by a group 
of army officers led by Colonel Christophe Soglo (Ayangwe, 2010:65).  The military justified 
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the coup on the basis that the regime of President Maga had failed to govern effectively, citing 
the following reasons:  
The luxurious lifestyles of the rulers, abusive increase in the number of ministerial posts, 
unsatisfied social demands, failure of the government to deliver on their promises, the rise of the 
cost of living and the antidemocratic measures that dehumanized the citizens of Benin (Ayangwe, 
2010:65). 
The 1999 coup in Pakistan is another example of a guardian coup. The military, under the 
leadership of Army General Pervez Musharraf, seized control of the government of Nawiz Sharif 
after Sharif was accused of corruption and incompetence (Aziz quoted in Ibrahim, 2009:6). Upon 
assuming power, Musharraf created a socio-economic programme which was aimed at rooting 
out incompetency and corruption through privatizing state assets, forcing his government to 
adhere to the principles of good governance. While this had a positive effect on the economy of 
Pakistan with the economy growing by 7% per annum and the service sector growing by 11% 
per annum, politically, however, Musharraf hindered democratic developments and created a 
political system that interfered with the independence of the organs of the state. For instance, in 
January 2000, the military regime issued an Oath of Office Order to all the judges of Pakistan. 
The oath required the sitting judges of Pakistan to pledge loyalty to the regime (Mishra, 2012:4).  
Palace coups occur within the existing structure of the political regime and are carried out by the 
political rivals of the President within the existing regime. A discontented group of army 
generals who are not satisfied by the manner in which the President governs a state may also 
execute a Palace coup. Basong (2005:8) explains that such coups are “characterised by deep 
secrecy and conspiracy”. They are normally accomplished through the assassination of the head 
of state.  An example of a Palace coup occurred in Nigeria in 1975 when a group of army 
officers executed Ramat Mohammed.   
Basong (2005:9) defines a putsch as “a violent military uprising by a group within the military, 
but not within the ruling group” and normally involves “a conspiracy for the seizure of key 
military targets and the subsequent seizure of state power”. In 1999, Ivory Coast experienced a 
Putsch when a group of disgruntled army officers deposed Konan Bedie and replaced him with 
General Robert Guei (Anyangwe, 2010:71).      
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3.2 Theories that explain the occurrence of coups in Africa   
There are many factors that might help to explain the occurrence of coups in Africa. The 
scholarly material is extensive and varied. Some African scholars have emphasised the transfer 
of arms as a major factor that causes coups, while others study the social tensions existing 
amongst different ethnic groups. Even though the literature is vast, this study will focus on four 
schools of thought that may help to explain the occurrence of coups in Africa: the democratic 
governance-stability theory, the ethnic dominance theory, the economic dependency theory and 
the military centrality theory. The democratic governance-stability theory is useful in helping to 
concretise the dynamics that motivated the military to institute the coups d’état in Guinea and 
Madagascar. This theory is by far the most prominent one used by political scientists to explain 
the occurrence of military coups on the continent. Its focus is that coups are likely to occur in a 
political environment characterised by a weak civil society and a corrupt political system 
(Ngoma, 2004:89). Additionally, democratic governance-stability theory goes on to assert that 
coups are fuelled by fierce internal rivalries that take place amongst members of the governing 
party and weak administrative structures that dispense patronage to loyal constituencies (Jenkins 
and Kposowa, 1992:273). Campbell (2006:1) describes the nature of these coups as follows: 
Coups appear to be once again an option when democracy seems to be failing, political gridlock 
has taken hold, or impoverished populations are alienated from constitutional authority. 
Successful coups legitimated by popular support (or at least acquiescence) and oiled with 
promises to restore democracy may become infectious, encouraging copycats in neighbouring 
states where governments are also weak or failing.  
The theory of ethnic antagonisms is the second theory that has helped political commentators to 
explain the occurrences of coups in Africa. It mainly argues that ethnic antagonisms create 
political tensions and result in military coups (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990:86). Jenkins and 
Kposowa use the idea of ethnic dominance to explain how social tensions, emanating from 
ethnic antagonisms, cause coups. Basically, ethnic dominance refers to the political and 
economic dominance of a single group that causes instability (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992: 275). 
It contends that if powerful ethnic groups monopolise top jobs such as ministerial positions, 
government posts, top military positions or ownership of major businesses, this dominance will 
rally the minority ethnic groups to contest the dominant ethnic group that has monopolised 
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privilege (Brass quoted in Jenkins and Kposowa 1992: 275). Post-colonial Africa has been 
plagued by military coups which were instigated by the concept of ethnic dominance.  
An example of this would be that of Nigeria. After gaining independence from Britain in 1960, 
Nigeria degenerated into a weak state characterised by social tensions between ethnic groups 
from the north and the east. In the early years of independence, there were growing concerns 
regarding economic control of the north, dominated by the Hausa ethnic group, by the east, 
dominated by the Ibo ethnic group. Salawu and Hassan (2011: 29) outline the foundations of 
these concerns, pointing out that these emanated from the fear that well-educated ethnic groups 
from the east could use their advantaged position to marginalise the ethnic groups in the north. 
This fear prompted politicians in the north to adopt a “northernilisation” policy which declared 
that jobs in the public sector of the northern region would be given to northerners. However, 
such policies impacted negatively on Nigeria’s development, leading to a coup in 1966 led by 
Major Chukwuma Kaduna. Notably, those who carried out the coup unleashed their ethnic 
frustrations on key political figures of the North, killing the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Alhaji 
Tafawa Balewa, who came from the north and the Premier of the north, Alhaji Ahmadu
18
. 
The third theory investigated is the economic dependency theory that has helped policy makers 
explain the occurrence of a coup. The basic assumption of this model is that unfair trade between 
Africa and the West has stunted economic development. In the main, the theory focuses on 
exploitation of African states by their former colonial masters. It states that “the persistence of 
colonial trading patterns, especially strong ties to the former colonial power and reliance on the 
export of a limited number” of primary goods and agricultural products has been seen as 
intensifying inequality in post-colonial Africa (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992: 275). The ex-
colonial states usually benefit from this exploitative relationship. As Renou (2002:8) notes:  
The independence of Francophone African countries did not really change the rules. A significant 
share of their trade, marketing and shipping activities remained entirely controlled by the old 
colonial companies. Former French African colonies remain restricted to the supplying of raw 
materials (65 per cent of the French imports from the Franc Zone in 1991 were agricultural and 
food products, or energy and fuel products) and purchasing of French manufactured goods.  
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  Isumonah. 2001. The Fear of Ethnic Domination and Electoral Democracy in Nigeria. 
www.apsanet.org/.../Victor%20Adefemi%20IsumonahWorking%20P... 
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As a result, the former French colonies in Africa never obtained a fair share. The surplus 
generated from the African markets was used to develop foreign industries, thus weakening 
domestic industries. Furthermore, transitional co-operation with foreign firms, which are based 
in the former colonial states, has also exacerbated the African situation. These foreign companies 
have imported advanced technologies that led to “over urbanisation, tertiarisation of the labour 
force and growing inequality” (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992:275). 
It was against this background that Ghana, a former colony of Britain that gained independence 
in 1957, experienced a series of military coups. The country was plunged into an economic crisis 
which was largely caused by unfair trade. Uche (1994:47) contends that the West was to be 
blamed for the situation. He goes on to explain that immediately after the industrialised West 
lowered prices, thus discouraging the growing, of those basic commodities, especially gold and 
cocoa, that sustained Ghana’s economic growth, this West African nation experienced blocked 
development, which in turn caused a drastic decline in the earnings of civil servants and 
increased corruption and nepotism. This led the military to overthrow the government of Dr. 
Busia in 1972. The military justified the coup on the following grounds: that Dr. Busia was 
unable to protect Ghana from the adverse effects of unfair trade, that his administration was 
corrupt and that he had mismanaged the economy (Wiking, 1983:87). 
The military centrality theory is the fourth theory that may help to explain the prevalence of 
coups in Africa. This theory focuses on the “corporate interests of the military” (Jenkins and 
Kposowa 1992: 862).  The military centrality theory is based on the premise that national armies 
normally institute military coups when the government meddles with the daily affairs of the 
military. According to Onwudiwe (2004:21) this meddling occurs when the government decides 
to cut down on the budget of the military and intervenes in the recruitment processes of the 
national army. Moreover, the military may institute a coup if it is not provided with the necessary 
logistics to carry out a particular task and if the regime reduces the privilege of the military. The 
military coup that took place in the CAR in 1966 occurred against the backdrop of the army 
trying to protect its corporate interests.  Decalo (1990:9) contends that the military was provoked 
to institute a military coup when the incumbent president, David Dacko, “attempted to balance 
the army against the police in a juggling of corporate interests and the personal ambitions of the 
army General Colonel Bokasa and Chief of Police Pierre Izamo”. 
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3.3 The record of coups in Africa 
Africa is the second largest continent in the world. The continent consists of 54 states, some of 
which gained independence, with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia, from the colonial 
empires of Belgium, Britain, France, Portugal and Spain in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and the 
1980s. Zounmenou’s (2009a) study entitled Coups d’état in Africa between 1958 and 2008, 
sheds light on the number of coups that have taken place in Africa during the period 1958-2008. 
In this study, Zounmenou shows that the continent experienced 77 coups from 1958-2008 
(Zounmenou, 2009a:73). These are discussed in detail below. 
 
3.3.1 West Africa  
West Africa is known as the most populous African region and is located in the South of the 
Sahara Desert. The region consists of fifteen states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria, Liberia, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, 
Togo, and Senegal. McGowan (2006:238) has dubbed West Africa as the most “coup prone 
region in the world” and his conclusion is supported by the data in Table 1. 
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3.3.3.1 Table 1: Coups in West Africa from 1963-2012 
Country  Year  Total 
Benin  1963, 1965 (2) 
1967, 1969, 
1972 
6 
Burkina Faso 1980, 1982, 
1983, 1987 
4 
Côte d'Ivoire 1999, 2010  2 
Gambia 1994 1 
Ghana 1966, 1972, 
1978, 1979, 
1981 
5 
Guinea 1984, 2008 2 
Guinea-
Bissau 
1980, 2003, 
2012 
3 
Liberia 1980 1 
Mali 1968, 1991, 
2012 
3 
Niger 1974, 1996, 
2010 
3 
Nigeria 1966 (2), 1975, 
1983, 1985, 
1993 
6 
Sierra Leone 1967, 1968, 
1992, 1997 
4 
Togo 1963, 1967, 
2005 
3 
Total   43 
    Sources: Zounmenou (2009a:72); BBC News (2010); The Guardian (2012); Vines (2013:92) 
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Table 1 points out that West Africa has experienced 43 coups from 1963 to 2012 with Benin and 
Nigeria leading, each country having respectively experienced six coups. They are followed by 
Ghana, which has experienced five coups. At the bottom of the list are Liberia and Gambia, with 
each of these states having only experienced one coup. A closer look at Table 1 also reveals that 
the frequency of coups in West Africa was high in the 1960s, up until the end of the 1980s. 
During these years, the region experienced 29 coups. However, there was a steady decline of 
military coups in the 1990s. From 1990 up until the year 2010, the region only experienced ten 
coups (Zounmenou, 2009a:73).  
This steady decline of coups in West Africa may have been made possible by what Huntington 
(1991:3) calls the Third Wave of Democratisation
19
. The advent of the Third Wave of 
Democratisation led to profound policy changes in some newly democratised states. Military 
dictatorships and undemocratic regimes had to be replaced by civilian rule; political power had 
to be contested through free, regular and fair elections and states had to embrace a culture 
founded on the values of the rule of law and respect for human rights. As the third democratic 
wave swept across the world, West Africa was also transforming her political landscape. The 
brutal assaults of military rule were becoming out-dated and the international community was 
condemning unconstitutional methods used to bring leaders into power. Increasingly, West 
African states implemented constitutional reforms that allowed for greater political participation 
through multi-party elections (Kacowicz, 1997:375).   
At the end of 1989, two of the states that had been prone to military coups, Benin and Ghana, 
earned themselves the status of consolidated democracies (Siegle, 2007:3). This was made 
possible by the adoption of democratic constitutions, which “granted political actors permission 
to create their own respective political parties” (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004:8). In 
addition, these new constitutions also guaranteed basic freedoms, civil rights and provided for 
the protection of human and property rights (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004:8).    
More importantly, many states in West Africa also adopted constitutions that limited the 
presidential term to a maximum of two terms. This was done to rid their respective countries of 
                                                          
19
 The third wave of democratisation refers to a period of democratic upsurge that started in the 1974 up until 1990 
(Huntington, 1991:4).  
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life time presidents or of those leaders who spent the rest of their lives as heads of state, as well 
as to block off the personality rules that had plagued the region since the beginning of 
independence (Edi, 2006:12). Lastly, presidential term limits were introduced for the purposes of 
facilitating a culture of political competition, which in turn enhances the prospects of political 
development and the consolidation of democracy.  
The states that tended to experience coups in the 1990s had been ruled by autocratic regimes that 
did little to implement the democratic reforms mentioned above. For instance, President Moussa 
Traore, who had ruled Mali for 23 years (1968-1991), was ousted in a military coup led by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani, in 1991, after he refused to accept the demands of 
democratic reform (New York Times, 12 September 1991). Niger, on the other hand, experienced 
a coup in 2010 when President Mamadou Tanja was deposed by the military after he amended 
the constitution for the purposes of extending his term in office
20
. In Togo, the coup that 
occurred in 2005 unfolded against the backdrop of a single party system which was strongly 
influenced by the military, this despite having had a multiparty system for more than a decade 
(The Forum of Political Parties, the Media and Civil Society in West Africa, 2005:29). 
Following the death of the veteran leader Gnassibe Eyadema in 2005, Togo experienced a coup. 
The Togolese army overrode the stipulations of the constitution, which stated that the speaker of 
the parliament was to take over once the president died, and installed the son of the late President 
Faure Gnassigbe as the head of state instead (Handy, 2005: 2). 
 
3.3.2 Central Africa 
Central Africa comprises nine states, most of which were colonised by France and Belgium. The 
states that make up the region are Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), 
Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
and Rwanda. Table 2 shows the frequency of coups in Central Africa
21
. 
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 Zounmenou, D. 2010. Is Niger’s Military Coup Merely Countering a Constitutional One? 
http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php 
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 UN. 2009. Classification of Countries by Major Area and Region.  
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050/pdf/96annexii.pdf 
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3.3.3.1 Table 2: Coups in Central Africa from 1965-2013 
Country  Year  Total  
Burundi 1966(2),1976, 
1987, 1996 
5 
Central 
African 
Republic 
1966,1979,1981, 
2003, 2013 
5 
Chad 1975,1979, 1990 3 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
1968,1999 2 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
1965, 1997 2 
 Equatorial 
Guinea 
1979 1 
Rwanda  1973 1 
Total   19 
Source:  Zounmenou, (2009a:72) BBC News (2013)
22
 
During the period extending from 1965 to 2013, Central Africa has experienced 19 coups. The 
first one occurred in 1965 in the DRC while the last occurred in the CAR in 2013. Table 2 also 
indicates that the CAR and Burundi lead the pack, each country having experienced five coups 
respectively. They are followed by Chad with three coups. Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC have 
each experienced two coups, while Equatorial Guinea and Rwanda have each experienced one 
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 Source adapted from Zounmenou (2009:72) and BBC News (2013). 
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coup. Coup behaviour in the region of Central Africa has largely been influenced by the military 
centrality theory. The implication of this is that the military in a number of states in the region of 
Central Africa instituted military coups to protect their corporate interests. The 1987 coup that 
installed Major Pierre Buyaya as the President of Burundi, came after the incumbent President, 
Jean Baptiste Bagaza, announced his plan to economise by forcing early retirements in the army 
(Bentley and Southall, 2005:44). 
Non-state actors, especially mercenaries, have also been responsible for overthrowing 
governments in Central Africa. Addo (2004:3) argues that most of these belligerents are recruited 
locally or from outside the country. A president who is known to have used mercenaries is 
François Bozize. Bozize came to power in 2003, backed by Chadian mercenaries, and in this 
manner deposed the regime of Ange-Felix Patasse in the Central African Republic
23
. In 2004, the 
Zimbabwean police impounded an airplane headed for Equatorial Guinea. The plane was 
carrying 64 mercenaries who were plotting to overthrow President Teodoro Nguema of the oil 
rich state of Equatorial Guinea (Addo, 2004:3).     
Rebel movements have also been central to coups in the region of Central Africa. The coup that 
deposed President Habre of Chad in 1990, was spearheaded by the former military advisor, Idris 
Derby, and his rebel movement called Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) (Berg, 2008:13). 
Similarly, Laurent Kabila and his rebel movement, called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFLCZ), ousted the veteran leader Mobutu Sese Seko in a 
military coup in 1997
24
. In 2013, the Seleka rebels deposed the regime of President François 
Bozize in the Central African Republic (All Africa, 27 June 2013)
25
.   
3.3.3 East Africa 
East Africa is made up of the following states that form part of the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD)
26
: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda
27
. 
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  The Economist. 2008. Will Foreign Interests Help Rescue a Rotting Country at the Heart of  
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 The Seleka rebels  are an alliance of various insurgent groups that include the Democratic Front of the Central 
African People (FDPC), Convention of Patriots and Peace (CPJP), Union of Democratic Forces (UFDR), Alliance 
for Revival and Building (A2R) and the Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK) 
26
 IGAD is a regional organisation in East Africa that is focused on issues of regional security in East Africa   
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Political instability has been a defining feature of this region, exacerbated by the border war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, anarchy in Somalia and the conflict between government forces as 
well as Joseph Koni’s rebel movement, known as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), in 
Uganda. As with West and Central Africa, coups have been a source of instability in the East 
Africa region.  Table 3 shows the number of coups the region has experienced. 
3.3.3.3 Table 3: Coups in East Africa from 1958-1989 
Country  Year  Total  
 Somalia 1969 1 
 Sudan  1958,1969, 
1985,1989 
4 
 Uganda  1966,1971, 
1979,1980 
1985,1986 
6 
Total   11  
 Source:  Zounmenou, (2009a:73) 
Table 3 also reveals that the region of East Africa has experienced 11 coups from 1958-1989, 
with Uganda experiencing the highest number, followed by the state of Sudan with four while 
Somalia has experienced one.  
The primary reason for the coups in East Africa appears to have been corruption. In this regard, 
Somalia is often used as a source of reference to show how corruption causes coups. Le Sage 
(2005:19) observes that the end of colonial rule created an independent Somali state, “but it also 
left behind a number of destabilizing political legacies”. Part of these legacies was the 
emergence of a corrupt ruling class, which included individuals who benefited most in terms of 
education and employment during the colonial rule. Essentially, this class used state resources to 
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dispense patronage amongst their loyal constituencies. Narrow nationalism became the language 
of the corrupt ruling elite, this occurring while clans were effectively transformed into 
constituencies and platforms for aspiring elites (Le Sage, 2005:19). Le Sage (2005:19) argues 
that the army used “corruption and the instability of the civilian government’s patronage system 
as a pretext for action”, assuming power in 1969, and installing General Mohamed Said Barre as 
President of Somalia.  
Similar to other regions in the continent, the military in the region of East Africa instituted coups 
to protect its corporate identity, as evidenced in the coup that occurred in Uganda in 1971. First 
(1971:133) insists that the catalysing factor that prompted the military to overthrow the 
government took place when the Ugandan Secret Service started collecting intelligence on the 
activities of the army.  
The occurrence of coups in East Africa may additionally be attributed to external factors such as 
foreign intervention. Holsti (1995:194) explains that foreign intervention refers to “any activity 
that seeks to change the political leadership or constitutional structure of a foreign state”. 
Usually, foreign intervention is enacted without the knowledge or consent of the legal 
institutions of the state concerned. Ngoma (2004:92) states that the standard motivation for 
foreign intervention includes, “new business opportunities, geopolitical interests”. The most 
prominent technique that foreign governments use to unseat the political leadership of a targeted 
state is when they sponsor militia groups or dissidents to engage in guerrilla warfare against their 
governments. In addition, external intervention also occurs when a foreign state directly assists a 
rebel movement to overthrow their government. The 1979 coup that ousted Idi Amin in Uganda 
shows characteristics of foreign intervention and was orchestrated by the Tanzanian army and 
the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF). The UNLF, with the aid of the Tanzanian 
military, “liberated Kampala on 11 April and pursued Amin to Sudan and Zaire” (Fouché, 2003: 
71).  
 
3.3.4 North Africa  
This region, also known as the Maghreb region, is composed of five states: Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Mauritania and Morocco. As in other regions of Africa, North Africa has also experienced 
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a series of military coups. Table 4 shows the number of coups that have taken place in North 
Africa between 1965-2008.   
3.3.3.4 Table 4: Coups in North Africa from 1965-2008 
 
 Source: Zounmenou (2009a:73) 
In total, the region has experienced seven coups during the period from 1965-2008 
(Zounemenou, 2009a:73). The region first experienced a coup in 1965 when Ahmed Ben Bella, 
Algeria’s first democratically elected President, was toppled in a bloodless coup by Colonel 
Houari Boumediène. In 1969, Muammar al-Qaddafi, an army captain, led a military coup that 
deposed King Idris of Libya. It appears that the belligerents who launched the military coup in 
Libya were motivated by a particular ideology
28
. For example, Global Issues (2003:1) points out 
that the coup makers wanted to direct the state of Libya into a revolutionary society guided by 
the values of Arab Socialism, a political ideology that integrated Islamic principles with social, 
economic and political reforms
29
. 
The 1987 coup that installed Ben Ali as president of Tunisia was motivated by constitutional 
reforms. Ware (1988:592) writes that the military coup was instituted for the purposes of 
revising the constitution to eliminate the “clauses relating to lifetime Presidency and automatic 
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 Global Issues. 2003. www.globalissues.org/article/793/libya 
29
   Global Issues. 2003. www.globalissues.org/article/793/libya 
Country  Year  Total  
 Algeria  1965  1  
 Libya 1969  1  
Mauritania 1978,1984, 
2005, 2008 
4 
 Tunisia 1987  1 
 Total   7 
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succession of the Prime Minister to the Presidential post”. The catalyst of the 2008 coup that 
occurred in Mauritania was a Presidential decree that sacked the Army Chief of Staff, the 
Commander of the Gendarmerie, the Commander of the Presidential Security Battalion and the 
Commander of the National Guard. As a result, conflict ensued between the legislature and the 
executive and this led to the resignation of a majority of MPs and senators from the ruling party, 
the PNDD (National Pact for Democracy and Development). Eventually, Prime Minister Zeine 
Ould Zeidane and his cabinet succumbed to public pressure and were forced to resign to avoid a 
motion of no confidence. The morning after the resignation, the rebels seized power and 
announced the plans to hold elections in the shortest period of time (Kamledy, 2008:3).   
In the beginning of 2011, states in North Africa, namely Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, experienced a 
series of popular uprisings. Observers note that these were caused by persistent corruption, a 
denial of basic rights and limited participation in policy-making processes
30
. Notably, these 
protests prompted the resignations of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and President Ben Ali 
of Tunisia. Libya, on the other hand was embroiled in a bloody conflict that eventually led to the 
assassination of President Muammar al-Qaddafi. These protests demonstrate that popular revolts 
are able to be a gateway to what Varol (2011:2) calls “democratic coups”: a type of coup that 
overthrows an “authoritarian regime for the purpose of transitioning the regime to democracy 
and holding free and fair democratic elections within a short span of time”.  Varol (2011:2) uses 
Egypt as an example to demonstrate how the military exploited the popular revolts to institute a 
democratic coup. He postulates that: 
Credit for the successful overthrow of the Mubarak regime went in large part to the Egyptian 
Armed Forces, which refused to fire on the protestors during the demonstrations and stepped in to 
assume control of the government when Mubarak stubbornly refused to relinquish his stronghold 
(Varol, 2011:2). 
The military has remained firm in its commitment to putting Egypt onto a democratic path. On 
20 January 2012, the Egyptian military released guidelines for the Presidential elections 
scheduled for the 23
rd
 and 24
th
 of May 2012. The runoff elections were to be held on the 16 and 
17 June 2012 (Varol, 2012:2).  
                                                          
30
    Democratist, 2011. The Great Arab Spring of 2011: Causes and Consequences.  
http://www.democratist.net/2011/03/28/great-arab-spring. 
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3.3.5 Southern Africa  
Southern Africa is composed of thirteen states, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the island 
states of Madagascar and Mauritius
31
.  
3.3.3.5 Table 5: Coups in Southern Africa from 1975-2009 
Country  Year  Total  
Lesotho  1986, 
1991 
2 
Madagascar  1975, 
2009 
2 
Total   4 
  Sources: Zounmenou (2009a:73) (Marcus, 2004:3) (BBC News, 2009)
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In contrast to other regions, Southern Africa has been least affected by the phenomenon of 
coups. During the period 1975-2009, the region has only experienced four coups, two of which 
occurred in Lesotho and two in Madagascar. This raises a question regarding how the region of 
Southern Africa escaped the coup contagion. Nkosi (2010:26) explains that governments which 
assumed power through the influence of armed struggle, such as those in Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, were able to create and reorganise their armed forces and were as a consequence, 
more successful in imposing control. Secondly, states that gained independence through a 
peaceful transition, such as South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, dealt effectively with the 
challenges arising from their armed forces
33
. They were able to “reorganise and institutionalize 
their civil-military relations and to sustain civilian rule” (Nkosi, 2010:26).  
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   SADC. 2001. SADC Member Countries. http://transition.fcc.gov/ib/initiative/africa/webfiles/append2.pdf 
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 Source adopted from Zounmenou (2009), Marcus (2004) and BBC News (2009) 
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 With the exception of Lesotho, which underwent two military coups in 1986 and 1991. 
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Once again, foreign intervention was at the centre of another military coup in Africa in 1986 
when Major Lekhanya Metsing assumed power in Lesotho. Nkosi (2010:25) contends that the 
coup was instigated by the South African Government. Nkosi (2010:25) makes a link between 
the abovementioned Lesotho coup and the South African government. He contends that the latter 
created a coup prone environment by imposing a border blockade on Lesotho for three weeks 
due to the Apartheid Government’s concern regarding the support given to the then banned 
African National Congress (ANC) by the regime of Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan
34
. 
The causes of the military coup in Madagascar are explored in the later sections of this 
dissertation.    
  
3.4 OAU and AU sanction policies  
In these subsections the sanction policies adopted by the OAU and the AU in dealing with coups 
in Africa will be examined and include the Lomé Declaration, the AU Constitutive Act and the 
AU Charter on Elections and Governance. The section on the AU sanction policies will discuss 
the new policy developments, the role of AU organs and the role of Regional Economic 
Communities.   
 
3.4.1 Sanction policies of the OAU 
The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was formed on 25 May 1963, its main aim being to 
“safeguard African interest by promoting the unity and solidarity” of African nations and ending 
all forms of colonialism on the continent (Omorogbe, 2011:125). In line with Article 3 of the 
OAU Charter which guaranteed the “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each 
state and for its inalienable right to independent existence”, the OAU adopted the principle of 
non-interference as its modus operandi (OAU, 1963). This principle barred the OAU from 
interfering in the domestic affairs of its member states. More importantly, this principle did not 
give the OAU the right to interfere in a situation where regimes acquired power through coups. 
                                                          
34
  Lesotho experienced a coup in 1970 when the incumbent Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan, who led the 
Basotho National Party (BNP), refused to relinquish his position after being defeated by the Basotholand Congress 
Party (BCP) in the national elections.   
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The Cairo Declaration of 1964 that legitimised national borders inherited from their colonial 
governments further strengthened the principle (Ikome, 2007: 16). Nevertheless, the policy of 
non-interference proved to be ineffective in dealing with the challenges on the African continent. 
The continental body did not question any of its member states, even if they violated the rights of 
their citizens.  
Moreover, the OAU did not punish any regime that acquired power through a coup. Instead, it 
welcomed whichever regime that was in effective control of a territory and it even granted them 
diplomatic representation in its structures. For example, the OAU granted diplomatic recognition 
and diplomatic representation to regimes that came into power through coups in Ghana (1966), 
Uganda (1971), Chad (1982), and Liberia (1980) (Omorogbe, 2011:126).  
Conditions for aid as set by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 
1980s challenged the OAU’s policy of non-interference significantly. This meant that African 
states had to embrace a development paradigm founded on democracy and good governance in 
order to receive aid (Aubut, 2004:11). For this reason, in 1981, the OAU adopted the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, which acknowledged a number of fundamental human, 
civil and political rights. Consequently, the adoption of the Charter prompted policy makers and 
African scholars to search for new ways of defining security. In 1991, the OAU adopted the 
Kampala Document, which sought to integrate the ideas of security, stability, development, and 
cooperation and it argued that security should be premised on the following understanding: 
The concept of security must be seen in its wholesomeness and totality. It must be taken beyond 
traditional definition, which is largely a military understanding. The security of each country and 
of the continent must be taken to include the security of the African People to live in peace with 
access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of their society freely and 
exercising their fundamental human rights (Hutchful, 2008:75).  
Because of this process, the OAU’s policy stance began to show some changes. Nkosi (2010:43) 
states that one of the first policy changes was witnessed during the 1997 OAU Summit held in 
Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare. The summit took place shortly after the military ousting of the 
regime of President Tejahn Kabbah in Sierra Leone. For the first time, the OAU took a radical 
stance and lashed out against the rebel movement responsible for masterminding the coup. The 
Secretary General of the OAU at that time, Salim Ahmed Salim, described the coup as a setback 
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for Africa. The UN joined the chorus of condemnation and the global body issued a statement 
which stressed that:    
The UN and the international community firmly uphold the principle that the will of the people 
shall be the basis of the authority of governments, and that democratically-elected governments 
shall not be overthrown by force (Pan African News, 26 May 1997).   
The Algiers Summit of 1999 was an event in which the year 2000 was declared a year of “peace, 
security and solidarity in Africa” and in which anti-coup rhetoric was articulated (Omorogbe, 
2011:127). The Summit took a resolution to suspend any government that assumed power though 
a coup. Moreover, the Algiers Summit also called on the regimes of the states of the Comoros, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau and Niger, that had come to power through coups since the 
Harare Summit, to restore constitutional rule before the next annual summit (Omorogbe, 
2011:127).   
Following this, the continental body went on to develop an anti-coup policy framework, 
witnessed at the OAU Thirty Sixth Ordinary Session of the Heads of State, which was held in 
Togo’s capital Lomé on the 10th of July 2000. The session adopted the Framework for an OAU 
response to unconstitutional changes in Government; also known as the Lome Declaration. The 
framework marked a new approach to coups in that it declared them a threat to the peace and 
security of the continent, constituting a very disturbing trend and serious setback to the on-going 
process of democratisation in Africa (OAU, 2000). Ikome (2007:31) observes that this 
framework was part of the OAU’s agenda of promoting democracy, giving a set of democratic 
principles that member states of the OAU should adhere to: 
 Adoption of a democratic Constitution: its preparation, content and method of revision 
should be in conformity with generally acceptable principles of democracy     
 Respect for the Constitution and adherence to the provisions of the law and other  
legislative enactments adopted by Parliament 
 Separation of powers and independence of the judiciary 
 Promotion of political pluralism or any other form of participatory democracy and the 
 role of the African civil society, including enhancing and ensuring gender balance in the  
 political process  
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 The principle of democratic change and recognition of a role for the opposition 
 Organisation of free and regular elections, in conformity with existing texts 
 Guarantee of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, including guaranteeing 
access to the media for all political stake-holders 
 Constitutional recognition of fundamental rights and freedoms in conformity with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the African Charter on Human 
Rights 
 Guarantee and promotion of human rights (OAU, 2000).  
 
The framework went on to define several situations that constitute an unconstitutional change in 
government:  
 Military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government 
 Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government 
 Replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and 
rebel movements  
 Refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, 
fair and regular elections (OAU, 2000). 
More importantly, the Lomé Declaration also made provisions for dealing with regimes that 
carried out the above-mentioned acts, stating that whenever an unconstitutional change took 
place within the member states, “the incumbent Chairperson of the OAU and the Secretary 
General should condemn the coup and urge a speedy return to constitutional order” (OAU, 
2000). The Chairperson and the Secretary were to warn the leaders of the coup that their actions 
would not be tolerated. Additionally, the Chairperson and the Secretary “should urge for 
consistency of action at a bilateral, inter-state, sub-regional and international level” (Nkosi, 
2010:55).  
After issuing a warning to the regime concerned, the OAU Central Organ would meet to discuss 
the situation, giving the leaders of the coup up to six months to restore constitutional order.  
During these six months, the government concerned was to be suspended from participating in 
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the policy structures of the OAU. The suspended government was also barred from participating 
in the meetings of the Central Organ, the Sessions of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly 
of the Heads of State. However, the suspension did not affect the country’s membership. The 
concerned state was also required to honour its basic obligations, including its yearly financial 
contribution to the OAU (OAU, 2000).  
Within that period of six months, the Secretary General would be mandated to gather relevant 
facts about the coup. He or she would additionally be tasked to establish contact with the 
perpetrators with a view to ascertaining their intentions regarding the restoration of constitutional 
order in their state. The Secretary General would also be mandated to seek the contribution of 
African leaders in the form of pressurising the perpetrators of the coup in order to cause them to 
cooperate with the OAU and facilitate the restoration of constitutional order in the Member State 
concerned. In addition, the Secretary General would be tasked with the responsibility of 
maintaining contact with the Regional Economic Grouping, to which the country in crisis 
belongs (OAU, 2000).  
At the expiration of the six months suspension period, a range of targeted and limited sanctions 
would be imposed against a regime that refused to implement the constitutional order. Some of 
these targeted measures may include visa denials and the freezing of the foreign bank accounts 
of the perpetrators of an unconstitutional change (OAU, 2000). Moreover, the continental body 
was mandated to impose measures that are able to restrict government-to-government contact 
and trade sanctions in the form of an arms embargo (OAU, 2000). When imposing sanctions, the 
OAU would be required to enlist the cooperation of member states, Regional Economic 
Communities and the wider International/Donor Communities. The OAU would also be required 
to scan the sanctions environment in order to ensure that the sanctions do not cause harm to the 
population of the targeted country (OAU, 2000). 
 
3.4.2 Sanction Policies of the AU   
This section focuses on the AU sanction policies. It also discusses new policy developments of 
the AU sanction regime, the role of AU organs and the role of RECs.   
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The transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) marked the beginning of a new era 
in African politics
35
. Arguably, the transformation represented a qualitative improvement in the 
“evolution of intra-African cooperation and integration” (Mathews, 2008:33). This qualitative 
progress is expected to improve the living standards of Africans, and in the long run lead to 
political and economic union in Africa (Matthews, 2008:33). The Union is also expected to 
champion the democratic and good governance agenda principles contained in the Lomé 
Declaration. These are clearly expressed in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, a founding treaty of 
the AU, which states that the “objectives of the Union shall be to promote democratic 
institutions, popular participation and good governance” (AU, 2002). Article 4 additionally 
prescribes the kinds of principles that should guide the functioning of the Union: 
 The right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the 
 Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and 
 crimes against humanity  
 The right of a member state to request intervention from the Union in order to restore  
peace and security  
 Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance  
 Respect for stability of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political 
assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities  
 Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (AU, 2002). 
Essentially, the adoption of these principles indicates that the AU has departed from the OAU’s 
traditional policy of non-interference. Mwanasali (2008:41) contends that this policy has been 
replaced by a new covenant called “non-indifference”. The new policy of non-indifference 
reflects a major shift in African political thinking and “augurs the dawn of an interventionist 
phase in the continental management of peace and security” (Mwanasali, 2008:41). The adoption 
of this policy approach has also made it possible for the AU to develop a milieu for responding 
to regimes that institute power acquired through unconstitutional means. This disposition is 
expressed in Article 30 of the Constitutive Act which provides that the “Governments which 
                                                          
35
 Matthews (2008:33) argues that the OAU was transformed into the AU for the purposes of creating an integrated 
and cooperative continent. 
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shall came to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the 
activities of the Union” (AU, 2000).  
The second policy empowering the AU to reject regimes that institute coups is the Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted in 2007. Odinkalu (2008:4) is of the view that 
the Charter gave “the definition of an unconstitutional change a treaty status”. Furthermore, the 
Charter added a fifth definition to the four already recognized in the Lomé Declaration, namely 
“the manipulation or amendment of the Constitution or legal instrument” for the purposes of 
prolonging the term of office (AU, 2007). The prohibition of unconstitutional changes in 
government has also found concrete expression in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance. This is clearly enshrined in the principles of the Charter, which states that the 
“Union shall prohibit, reject and condemn the unconstitutional change of government in any 
Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development” (AU, 2007).  
More importantly, Article 25 of the Charter goes on to prescribe the punitive measures which 
should be imposed on those responsible for supporting the disruption of constitutional rule: 
 The perpetrators of an unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to 
participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or hold any position of 
responsibility in political institutions of their State. 
 Perpetrators of an unconstitutional change of government may also be tried before the 
competent court of the Union (AU, 2007). 
Notably, Article 25 of the Charter urges member states of the AU to cooperate with the Union in 
bringing the culprits of such an unconstitutional change to justice. This Article also recommends 
that the Union should deal harshly with states that support actors who instigate an 
unconstitutional change: 
 The Assembly shall impose sanctions on any Member State that is proven to have 
instigated or supported unconstitutional change of government in another state In 
conformity with Article 23 of the Constitutive Act, 
 State Parties shall not harbour or give sanctuary to perpetrators of unconstitutional 
changes of government, 
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 State Parties shall bring to justice the perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of 
government or take necessary steps to effect their extradition, 
 State Parties shall encourage conclusion of bilateral extradition agreements as well as the 
adoption of legal instruments on extradition and mutual legal assistance (AU, 2007). 
 
The Rules and Procedures of the Assembly, which were adopted in 2002, clearly prescribe the 
kinds of sanctions to be imposed on an unconstitutional regime (AU, 2002). In this context, 
sanctions considered are issues such as the denial of transport and communication links with 
other member states. The Union is also given the discretion of establishing other sanctions 
measures which may be political and economic in nature. It is important to note that this policy 
document differs significantly from the Lomé Declaration and the Constitutive Act, which 
imposes sanctions such as visa denials and prohibition of government-to-government contact, 
because it opens the doors for other types of sanctions, upon the determination of the Union 
(Eriksson, 2010:32). 
The new policy developments that seek to enhance the AU’s capacity of dealing with 
unconstitutional regimes on the continent were ratified in the 13th Session of the AU Assembly 
held in the Libyan capital Tripoli from 1-3 July 2009 (Eriksson, 2010:39). In the session, the 
Chairperson of the AU was requested to start consultations with the following institutions: 
Regional Economic Communities, Pan African Parliament, the Economic Cultural Council and 
other AU structures. Primarily, these consultations were aimed at finding ways of strengthening 
the AU’s capacity to deal with unconstitutional changes of government by means of sanctions. 
Correspondence was also sent to other organisations: the EU, the Arab League and the UN, 
requesting them to share experiences (Eriksson, 2010:39). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
in the AU Ordinary Session of January 2010 later tabled the findings of this initiative.  
One of the key recommendations that the PSC made was that the AU and RECs should initiate 
actions to facilitate the ratification of the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance as 
well as to establish a sanctions committee. The Peace and Security (PSC) meeting, which was 
held in Swaziland on the 17-19 December 2009, also contributed towards the development of the 
AU policy towards unconstitutional changes of government (Eriksson, 2010:39). In this meeting, 
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the PSC adopted the Framework for the Enhancement of the Implementation of the Measures of 
the African Union in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa. This 
framework suggested that that new principles be added to the existing norms of the AU policy 
and proposed that: 
 The current suspension period of six months as provided by the Lomé Declaration should 
 be shortened to three months (90 days) 
 Perpetrators of a coup should be prosecuted before the African Court of Human Rights 
 The military and the police force should not interfere in the transition towards the return 
to constitutional order  
 The AU should enhance coordination and cooperation between AU organs, RECs and 
other regional mechanisms in the implementation of targeted sanctions 
 It should seek the support and cooperation of national parliaments through the Pan 
African Parliament in the process of implementing sanctions through the adoption of 
enabling   legislation 
 It should increase and strengthen information gathering to inform the decision making 
process on actions relating to sanctions against unconstitutional changes in government 
(PSC, 2009). 
The Framework delineated the concrete steps of establishing a sanctions committee. Section D of 
the Framework, entitled “The Establishment of the committee on sanctions”, defines the 
committee as a subsidiary body of the PSC established “pursuant to Article 7 (g) and Article 8 
(5) of the PSC Protocol and within the broad framework of relevant AU instruments” (PSC, 
2009). It went on to further declare that the committee shall be composed of five members of the 
PSC, appointed on the basis of regional representation. The primary function of the sanction 
committee would be to supervise the implementation of sanctions by the PSC. In addition, the 
committee would be expected to monitor and make recommendations on the implementation of 
sanctions (Eriksson 2010: 39). Additionally, the committee is expected to play the following 
roles: 
 Collect information on member state’s implementation of sanctions  
 Examine information regarding alleged violations   
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 Consider exemption from sanctions measures 
 Identify individuals and entities to be included on the AU sanctions list 
 Review regularly the list of individuals and entities designated by the PSC and to 
encourage member states to supply additional information 
 Report at least once a month to the PSC on its activities and on the implementation of 
 sanctions effectiveness  
 Identify non-compliance (Eriksson, 2010: 39).   
In addition to these measures, a manual to facilitate a quick response to unconstitutional changes 
in government is being developed by the PSC to guide its members on the types of sanctions to 
impose when dealing with unconstitutional regimes. Currently, the AU is collaborating with the 
European Union in matters relating to the establishment of a sanction committee. This is part of 
AU experiential learning and it seeks to teach the AU how to administer and institutionalise a 
sanction regime (Eriksson, 2010: 42). 
The roles of AU organs in the context of an unconstitutional change are defined by the Rules and 
Procedures of the Assembly of the African Union. In this regard, the tasks are delegated to the 
AU Assembly which is the supreme organ of the Union. This organ is composed of all heads of 
states and governments of member countries. The Assembly meets once a year for an ordinary 
session; an extraordinary session may be called by a two thirds majority. In the main, the 
Assembly is responsible for: developing common policies of the Union; establishing the 
priorities of the Union and adopting its yearly programme (AU, 2002). This organ is also 
empowered to take decisions on behalf of the Union. The types of decisions taken by the 
Assembly may be classified in three categories. The first category is regulatory in nature; these 
are the types of decisions that “member states need to take all necessary measures to implement” 
(Förander, 2010:16).  With regard to the second category, the Assembly gives directives which 
are “addressed to any or all member states, to undertakings or to individuals and bind member 
states to the objectives to be achieved while leaving national authorities with the power to 
determine the form and the means to be used for their implementation” (Förander, 2010:16). 
Lastly, the Assembly makes recommendations, declarations, resolutions and puts forward 
opinions. These types of decisions do not bind member states; instead, they are intended to guide 
the views raised by member states (Förander, 2010:16).  
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In the context of an unconstitutional change, the Assembly is mandated to invoke Article 30 of 
the Rules and Procedures of the Assembly (AU, 2002). This states that the: 
Assembly shall approve, upon recommendation of the Executive Council, the implementation of 
sanctions under Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act on a state that violates the policies of the 
Union. (AU, 2002) 
The Chairperson of the Assembly who is chosen from the rank of the Heads of State is expected 
to play a proactive role in terms of mediating the impasse in the state that experienced an 
unconstitutional change. He/she is required to fulfil the role of ensuring a consistency of action at 
the “bilateral, interstate, sub-regional and international levels” (AU, 2002). The Assembly also 
determines the nature of sanctions to be imposed, which may be diplomatic, travel or targeted 
economic sanctions (AU, 2002).  
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the second institution charged with the responsibility of 
directing the AU policy with regard to coups in Africa. Basically, this body is mandated with the 
task of handling matters that relate to peace, security and stability in the continent. Article 7 (e) 
of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council empowers the 
PSC to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely war, genocide, crimes against humanity. Another issue that has prompted the 
intervention of the PSC in the domestic affairs of member states is the occurrence of an 
unconstitutional change (PSC, 2002). The type of intervention that the PSC has adopted in this 
regard is discussed in Article 7 (g) which states that the Chairperson of the Commission, in 
conjunction with the Peace and Security Council, shall institute sanctions whenever an 
unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the 
Lomé Declaration (PSC, 2002).  
In the event of an unconstitutional change, the PSC is expected to liaise with the chairperson of 
the REC. This implies that the Chairman of the REC will notify the PSC about the events of an 
unconstitutional change that occurs in the region. The PSC will then consider the information 
and impose targeted sanctions in the form of travel bans and financial sanctions on those who 
instituted the unconstitutional change. Subsequently, the PSC will then produce a communiqué 
that will convey its decisions to the relevant REC and Member States of the AU (Eriksson, 
65 
 
2010:37). More importantly, this decision is binding on the Member States and RECs to 
implement the decisions of the PSC.  
RECs, which are groups of nation-states in a shared geographical location who have agreed to 
“some form of economic-co-operation and as such pursue policies to eradicate barriers to trade 
and economic integration”36, are also expected to play an active role in punishing those who 
acquire power through unconstitutional means. Africa has five Regions of which each are 
represented by five RECs: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Economic Community for West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (Adebajo, 2008:132).   
In essence, RECs are the “founding pillars of the Union” and are required to work closely with 
the AU in coordinating and harmonizing “the policies between existing and future Regional 
Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union” (AU, 2002). 
Eriksson (2010:43) argues that in the context of a coup, RECs are required to provide an analysis 
of the political situation and monitor the sanction imposed on the targeted regime. Additionally, 
regional groupings also conduct a sanctions list on whom to target with visa denials as well as 
asset freeze measures (Eriksson, 2010:43).  
However, there have been tensions between the PSC and regional groupings. At times, regional 
organisations and continental bodies may adopt different attitudes towards regimes that acquire 
power through coups. For example, in 2003, the AU condemned Bozize’s coup in the CAR while 
the regional body ECCAS welcomed it (Eriksson, 2010:43). Again, in 2009 ECOWAS suggested 
that a tough approach should be adopted against Niger following a coup, whereas the AU failed 
to act on this recommendation.  
Some regional groupings are plagued by weak sanctions regimes, usually arising from limited 
resources and a lack of technical expertise (Eriksson, 2010:43). ECOWAS is the only regional 
grouping that has developed a peace and security architecture that aligns itself with the AU 
sanction policy. In 2001, the regional grouping adopted the Protocol on Democracy and 
Governance. In principle, the Protocol is intended to protect and enhance democratic rule in 
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 East African Community. 2002.  Common Terms used in EAC work. www.eac.int/news/index.php 
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West Africa and in fact this aim has found concrete expression in Article 45 (1) of the Protocol 
on Democracy and Governance, which contends that: 
In the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is massive 
violation of Human Rights in a Member State, ECOWAS may impose sanctions on the State 
concerned (ECOWAS, 2001). 
ECOWAS has also drafted a response against any regime that violates its democratic ideals, 
which may be found in Article 45 (2) of the Protocol on Democracy and Governance which 
provides that “the sanctions which shall be decided by the Authority, may take the following 
forms, in increasing order of severity”: 
 Refusal to support the candidates presented by the Member State concerned for elective 
posts in international organisations; 
 Refusal to organise ECOWAS meetings in the Member State concerned; 
 Suspension of the Member State concerned from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies 
(ECOWAS, 2001).  
During the suspension period, the member state will be required to pay its dues. Furthermore, 
while the state concerned serves its suspension period, ECOWAS is required to play a proactive 
role. This is highlighted in Article 45 (4) of the Protocol which states that the regional body has 
the responsibility of monitoring, supporting and encouraging the efforts undertaken by the 
suspended state to return the country to normality and constitutional rule (ECOWAS, 2001). 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion    
This chapter examined the concept of coups, first defining the concept and then expounding the 
theories that explain the occurrence of coups in Africa. Furthermore, this chapter also sketched 
the record of coups in the continent by concretising this phenomenon within the five regions of 
Africa. This was done by initially investigating coups within the region of West Africa. It was 
found that this region is the most coup-prone region in the continent, having witnessed 43 coups 
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since the start of independence. This region is followed by Central Africa which experienced 19 
coups, followed by East Africa which has experienced 11 while North Africa has experienced 7. 
Lately, the North African region has been rocked by a series of revolutions spearheaded by 
ordinary members of the public, some of which have received the support of the military and 
have been dubbed democratic coups. However, it is of moment that these revolutions that swept 
across the Arab world involving Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, demonstrate the limitations of the AU 
sanctions policy. This does not make provisions for popular democratic uprisings. This loophole 
has recently attracted the attention of academics that have come to question the role of the AU in 
this regard. 
The last region to be investigated in this chapter was the Southern African Region, which 
experienced four coups that took place in Lesotho and Madagascar. The chapter also examined 
OAU and AU sanction policies, with this section revealing that both the policy responses of the 
OAU and the AU are anchored in the desire to protect democratic governance in Africa.    
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Chapter 4: The Successes of the AU Sanction policy in Guinea  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the subject of coups in Africa and the sanction policies of the 
OAU and the AU. This chapter discusses and analyses why the AU sanction policy succeeded in 
relation to the 2008 coup in Guinea. The first section describes the post-colonial history of 
Guinea under the regime of Sekou Touré (1958-1984), while the second part focuses on Guinea 
under the regime of Lansana Conté (1984-2008) and the third concentrates on more recent 
events, sketching the events of the military coup that occurred in 2008 and the AU responses. 
This section portrays the role played by the AU and ECOWAS in resolving the political impasse 
in Guinea with the final section of this chapter analysing the factors that contributed to the 
success of the AU sanction policy in Guinea. 
 
4.1 Guinea under the regime of Sekou Touré (1958-1984) 
The Republic of Guinea became the second state in Sub-Saharan Africa, after Ghana in 1957, to 
attain independence after being part of the French colonial empire for more than sixty years. It 
attained independence on 2 October 1958 after “Guineans, in a popular referendum”, a 
referendum organised by French authorities in which citizens in the colonial states were to vote 
for independence or autonomy in the French Union, voted for immediate independence outside 
the French Community (Sawyer, 2004:440). The “No” vote in the public referendum was a clear 
indication that the people of Guinea wanted to restore their lost identity which they believed had 
been stolen from them by the colonial regime. Sekou Touré’s Parti Démocratique de Guinée 
(PDG) gave voice to this conviction when noting that: 
Exploitation by the colonial regime resulted not only in robbing Africa of its resources but in 
destroying the basic values of the African society. The changes which the colonial system 
brought about in African traditional life undermined the network of mutual obligation which 
created communal solidarity (Schwab, 2004:118-119). 
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Touré ruled Guinea from 1958-1984. He created a government of “absolute power and a police 
regime”37. This meant that his political party, the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), was the 
only political organisation allowed to operate in Guinea. Schwab (2004:120) argues that the PDG 
was tasked with the responsibility of fighting the imperialist ambitions of France, mobilising the 
citizens to work towards to national unity and state building. The PDG, designed as the “steering 
body, the driving force” and the instrument that organises political life, was placed at the top of 
the government hierarchy (Schwab, 2004:120). This meant that all other public institutions, 
including the military and the police force were subordinate to the party and were only used as 
organs of implementation and instruments in its service. Andrian (1980:84) points out that Touré 
held all governing power and used the party to assume total political control of the nation. In 
1961, he was elected for a seven-year term as President and was the only candidate running for 
the position. In 1968, 1972 and 1982, Touré was again elected unopposed, and retained his 
position as the head of state and the PDG.  
During his term as President, Touré based his policy on the principles of Marxism. In 1960, he 
nationalised banks, transportation and public utilities. The government also extended regulation 
to all the bauxite and aluminium industries (Nelson et al., 1977:166). Guinea’s Marxist policies 
gained her allies in Eastern Europe. In 1959, the country established diplomatic relations with the 
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Czechoslovakia, aimed at eradicating 
French influence in the West African state. The major focus of these relations was on developing 
the economy of Guinea. For example, in 1960, the USSR deployed its technicians to help the 
Guinean government to develop its agricultural and transportation sector (Nelson et al., 
1977:191).  
However, relations with the Soviet Union reached an all-time low in 1961 (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1964:1). This, after Guinean authorities accused the USSR of importing 
equipment that was of poor quality. Relations with the USSR collapsed in December 1961 when 
the Guinean government implicated a staff member of the Soviet embassy in what President 
Touré described as a plot against his regime by the left-wing intellectuals of the PDG (Royal 
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Institute of International Affairs, 1964:1). Consequently, the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea at 
that time, Daniel Solodo, was expelled from the country (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1964:1). The break with the Soviet Union pushed Guinea into the hands of Western powers. 
Immediately after ending relations with the Soviet government (a matter of days), Guinea 
became a trading partner of West Germany. West Germany also provided considerable 
assistance to Guinea, evidenced in 1962 when it deployed military personnel who were mandated 
to train Guinea’s military and police force (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1964:116). In 
the same decade, Guinea established relations with the United States and diplomatic ties between 
the two states were strengthened in October 1962 after Touré paid a state visit to the United 
States where he met with the then American President, John F Kennedy (Schwab, 2004:127). 
Whiteman (1971:351) argues that Touré was impressed with Kennedy, especially his interests in 
African development, his opposition towards colonialism and his interest in the Civil Rights 
movement in the US. In 1963, the US rolled out its Peace Corps Mission, made up of volunteers 
from the US who usually help in developing agriculture, sanitation and youth programs, in 
Guinea followed by the supply of food grains. Within a period of ten years, 1961-1971, Guinea 
received US aid to the value of US$ 103 million (Nelson et al., 1977:195).  
At a regional level, President Touré had two primary allies: President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana 
and Modibo Keita who was the Head of State in Mali. This trio had a common aspiration: to see 
a united and a prosperous Africa. In 1960 Guinea, Ghana and Mali established a regional 
grouping called the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. Primarily, the Union was tasked with the 
responsibility of promoting economic cooperation between the three states and was also used as 
a platform for tackling the issues of colonial rule and influence on the African continent. 
However, the Union collapsed in 1966 after a military coup deposed President Nkrumah 
(Schmidt, 2007:15).   
At a domestic level, Touré was known as a strong President who ruled Guinea with an iron fist. 
His dictatorship was founded on totalitarian values that denied Guinean citizens basic human 
rights such as the freedom of expression, freedom of thought etcetera (Yabi 2010:35). Under 
Touré’s dictatorship, civilian life was strictly monitored by the police force and the military. 
These two institutions were also used as instruments for harassing the populace as Touré 
tolerated no opposition to his rule (Yabi 2010:35). In the 1960s, he constructed Camp Bioro, a 
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concentration camp, which sometimes served as a political prisoner’s death camp, which he later 
used to purge his opponents. Kaba (1977:32) aptly exposes the punitive measures imposed on 
those who opposed President Touré: 
To criticize Toure's reports is considered a counter-revolutionary move, and leads to 
imprisonment, as it did in the case of Balla Camara, an able administrator arrested at a 
conference in I969 and later condemned to death.  
At times, Touré became paranoid about his own security and he constantly accused senior army 
personnel of trying to topple his regime organising the killing of Major General Mamadou Keita 
in 1965 after he was accused of trying to instigate a military coup against Touré (Yabi, 2010:35). 
In 1969, President Touré ordered the execution of Colonel Kaman Diaby and his companions. In 
1971 Touré ordered the killing of General Keita Noumandian and the Joint Army Chief of Staff, 
Colonel Diallo Mamadou, who were implicated in a coup plot. Victims of the purges also 
included key political figures of Touré’s regime. For example, in 1976 the veteran politician 
Diallo Telli, who was once the Secretary General of the OAU, was arrested by Guinean 
authorities after he was accused of attempting to lead a coup against the regime of Sekou Touré. 
Telli died in custody in 1977 due to severe malnutrition (Yabi, 2010:35).  
Touré’s one-party system and his Marxist policies created weak institutions that stunted 
economic development. Research provided by the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(1964:118) points out that the state controlled economy in Guinea led to severe and chronic 
shortages of the basic necessities such as meat, rice, oil and spare parts for motor vehicles. In 
addition, in 1962 when the diamond revenue fell from US$ 10 million to barely a tenth of that 
amount, these economic conditions forced Guineans into turning to the informal sector for a 
livelihood.    
Touré’s dictatorship came to an end on 26 March 1984 with his death while undergoing heart 
surgery in the United States. Prime Minster Louis Lansana Beavogui became the acting Head of 
State, pending the national elections which were due to take place in May 1984
38
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4.2 Guinea under the regime of Lansana Conté (1984-2008) 
Lansana Conté made a mark in Guinea politics when he and a group of army officers, known as 
the Comité Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN), carried out a military coup on 3 April 
1984, a few days after the death of Sekou Touré (International Crisis Group, 2007: 1). According 
to Yabi (2010:31), the military instigated a coup due to disputes amongst the ruling elite as to 
President Touré’s successor.  
Lansana Conté was not a stranger to Guinean politics. By the time the Republic of Guinea 
attained independence from France in 1958, he was an “under-educated sergeant” serving the 
colonial army (Picard and Moudoud, 2010: 57). His military career advanced in 1963 with his 
promotion to second lieutenant and in 1965, to the position of lieutenant. His military career 
reached a high point in 1973 when he provided training to the guerrilla movements that fought 
colonial occupation in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. His superiors were 
impressed by the kind of training he provided to the guerrilla movements, and this earned him 
the position of Chief of Staff of the Army in 1977 (The Guardian, 28 December 2008).  
President Conté’s government retained the same authoritarian political culture introduced under 
Sekou Touré’s regime. State institutions such as the army and the police force served to purge 
opponents and they were devoted to protecting President Conté. In 1985, Conté eliminated his 
main political rivals such as Colonel Diarra Traore, who had been one of the military personnel 
involved in the original coup after the death of Touré, accused of attempting to depose Conté’s 
regime. Forty army officers and about thirty dignitaries of the previous regime were executed 
because of their alleged involvement in the coup plot (Yabi, 2010:32). 
Once again, President Conté’s reliance on the support of the security apparatus was illustrated in 
February 1996 after his regime survived another coup plot when Conté used the army to 
eliminate the people responsible for planning the attempted coup and has been accused of using 
violent tactics to crush any form of protest. For instance, in 2005, during food riots, the 
presidential guard and police arrested and tortured a large number of civilians.
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Nevertheless, President Conté was more welcoming to Western advice than his predecessor 
(Sekou Touré) and this approach earned him the title of a reformist. The first significant reform 
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he made came in 1985 when he dismantled the one-party system enacted by his predecessor and 
replaced it with a system that embraced public participation. In 1990, a new Constitution was 
“promulgated through a public referendum”40. Signs of putting Guinea on a democratic path 
became evident in 1991 when the Military Committee for National Recovery (MCNR) was 
abolished and replaced by the Transitional Committee for National Recovery (TCNR), a civilian 
and military institution charged with the responsibility of implementing democratic measures. 
Another major step towards democratising Guinea occurred in 1992 when political parties were 
officially allowed to take part in Presidential elections (International Crisis Group, 2005:9).  
The first multi-party election took place in 1993. Lansana Conté’s United and Progressive Party 
(UPP) were declared winners, followed by Alpha Condé’s People’s Assembly of Guinea (RPG). 
Another major reform that President Conté undertook during the early 1990s was the dismantling 
of a state led economy. Conté replaced this system with an economic model that embraced 
market led growth through privatising business entities that had previously fallen under state 
control. This move invited multi-national companies to invest in Guinea’s mining industry. 
Melly (2008:7) notes that BHP Billiton and the United Arab Emirates built an aluminium plant 
to the value of  US$ 4.3 billion. A renowned global mining company by the name of Rio Tinto 
built a US$ 6 billion iron ore mining in the mineral rich region of Simandou.  
However, the promising developments in the political situation changed as the years progressed. 
In 1998 Alpha Condé, the leader of the main opposition party, the Rally of the Guinean People 
Party (RPG), was arrested after he was accused of trying to leave Guinea illegally (Melly, 
2008:13). Condé was also accused of trying to recruit members of the Guinean military to 
destabilise the government. In 2005 members of the RPG were arrested and detained in the 
infamous prison of Siguiri “when their party appeared poised to win the Mayoral elections” 
(Melly, 2008:13).   
In January 2007, Guinea experienced a strike that nearly brought the economy to its knees: civil 
servants and employees in the private sector as well as those operating in the informal economy 
orchestrated it. Its main purpose was to pressurize the government to implement political 
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reforms. Some of the desired political reforms put forward by the demonstrators were the 
creation “of a broad based administration, led by a Prime Minister as head of the government” 
(International Crisis Group, 2007:6). Although, as was typical, violence was used to crush the 
strike, resulting in the death of 59 unarmed civilians, this did not stop the unions from carrying 
forward their demands. They pressed on until an agreement was finally reached on the 27th of 
January 2007. Under the agreement, Conté made promises as regards reforming his political 
system. The first significant political reform that Conté made came on the 13
th
 of February 2007 
when he appointed Lansana Kouyaté to the position of Prime Minister. For a number of reasons, 
the 2007 strike was hailed a success by many analysts because it managed to mobilize civil 
society actors of the Guinean society in the task of fighting for better living conditions 
(International Crisis Group, 2007:6).      
Conté’s political regime depended on nepotism and patronage. Evidence presented by the 
International Crisis Group (2007:2) points out that President Conté created a system of “crony 
capitalism that encourages total confusion between public and private property”. This system is 
believed to have benefited businessmen close to President Conté. For example, prominent 
businessman Mamadou Sylla accessed wealth because of his good relations with the President, 
being awarded many tenders in the public sector; he gained tax exemptions and received many 
favours from the Central Bank of Guinea. Nepotism manifests itself in many ways in Guinean 
society. Notably, senior posts in the public sector were allocated to the officials who showed 
loyalty to Conté’s Unity and Progress Party (PUP) (International Crisis Group, 2007:2). 
Corruption was central to Conté’s government amongst senior public officials such as Fodé 
Soumah, former Minister of Youth and Central Bank Governor, arrested in 2006 after being 
implicated in a corruption scandal, accused of using false cheques and embezzling public funds 
to the value of 15.5 billion Guinean Francs. In 2008, the Republic of Guinea was ranked 173rd 
out of 180 states, of the most corrupt states in the world
41
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As the years progressed, Conté’s political system began to show signs of weakness. Power 
struggles in the PUP party over Conté’s successor as President led to the postponement of 
legislative elections due to take place in 2007. Moreover, the state of Guinea was experiencing a 
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series of military and police mutinies over slow rates of promotions and under-paying. One of 
the most serious mutinies occurred in May 2008 when junior army officers exchanged fire with 
the Presidential guard. Conté stopped the mutiny when he visited the junior officers and agreed 
to increase the salary of such officers. In the same year, the army crushed a mutiny spearheaded 
by the police force. Non-payments, late payments and a “failure to implement pledged 
promotions” were once again at the root of the rebellion (Arieff and Cook, 2010:6).  
At a regional level, Conté’s government was renowned for interfering in the domestic affairs of 
its neighbouring states. In 2000, Lansana Conté aided a rebel movement called the United 
Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) that waged an armed resistance 
against Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia (Arieff, 2008:340). He provided ULIMO with refuge, 
weapons and money to carry out Guinea’s foreign policy goals to oust Charles Taylor from 
power.
42
 It is believed that Conté used the regional insecurity to his advantage. Arieff (2008:342) 
contends that Conté’s regime used regional instability as a distraction “from, and a warning 
against, domestic and international criticism, and as a reason to delay long-awaited democratic 
progress”. For instance, during the 2000 border attacks waged by the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF), Conté used the influx of refugees from neighbouring states such as Sierra Leone and 
Liberia to impose national cohesion and to receive international support for widely welcoming 
refuges from neighbouring states. In addition, he used the flow of refugees as a tactic to delay the 
legislative elections which were scheduled for November 2000 (Arieff, 2008:342).  
In a sudden twist of events, President Conté, who had suffered from long years of living with an 
unknown illness, died on 22 December 2008 and was laid to rest in his village of Lansayana on 
26 December 2008 (The Guardian, 28 December 2008).       
 
4.3 The 2008 military coup and the rise of the military junta  
The constitution of the Republic of Guinea states that the Speaker of the National Assembly 
must assume power when the president dies and the interim President must organise national 
elections within 60 days (Eriksson, 2010:58). However, this constitutional process was not 
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followed after Conté’s death. Instead, the military decided to overthrow the civilian government 
by dissolving the constitution and the National Assembly, banning political and union activity 
(Arieff and Cook, 2010:8). This raises the question: what motivated the military to stage a coup 
in Guinea? The democratic governance-stability theory – which is discussed in chapter three – is 
useful in helping answer it. To recap, this theory postulates that coups are likely to occur in a 
political environment characterised by corruption and weak administrative structures that 
dispense patronage to loyal constituencies. It was against this background of a political 
environment characterised by corruption and weak administrative structures that dispenses 
patronage to loyal constituencies that Guinea experienced a coup in 2008. More than fifty years 
of corrupt rule had stunted economic development. The speech issued by one of the coup leaders, 
Moussa Dadis Camara, aptly exposes how the corrupt rule of the two Presidents (Touré and 
Conté) had frustrated the aspirations of many citizens of that country: 
At a time of celebrating the 50th anniversary of its independence on 2 October, Guinea was 
ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world despite its abundant natural resources. Guinea 
could have been more prosperous. Unfortunately, history and men have decided otherwise. The 
embezzlement of public funds, general corruption, impunity established as a method of 
government and anarchy in the management of state affairs have eventually plunged our country 
into a catastrophic economic situation which is particularly tragic for the overwhelming majority 
of Guineans. All these woes have been worrying the population for a long time and have caused 
deep despair for the future (Pan African News, 5 January 2008). 
Shortly after staging the coup, the military leaders announced that they would form a 
government headed by a new body: the National Council for Democracy and Development 
(CNDD). The CNDD was composed of 33 members, most of who were chosen from the ranks of 
the national army (Arieff and Cook, 2010:7). The CNDD appointed Moussa Dadis Camara as 
the Head of State. He was a junior officer who had spent 17 years in the army after being 
educated at Conakry's Abdel Nasser University where he studied Law and Economics. He joined 
the army in 1990 and received military training in Germany. The most senior position that 
Camara had held was that of army captain. One of the reasons given for him being catapulted to 
the elevated position of Head of State was, as an army officer described Camara, his being a 
“fierce man of fierce ambition who possesses strong social skills and a reputation that he can get 
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things done”43. Camara was also quick to convince the public that he was the right man for the 
job: “I tell you this, I did not come to power by accident, it is due to a lot of qualities, I am a 
patriot”44.  
At first, Camara appeared as a leader who was about to lead Guinea to a democratic 
dispensation. However, this changed when he sacked “civilian regional administrators” and 
replaced them with military personnel (Arieff and Cook, 2010:9). The military leader also made 
attempts to centralise his power. He attached important Ministries such as the ministry of 
defence, finance and the central bank to the Presidency.  In January 2009, he established new 
ministerial positions and appointed military commandos to lead them.  
The paranoia that had characterised the previous regimes remained an ever-present feature of 
Camara’s government too; in the early days of 2009, Camara arrested junior officers and 
accused them of plotting a coup against the CNDD and his assault victims included influential 
figures of the CNND as well. In another instance in 2009, the security minister, General 
Mamadouba Toto was arrested and assaulted by presidential guards after being accused of trying 
to overthrow the government (Arieff and Cook, 2010:9).  
In the most infamous incident of Camara’s rule, which occurred on 28 September 2009, 
Guineans from all walks of life gathered in the early hours of this day at Conakry Stadium to 
support a nation-wide rally, organised by opposition parties. The main purpose of the rally was 
to put pressure on Camara not to contest the national elections, which were due to take place on 
31 January 2010. As opposition leaders were about to address a crowd of 50 000 people who 
were gathered at the stadium, soldiers entered it, closed the gates and opened fire on the 
protestors (International Crisis Group, 2009:2). In the stampede that ensued, 160 people were 
killed and close to 1700 people were injured.  
Subsequently, the army embarked on a brutal crackdown on those who had formed part of the 
rally including assaults of a sexual nature. These assaults were usually accompanied by acts of 
violence such as extreme acts of physical brutality, degrading insults and death threats. It is 
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alleged that close to 18 women were raped and about 28 women were assaulted (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009:8).     
The massacre caused an international outrage. The UN condemned the incident and urged 
Camara to abide by his prior commitment of not contesting the elections. The global governing 
body also “created an international commission of inquiry (the Commission) to investigate the 
many killings, injuries and alleged gross human rights violations that took place in the Republic 
of Guinea on 28 September 2009” (International Crisis Group, 2009:3). The US later joined the 
chorus of condemnation and called for appropriate action against the military leaders. On the 
other hand, the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner pleaded with the international 
community to send a military force that would protect civilians. ECOWAS added its voice to the 
condemnation too. The President of the regional body at that time, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, 
declared the acts unacceptable (International Crisis Group, 2009:3). 
Two days after the massacre, Conakry, the capital City of Guinea, was plunged into a state of 
violence. This, as security forces unleashed a reign of terror on those considered to be hostile to 
the military regime (Amnesty International, 2010:3). One person who witnessed the brutal 
crackdown on opposition supporters told the UK-based humanitarian agency Amnesty 
International that:  
Some were arrested and put into the boot of one of the vehicles, a Toyota Corolla. There already 
were two dead bodies in the boot. The soldiers arrested another young man from the 
neighbourhood. They hit him with their rifle butts and then made him get into the boot of a car. 
Some people who had been arrested were in a Pajero (a Mitsubishi 4x4) tried to escape but the 
soldiers opened fire and wounded one of them. The soldiers dragged him along the road and one 
of them finished him off by stabbing him three times with a knife, in the stomach, heart and back 
(Amnesty International, 2010:19). 
Other opposition supporters were detained in big shipping containers at the infamous Alpha Yaya 
Diallo camp. The container only had a small ventilation gap with iron bars and there was no 
toilet inside (Amnesty International, 2010:19). Officials of the army were also victims of this 
brutal crackdown. One prominent figure was an army lieutenant named Mohamed Lamine Diallo 
who was arrested by security forces on 7 October 2009 and sent to Alpha Yaya Diallo camps 
where he was held in solitary confinement (Amnesty International, 2010:19). 
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4.4 AU and ECOWAS responses to the military coup in Guinea  
Just hours after Camara sized power, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) called a press 
conference condemning the act as a “flagrant violation of the constitution and of African 
legality” which denounces any form of unconstitutional change (Eriksson, 2010:58). On 29 
December 2008, the 165
th
 meeting of the PSC passed a resolution that imposed diplomatic 
sanctions on the regime of the CNND. These diplomatic sanctions suspended Guinea from the 
policy structures of the AU (AU, 2008). ECOWAS also followed suit. On 10 January 2009, the 
regional body convened an extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State 
and Government. On this occasion, ECOWAS condemned the military coup, suspended 
Guinea’s membership and called on the military regime to respect democratic processes. The 
Heads of States attending this meeting proposed a series of concrete steps aimed at restoring 
constitutional order in Guinea. These steps included the following: 
 The establishment of the National Transitional Council (CNT) as a deliberative body, 
including civilians and the military, to achieve the objectives of the transition 
 The establishment of a consultative forum consisting of all components of civil society in 
Guinea which will serve as a framework for dialogue to allow Guineans to work 
collectively  towards establishing national cohesion  
 The completion of the transition process through the organisation of free and fair 
elections in 2009 
 The non-participation of the CNDD, as well as the Prime Minister of the Transitional 
government and members of his government in the elections to be held in 2009 
 The commitment of the Transitional authorities to respect human rights and the rule of 
law and to fight against impunity and drug trafficking (ECOWAS, 2009a). 
Immediately after this meeting, ECOWAS spearheaded the formation of the International 
Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G). The ICG-G was composed of representatives from the 
following organisations: the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the European 
Union (EU), the Mano River Union (MRU), the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the 
Organisation de la Franchophonie (OIF), the Chair of the AU PSC, the African and Permanent 
Members of the UNSC (Lar, 2011:138). The Special Envoy for Guinea appointed by the AU, 
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Ibrahim Fall, AU Chairperson, Jean Ping and the President of the ECOWAS Commission, 
Mohamed Ibn Chambas chaired the sessions of the group. The group was tasked with the 
responsibility of monitoring the progress towards the restoration of constitutional rule, engaging 
in direct talks with the Guinean political stakeholders, who included members of the CNDD, 
opposition parties, trade unions and civil society. In addition, the group was given the task of 
coordinating AU efforts with other international and regional initiatives to bring about normality 
in Guinea (Witt, 2012:12).  
The group held its first session in Guinea’s capital, Conakry, on 16-17 February 2009. In the 
inaugural meeting, discussions centred on the transitional stages leading to the elections. The 
representative of the CNDD, Sidya Touré, told delegates that members of the military regime 
would not participate in the upcoming elections (ICG-G, 2009a). This stance was adopted by the 
military regime mainly because the ICG-G was a powerful group made up of regional, 
continental and international actors which they did not want to antagonise.  
The second meeting of the ICG-G was held on the 16 March 2009. Representatives in this 
meeting urged the CNDD to start the process of establishing a National Transitional 
Government. Furthermore, the military regime was asked to finalize the process of voters’ 
registration. The CNND implemented these demands and approached the Ministry of Political 
Affairs and the Independent Electoral Commission “to put in a clear and detailed request for 
financing” the elections (Yabi, 2010:45). Camara’s regime also appealed to the global 
community to offer assistance in terms of “financial and material resources required for the 
conduct of credible and transparent legislative and presidential elections in the course of 2009” 
(ICG-G, 2009b). However, doubts remained that the military was committed to serious changes. 
In this, the sceptics were proved right when things turned sour during the fourth meeting of the 
ICG-G, which was held on 15 July 2009 in Syrte in Libya. Jean Ping (Chairperson of the AU 
Commission) and Mohamed Ibn Chambas (President of the ECOWAS Commission) co-chaired 
the meeting in which members of the contact group raised concerns over the security situation in 
Guinea. The main security concerns raised by the ICG-G included human rights violations and 
the limitations on freedom of expression regarding political organisations (ICG-G, 2009c). It was 
clear at this point that the ICG-G was concerned that the regime of the CNDD was not abiding 
by its obligations for restoring political order in Guinea.  
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In addition, in an effort to put pressure on the military regime to change its policy, the AU 
threatened to impose tougher measures in the form of smart sanctions and targeted economic 
sanctions on the regime. The situation worsened by the time the ICG-G held its sixth meeting in 
Conakry on 3-4 September 2009 when the ICG-G raised concerns about the delays in the 
electoral process. The group also noted that democratic processes might be undermined if 
Camara participated in the upcoming elections (ICG-G, 2009d).    
The massacre that occurred in Conakry Stadium on 28 September 2009 led to a dramatic policy 
shift in terms of how the AU and ECOWAS handled the coup in Guinea. ECOWAS condemned 
the killings and called on member states to help set up an International Committee of Inquiry that 
would identify the people responsible for instituting the barbaric acts. The regional body then 
went on to appoint the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, as a mediator “who would 
have direct consultations” with the coup leaders (Yabi, 2010:47). Compaoré’s role as chief 
mediator was outlined in the Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Heads of States held in 
Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria, on 17 October 2009. The Burkinabe President was strictly 
mandated with the re-establishment of talks among Guinea political actors with the aim of: 
 Establishing a new transitional authority to ensure a short and peaceful transition to 
constitutional order through credible, free and fair elections 
 Ensuring that the Chairman and members of the CNDD, the Prime Minister and those 
who hold high offices in the new transitional authority [will] would not be candidates in 
the forthcoming presidential elections 
 Setting up benchmarks in the transition chronogram already agreed and ensuring a timely 
achievement of the set benchmarks (ECOWAS, 2009b).  
The Summit also welcomed the decision made by the Secretary General of the UN to establish a 
commission of inquiry to investigate the events that unfolded on 28 September 2009. 
Furthermore, the summit went on to direct the President of the ECOWAS Commission 
(Mohamed Ibn Chambas) to:  
 Work with the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), the Chairperson of the AU to 
create a conducive and enabling environment, including the provision of a security cover, 
to allow the Commission of Enquiry to undertake its mission. 
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 Work with the African Union on a regime of targeted sanctions against individuals who 
would pose a threat to the implementation of the transitional agenda.  
 Work with the new transitional authority and subsequently the new Government at the 
end of the transition, in designing a program for Security Sector Reform, with the support 
of the AU, UN and other partners (ECOWAS, 2009b).
 
 
The decisions taken by ECOWAS were endorsed by the AU in the 207
th
 Meeting at the level of 
Heads of States and Governments which took place in Abuja on 29 October 2009 (AU, 2009). 
The officials of the PSC attending this meeting pledged to offer support in establishing an 
International Commission of Inquiry on the events of 28 September. The council made it clear 
that it fully supported the mediation efforts of Blaise Compaoré. More importantly, the PSC 
imposed a new round of sanctions against the military regime of Camara. These measures took 
the form of smart sanctions or targeted sanctions. In short, the Communiqué of 207
th
 PSC 
meeting captured the sanction package as follows:  
Implementation of targeted sanctions, including denial of visas, travel restrictions and freezing of 
assets against the President, and members of the CNDD, as well as members of the government – 
and any other civilian or military individual whose activities are aimed at maintaining the 
unconstitutional status quo in Guinea (AU, 2009c). 
The PSC also endorsed the arms embargo which was imposed by ECOWAS. In the events that 
followed, President Compaoré held high-level talks with the Forum of the Forces Vive and the 
CNDD
45
. The first round of talks took place on 3 November 2009 in Ouagadougou, the capital 
city of Burkina Faso. Yabi (2010:48) contends that talks between these actors were characterised 
by a difference of opinion. The CNDD were eager to preserve the status quo. They argued for 
Camara being allowed to stand in the elections scheduled for January 2010. The Forces Vives on 
the other hand argued that if Camara was allowed to participate in the upcoming elections that 
democratic processes might be undermined. The forum representing actors of the Guinean civil 
society also rejected Compaoré’s proposal that Camara should be included in the Government of 
National Unity.  
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    The Forum of the Forces Vive was composed of social (trade unions, human right groups) and political 
stakeholders (political parties) in Guinea. 
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On 3 December 2009, Camara survived an assassination attempt when one of his close allies 
Lieutenant Toumba Diakite shot him. He was then replaced by General Sekouba Konaté, who at 
that time, was the Minister of Defence (New York Times, 4 December 2010). 
The policy proposals towards restoring constitutional rule in Guinea, made by both ECOWAS 
and the AU were finally accepted on 15 January 2010 when chief mediator, Blaise Compaoré, 
announced that a new agreement, known as the Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou had been 
signed by the CNDD and the Forum on Forces Vives (Arieff, 2010:2). In this deal, General 
Sekouba Konaté was recognised as the interim president and was mandated to form a 
government of national unity. The Declaration also made the following commitments: 
 The appointment of a prime minister from the Forces Vives, a coalition of opposition 
political parties, trade unions, and civil society groups formed after the 2008 coup d’état. 
 The inauguration of a quasi-legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT). 
 The organisation of presidential elections within six months, with Konaté, the Prime 
Minister and members of the Government, the CNDD, the CNT, and the Defence and 
Security forces barred from running as candidates. 
 Reform of the Defence and Security forces. (Arieff, 2010:2) 
The transition from military to civilian rule came about with the formation of a transitional 
government on 19 January 2010, with senior ranking representatives of the Forces Vives asked to 
serve in the Government of National Unity (GNU). After the signing of the declaration, 
prominent political actors of the Forces Vives who swelled the ranks of government included 
Jean-Marie Doré who assumed the position of Prime Minister along with Serah Diallo who 
hailed from the trade union movement. She was tasked to head the CNT, composed of 155 
members who represented political parties, trade unions and civil society organisations. The 
transitional council was mandated to effect Guinea’s transition to a democratic dispensation 
through revising electoral laws and organising national elections within a period of six months 
(Arieff, 2010:2).
 
 
The Prime Minister’s cabinet comprised 34 ministers of which 24 were to be civilians and 10 
from the ranks of the army. However, the defence, security and justice ministry remained under 
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the control of the CNDD (Arieff and Cook 2010:2). Constitutional rule was finally restored on 
15 November 2010 after Alpha Condé won 53% of the votes in a run-off election. 
 
4.6 Analysis of the factors that contributed to the success of the AU sanctions policy in 
Guinea  
The key to the success of the AU sanction policy in Guinea is attributable to various factors. 
First, the reactions and responses of the AU and ECOWAS were directed by policies and 
protocols such as the Lomé Declaration, AU Constitutive Act, the ECOWAS Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance, which were adopted to deal with governments that have 
come into power by carrying out coups (Lar, 2011:136). These were well designed documents 
which clearly stipulated appropriate and necessary responses in the event of such a crisis. 
The AU’s sanctions policy with regard to events in Guinea found expression in the Communiqué 
of the 165th Meeting of the PSC which described the coup as: “a flagrant violation of the 
constitution of Guinea and the relevant AU instruments, as well as its demand for the return to 
constitutional order” (AU, 2008).  Additionally, the suspension of Guinea from the policy 
structures of the AU was also informed by Article 30 of the AU Constitutive Act which states 
that the “Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be 
allowed to participate in the activities of the Union”. For example, paragraph 3 of the 
Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council 165
th
 Meeting captured the sanctions policy 
towards Guinea as follows: 
Suspends the participation of Guinea in the activities of the AU until the return to constitutional 
order in the country in accordance with the relevant provisions of the AU Constitutive Act and 
the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on unconstitutional changes of government. In addition, 
Council reaffirms its determination to take, in due course, all other measures prescribed in the 
Lomé Declaration to accelerate the return to constitutional order (AU, 2008).  
At a regional level, the sanctions policy towards Guinea was expressed in the Extraordinary 
Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government. The Session declared 
that ECOWAS is committed to the principles of democracy and the rule of law, “and its rejection 
of unconstitutional accession to or maintenance of power will be rejected in accordance to 
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ECOWAS Protocols and relevant AU instruments”. Particularly, the ECOWAS decision that 
implemented sanctions on Guinea was taken in accordance with Article 45 of the Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance which states, in the event that democracy is abruptly brought 
to an end, ECOWAS may impose diplomatic sanctions in the following forms: 
 Refusal to support the candidate presented by the member state concerned for elective 
posts in international organisations 
 Refusal to organise meetings in the state concerned 
 Suspension of the concerned member states from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies 
(ECOWAS, 2001:22). 
The mediation role of ECOWAS especially that of engaging the perpetrators of the coup in 
Guinea, was also shaped by the sanction policies of ECOWAS. For example, Article 45 (3) of 
the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance prescribes that: 
During the period of suspension, ECOWAS shall continue to monitor, encourage and support the efforts 
made by the suspended member state to return to normalcy and constitutional order (ECOWAS, 2001).   
These sanction policies had the following effects on the military regime in Guinea. Firstly, they 
managed to influence it, as mentioned previously, to form a transitional government composed 
of 34 civilians and 10 officials from the army. Secondly, the sanction policies managed to 
prohibit members of the military regime from participating in the elections, thus fulfilling the 
commitment made by ECOWAS Heads of State on 10 January 2009, which advocated for:  
Non participation of the CNDD, as well as the Prime Minister of the Transitional government and 
members of his government in the elections to be held in 2009 which was (ECOWAS, 2009a).  
Thirdly, the sanction policies of the AU and ECOWAS were able to isolate the regime of the 
CNDD to the extent that it was not able to make appeals to African states to recognise the 
military regime as the legitimate government of Guinea. For example, the travel ban and the visa 
denial that were imposed by the AU on 29 October 2009 prohibited Camara from attending any 
meeting hosted by the AU. Furthermore, these sanctions also prohibited him from visiting 
member states of the AU. Thus, the existence of clear policies and the resolute intention to apply 
them to Guinea led to effective pressure on the military regime to comply and restore normalcy 
in Guinea (Lar, 2011:136). 
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In addition, these sanction policies made it possible for the AU and ECOWAS to articulate a 
common position, thus preventing a situation whereby the targeted state could have played one 
organisation off against the other (Lar, 2011:136). Thus, the cooperation between the two bodies 
closed their ranks, preventing the military from acting in any way that was contrary to the 
policies enunciated by these two organisations. In sum, the existence of clear policies and the 
political will to act decisively by both the ECOWAS and the AU (guided by its policies) made it 
possible to put pressure on the military regime to act in practical ways to restore order in Guinea.   
Another reason for the success of the AU sanctions policy is that the activities instituted by 
ECOWAS and the AU after the Guinea coup received the support of social and political actors. 
This included trade unions, civil society and the opposition parties; these were a significant voice 
in the society and were thus invited regularly to the meetings of the ICG-G. More importantly, 
these actors agreed with the transitional modalities proposed by ECOWAS. This was significant 
because it demonstrated that such actors supported the project of resolving the coup in Guinea 
(Yabi, 2010: 49). For example, the move adopted by ECOWAS which focused on permanent 
dialogue with CNDD, coupled with compliance to the election schedule, as well as the 
prohibition of members of the junta from participating in the elections, was supported by 
activists as well as the trade union movement (Yabi, 2010:49).  In addition to the above, the 
political and social actors of Guinea welcomed the smart sanctions, in the form of a travel ban 
and visa denials, imposed by the AU and ECOWAS after 28 September 2009. The support of the 
civil society, trade unions and opposition parties was critical because it mobilised domestic 
support for the AU and EOWAS sanctions policy.  
The AU and ECOWAS decision to prohibit Camara from participating in the elections 
introduced a new dynamic in the political landscape of Guinea. It influenced trade unions, 
political and human rights activists to organise a nation-wide rally aimed at putting pressure on 
Camara not to participate in the elections scheduled for 31 January 2010 (Matlosa and 
Zounmenou 2011:106). Consequently, Camara made a public statement insisting that the 
opposition should not have held the rally and promised that he was not going to stand in the 
elections scheduled for January (Aljazeera News, 29 October 2009).   
Another reason that made the AU sanction policy a success was that the ICG-G played a pivotal 
role in coordinating the efforts of the AU and ECOWAS and those of other international actors 
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such as the EU, France, United States and UN etcetera. This was important because it allowed 
the above-mentioned actors to apply pressure on Guinea to restore constitutional rule. For 
instance, just days after the military opened fire on peaceful protestors at Conakry Stadium on 28 
September, the United States announced that it was imposing a travel ban on members of the 
Junta and individuals who supported actions that undermined the restoration of democracy in 
Guinea (Mail & Guardian, 3 October 2009). Soon thereafter, the EU and France followed suit, 
with these two actors going as far as imposing an arms embargo on the government of Guinea 
(Mail & Guardian, 3 October 2009). 
A further reason is that the ICG-G displayed a level of serious commitment in resolving the 
political crisis. For example, “the ICG-G distinguished itself from other contact groups in the 
region by the frequency of its sessions – the group held nine sessions between February and 
December 2009 against two or three sessions per for the Guinea Bissau International Contact 
Group” (Yabi, 2010:50). This level of commitment may be attributed to the fact that two African 
Organisations were co-chairing the meetings of the ICG-G and were therefore in a better position 
than “non-African partners to” apply pressure on the military regime to change its policy (Yabi, 
2010:50). Through the ICG-G, the AU and ECOWAS managed to mobilise international support 
for its sanctions regime. This was evidenced in the 207
th
 Meeting of the PSC that recommended 
the AU to circulate the list of individuals to be targeted to the UNSC and all other AU partners, 
which in this case included the EU, the OIC, the USA and the IOF (Magliveras, 2011:23).  
Another factor that contributed to the success of the AU sanctions policy is that actors, such as 
the AU, ECOWAS and the ICG-G, responded with a level of urgency towards resolving the coup 
due to the geographic position of Guinea. It is located in the politically unstable region of West 
Africa, characterised by states that are trying to recover from decades of underdevelopment, civil 
wars and high levels of poverty and unemployment. A lack of urgency in resolving the resolving 
the crisis in Guinea on the part of international actors would have had serious implications for 
the region: Guineans would have fled their country, resulting in an influx of refugees into fragile 
neighbouring states such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. The influx would have perpetuated 
instability by increasing poverty and unemployment levels (Conciliation Resources, 2012:8). 
However, the prompt response from the international actors prevented this dire scenario.  
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Another factor contributing to the success of the AU sanction policy in Guinea was the 
accumulated experience of ECOWAS in conflict resolution. The preponderance of coups in West 
Africa, 43 coups in the period 1962-2012, prompted ECOWAS to develop mechanisms of 
conflict resolution such as the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance that have allowed 
it to respond effectively to coups. Prior to the coup in Guinea, the regional body had deployed its 
tools of conflict resolution to the 2003 coup in Guinea-Bissau and the 2005 one that occurred in 
Togo (Zounmenou, 2009b:72). In both these situations, ECOWAS managed to restore 
constitutional regimes after these states experienced coups. Thus, the knowledge gained by 
ECOWAS in mediating constitutional rule in these two states furnished the regional organisation 
with the skills and experience required to handle the coup in Guinea.     
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the policy success of the AU sanction policy as regards Guinea, first 
examining its post-colonial history as the background to events discussed. This section revealed 
that two dictators, Sekou Touré and Lansana Conté, who failed to implement a democratic 
programme, had ruled Guinea. Furthermore, the two leaders left behind a legacy of human rights 
abuses, and underdevelopment, which set the stage for a military coup. This chapter also 
discussed the rise of military rule. In this section, the impact of this rule that nearly paralyzed 
Guinea was revealed; where political change was arrested by using violence against those who 
sought to oppose the military policies.  
The responses of the AU and ECOWAS in restoring order to Guinea were also assessed, 
revealing the manner in which they responded to the coup by imposing sanctions on the military 
regime there. More importantly, the AU managed to restore normality in Guinea, which may be 
attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, both the AU and ECOWAS responded to the coup in 
Guinea based on existing policies. These were clearly articulated. Secondly, the activities 
instituted by the AU and ECOWAS managed to elicit the support of social and political actors. 
Thirdly, the sanctions policies of the AU and ECOWAS eroded the legitimacy of the CNDD 
regime thus preventing endorsement by the international community. The level of commitment 
and the sense of urgency displayed by the ICG-G was a crucial dimension that shaped the 
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success of the AU sanction policy. Indeed, failure to do this would have perpetuated regional 
instability. Overall, the success of the AU sanction policy in Guinea may be attributed to the 
accumulated experience of ECOWAS. 
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Chapter 5: Pitfalls of the AU sanctions policy in Madagascar  
 
5. Introduction  
This chapter analyses and discusses why the AU sanctions policy failed in relation to the military 
coup that took place on 17 March 2009. It first addresses the immediate post-colonial political 
history of Madagascar, starting with the regime of Philbert Tsiranana (1960-1972), followed by 
that of Didier Ratsiraka (1975-2001) and that of Marc Ravalomanana (2001-2009)
46
. This is 
followed by a discussion on the 2009 military coup and the rise of Andry Rajoelina to power. 
The AU and SADC responses are examined and this chapter is rounded off by a presentation of 
the factors that contributed towards the failure of the said policy in Madagascar. 
 
5.1 Madagascar under the regime of President Philibert Tsiranana (1960-1972) 
For eleven years (1960-1972) after gaining independence from France, Madagascar was ruled by 
Philibert Tsiranana. Tsiranana, a former schoolmaster who entered the political scene in the 
1940s, created a government that embraced democratic values. Socially, the following features 
exemplified democratic life in Madagascar: Tsiranana’s regime was able to create an atmosphere 
of tolerance, which was anchored to “a considerable degree on freedom of speech and press” 
(Brown, 1995:295). In addition to this, citizens in the post-colonial state of Madagascar were 
given freedom of political association, and there were no political prisoners and no clampdown 
on journalists and opposition supporters.  
The principles of multiparty democracy shaped the political system of Madagascar and a number 
of political organisations participated in the 1960 National Assembly elections (Allen, 1995:52). 
They included the Party of the Independence of Congress of Madagascar (AKFM), Miara 
Mirindra (MM), Mouvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar (MONIMA)  
                                                          
46
   From 1972-1975 Madagascar was ruled by Gabriel Ramanantsoa. On 5 February 1975 until 9 February [1975] 
Madagascar was ruled by Richard Ratsimandrava.  From 1993-1996 Madagascar was ruled by Albert Zafy. 
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Tsiranana’s political party, the PSD (Parti Social Démocrate), acquired 75 of 107 seats in the 
National Assembly. This number increased in 1965 when the party obtained 104 seats (94% of 
the votes). In the Parliamentary elections held on 6 September 1970, the PSD managed to retain 
104 seats in the National Assembly (Allen, 1995:52). 
Soon after winning elections, Tsiranana consolidated his rule by merging political and 
administrative functions into one role. Allen (1995:52) contends that this political programme 
was carried out for the purposes of reaffirming the slogan “the PSD state”. Brown (1995:299) 
observes that the rule of the PSD was further reinforced by the establishment of a government 
newspaper namely the Vaovao, published in the Malagasy language and the Courrier de 
Madagascar, which was published in the French language.   
In matters relating to international relations, President Tsiranana and his administration followed 
an anti-communist course and pro-Western policy. During his tenure, President Tsiranana 
banned Mao’s Little Red Book and criticised the Chinese railway construction in Tanzania. 
Moreover, Tsiranana condemned the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet, but not the American and 
French fleets, complaining that the Soviet fleet was a military threat (Allen, 1995:51). On the 
other hand, relations with the West and capitalist nations were good. In 1961, the Tsiranana 
administration established embassies in Britain, Italy, Taiwan and South Korea. During the same 
period, President Tsiranana visited the United States of America, Germany and France 
(Hardyman, 1961:130). Additionally, France, Madagascar’s former colonial ruler, continued to 
maintain strong ties with Madagascar. It is alleged that the French government supplied 
Madagascar with economic aid and technical assistance.  
In the realm of regional politics, Tsiranana always maintained a foreign policy that was not 
consistent with the prevalent Pan-African views of that time. Repeatedly, he argued that Pan-
Africanism was full of empty rhetoric and that some of its visions were impractical (Brown, 
1995:301). On a number of occasions, Tsiranana and his administration made decisions contrary 
to the ideals of the Organisation of African Unity. In the 1960s, he attempted to change the name 
of the OAU to the Organisation of African and Malagasy Unity. In the same decade, he sided 
with Moise Tshombe, a Congolese politician who instigated the invasion of Stanleyville by 
mercenaries from Belgium. Other acts that made Tsiranana unpopular within the African 
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community included the signing of a diplomatic treaty with Israel and maintaining diplomatic 
and economic ties with Apartheid South Africa in the 1960s (Brown, 1995:301).  
Signs of weakness in Tsiranana’s regime became apparent in the late 1960s, and were 
attributable to several factors. Economic stagnation, caused by a scarcity of foreign investment, 
led to a drastic decline in living standards. In 1967, Madagascar was ranked as one of the twenty 
poorest states in the world, with a per capita income of only US$ 80, with this economic crisis 
creating a perception, particularly amongst the Malagasy population, that little had changed since 
Madagascar’s independence from France (Brown, 1995:304-307). Another major factor that 
weakened the regime of President Tsiranana was the issue of political corruption and patronage. 
Government and local party leaders embezzled funds allocated for growth and development in 
the agricultural sector (Brown, 1995:55). Consequently, the peasants and the urban proletariat 
waged a revolt against the regime during 1971 in the Malagasy Province of Toliara. Evidence 
provided by Global Security reveals that the revolt turned violent when protestors attacked 
military and administrative buildings in Toliara 
47
. 
On 18 May 1972, Tsiranana transferred all executive powers to the Army General, Gabriel 
Ramanantsoa whose government was largely composed of the highest-ranking officers who 
served in the national army during the reign of Tsiranana. However, corruption stunted progress. 
Amongst others, the Minister of the Economy, Pierre Rabetafika, received bribes from French 
companies doing business in Madagascar (Covell, 1987:53). As a result, Ramanantsoa was 
asked to resign on 5 February 1975, to be replaced by Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava. 
However, Ratsimandrava’s ascendancy was cut short when he was assassinated in an attempted 
coup, instigated by the military, five days after assuming power (Marcus, 2004:2). 
 
5.2 Madagascar under the regime of Didier Ratsiraka (1975-2001) 
After the death of Ratsimandrava, a military Directorate, composed of 18 officers, was formed 
and assumed all government authority. However, a military Supreme Revolutionary Council 
(SRC) composed of eight senior officers deposed the Directorate from power (Randrianja and 
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 Global Security, 2011. Madagascar’s Battle for Independence. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/madagascar.htm  
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Ellis, 2009:193). A prominent figure who emerged as a key member of the SRC was a former 
naval officer and minister of Foreign Affairs, Didier Ratsiraka. In June 1975, Ratsiraka was 
appointed as Head of State and Chairman of the SRC (South African Institute of International 
Affairs, 1991:1). Furthermore, Ratsiraka cemented his personal status by organising a 
constitutional referendum on 21 December 1975. Essentially, the Referendum was aimed at 
testing the public, to gauge if they would accept Ratsiraka’s political programme. Notably, some 
of the questions of the constitutional referendum were formulated as follows: do you accept the 
Charter of the Socialist Revolution and the constitution that will implement it, and Captain 
Didier Ratsiraka as President of the Republic? (Randrianja and Ellis, 2009:193).   
Overall, 96% of the voter population accepted the new constitution and Ratsiraka’s governing 
programme which was rolled out under the Charter of the Socialist Revolution. Quintessentially, 
this Charter envisioned a Malagasy society founded on socialist values. It argued that the only 
road to development was one of socialism which could be achieved through: Nationalising the 
economy, condemning Western imperialism, supporting liberation movements, waging wars of 
independence against their respective colonial governments and condemning any form of neo-
colonialism (Brown, 1995:329).  
The socialist experiment was implemented in the economy during 1976 when the Ratsiraka 
regime nationalised the petroleum distribution industries and sugar refineries which were owned 
by French companies. The government also nationalised the textile industry; financial 
institutions such as banks; insurance companies and many of the agricultural industries (Pillard, 
1979:343)  
Ratsirakas’s socialist posture pushed him towards the communist bloc. This first became 
apparent on 15 June 1976 when he visited the People’s Republic of China. The visit was aimed 
at improving economic relations between China and Madagascar. Apart from discussing 
economic matters, the two states pledged to strengthen ideological ties and fight the imperialist 
forces that trampled on the sovereignty of the developing world (Peking Review, 18 June 1976).  
Ratsiraka’s speech attests to this stance: 
We have come on pilgrimage to the great source of the contemporary revolution. We have come-
to strengthen our relations of militant co-operation. We have come also to reinforce the testimony 
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of our common commitment to the defence of the principles and ideals of the revolution of 
peoples. Together with you, side by side with you and in unity with all peoples devoted to 
freedom, progress and peace, we take this exceptional opportunity to declare once again our firm 
commitment to the defence of the free determination of all the peoples, to unremittingly combat, 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism, to wipe out racism and racial 
discrimination from the face of the globe, to fight against the diabolical creation of hotbeds of 
tension by the action of big powers (Peking Review, 18 June 1976). 
Additionally, economic and political relations were cultivated with other communist states. In 
the late 1970s, North Korea became one of the leading communist states that assisted the regime 
of President Ratsiraka, providing, inter alia, military equipment and training to the national army 
in Madagascar as well as training to the personal bodyguards of Ratsiraka. Other sources of 
economic aid at that time also emanated from the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) 
and China (Brown, 1995:332). The USSR is purported to have sponsored Ratsiraka with 
weapons such as MiG 21 fighters while the Chinese government was at the forefront of building 
the highway that linked the Malagasy capital Antananarivo with Toamasina. Moreover, the 
socialist bloc, in particular China and the Soviet Union, asserted their presence by building 
embassies in Antananarivo. However, the decade of socialist rule during the period 1975-1985, 
stunted economic growth. According to the South African Institute of International Affairs 
(1991:4), state control of market prices had an adverse economic effect on the coffee, vanilla, 
sugar and coconut industries.  
A flurry of political reforms aimed at creating an open and pluralistic society followed, with the 
first political changes occurring shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; these included 
the granting of press freedom and the acceptance of a multiparty democracy. Multiparty elections 
were held in 1989 and Ratsiraka’s party, known as the Association for the Rebirth of 
Madagascar (AREMA), won the national elections with 62.71% of the votes. The remaining 
votes went to the Activists for Madagascar Progress (MFM), which received 19.33% with the 
Madagascar for the Malagasy Party (MONIMA) achieving the lowest number or votes at 3.03% 
of the total
48
. 
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However, by the 1990s, cracks also began to appear in Ratsiraka’s regime. A growing economic 
crisis that was caused by disastrous socialist policies was part of the beginning of the fracturing 
of the regime. As Marcus (2004:2) explains: 
Ratsiraka’s economy was in tatters, he had a debt crisis stemming from a donor bailout of his 
experiment in state owned enterprises and his significant partner, the Soviet Union, was on the 
brink of collapse.  
Consequently, this eroded Ratsiraka’s legitimacy and by 1991, his position had become so weak 
that the opposition leader Albert Zafy of the National Union for Democracy and Development 
(UNDD) party led an 80 000 strong-civilian strike. Again, in August 1991, 400 000 people 
marched to the city centre in Antananarivo. This strike brought the economy to its knees as it led 
to a sudden halt in the country’s banking, trading and governance sectors, which ceased to 
function (Marcus, 2004:2).  
However, Ratsiraka was unable to respond to the crisis, resulting in Zafy forming a shadow 
government (proclaiming himself as Prime Minister) and the Haute Autorité, a political body  
composed of 16 parties in the Henry Velano became the National Assembly under Zafy’s shadow 
government (Marcus, 2004:2). Henry Velano was a coalition of multiple parties that was led by 
Albert Zafy, Manandafy Rakotonirina and Richard Anndriamanjato. The aim of the Henry 
Velano coalition was to mobilise the urban disenfranchised against Ratsiraka’s AREMA party 
(Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, 2005:502).  
The formation of this shadow government forced Ratsiraka to the bargaining table and on 31 
October 1991, he signed the Panorama Convention, paving the way for a transitional 
government. The Panorama Convention permitted Ratsiraka to remain as President and the 
Haute Autorité became the legislature (Marcus, 2004:2). A major turning point in Ratsiraka’s 
regime came in August 1992 when a new constitution was adopted in a referendum organised by 
transitional authorities, paving the way for a democratic dispensation. On 25 November 1992, 
Malagasy authorities managed to organise Presidential elections, after the High Constitutional 
Court ruled in favour of Ratsiraka’s eligibility for candidature in the Presidential elections.  The 
November elections failed to produce a clear victor and the second round of elections in 
96 
 
February 1993 ended with the leader of the opposition, Albert Zafy, winning elections and being 
sworn in as President in March 1993 (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 2009:1).  
However, when he entered office, Zafy struggled to build a political culture founded on 
democratic norms and values. Marcus and Ratsimbaharison (2005:503) aptly demonstrate how 
Zafy’s regime throttled the development of democracy. 
In office, however, Zafy while rhetorically espousing liberalism, proceeded to centralize political 
and economic power in the presidency, for example, by proposing and securing constitutional 
amendments through a referendum that enabled him to appoint a Prime Minister without 
legislative approval, by weakening the authority of the provinces vis-à-vis the central government 
and by building his neo-patrimonial network organised by Henry Velona. 
Ultimately, these acts made Zafy unpopular with the members of the public and in September 
1996, he was asked to step down from his position after being accused by the opposition of 
violating the constitution. The power vacuum left behind by his departure ended in December 
1996 when the interim government decided to hold Presidential elections. The main contenders 
for the Presidency at that time included the impeached and discredited leader, Albert Zafy, 
unpopular contender, Nobert Ratsirahonana and the former dictator, Didier Ratsiraka. The 
voters elected Ratsiraka as President of the Malagasy state (Marcus and Razafindrakoto, 
2003:30). 
 
5.3 Madagascar under the Regime of Marc Ravalomanana 2001-2009  
Marc Ravalomanana entered the political scene in Madagascar in 1999 when he successfully 
campaigned for and won the “mayorship” of Antananarivo (Cornwell, 2003:41). 
Ravalomanana’s social status set him apart from his predecessors. He was a “self-made 
millionaire”, a businessperson who came up with a fresh approach to servicing a society torn 
asunder by decades of corruption, political instability and poverty (Cornwell, 2003:41).   
The highlight of his political career arrived in December 2001 when he decided to run against 
incumbent head of State, Didier Ratsiraka, in the Presidential elections. In the end, neither 
Ratsiraka (with 40.61%) nor Ravalomanana (46.44%) managed to obtain the required number of 
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votes (50%+1) to claim the reins of power (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 2006:4). This 
stalemate produced ominous results. Ploch (2010:6) argues that the dilemma led to an intense 
standoff between the two candidates and their parties. The group led by Ravalomanana refused 
to accept the results of the elections. They called on the international community to assist 
domestic authorities to verify the election results. The Ravalomanana faction also appealed to 
multilateral institutions to help launch the process of establishing transitional authorities that 
would lead the Malagasy population to a democratic dispensation. Eventually, Ravalomanana 
declared himself the winner of the presidential elections (Ploch, 2010:6). However, Ratsiraka 
refused to accept Ravalomonana’s legitimacy and continued to maintain control in the provinces 
of Mahajanga, Toamasina, Toliara, Fianarantsoa and Antsiranana, while Ravalomanana 
controlled the capital city Antananarivo (Marcus, 2004:9). As a result, fighting ensued in these 
provinces between the supporters of Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka. The matter was eventually 
settled by the High Constitutional Court which called for a recount of votes. The recount was 
concluded on 29 April 2002, and the Court announced the results (Ravalomanana 51.46% and 
Ratsiraka 35.90%). Realising that he had lost power, Ratsiraka went into exile in France on 5 
July 2002 (Marcus, 2004a:9).    
Immediately after he assumed power, Ravalomanana unveiled a programme aimed at reforming 
the public sector. This sought to rationalise the bureaucracy by creating a public service that was 
“leaner, more efficient and more accountable” (Marcus, 2004a:1). For instance, the once bloated 
cabinet was cut from 33 ministers to 16, who were incentivised by bonuses if they met 
performance targets.
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Another significant achievement made during the regime of Ravalomanana was the 
establishment of an Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (BIANCO). In the main, BIANCO was 
tasked with the responsibility for investigating cases of corruption in the public sector. This body 
was led by a capable workforce that included General Rene Ramarozatovo, who was chosen 
based on his success as leader of the investigation into former President Ratsiraka’s violent 
crackdown on demonstrators on 10 August 1991 (Marcus, 2004:1b). 
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Moreover, Ravalomanana’s regime dealt extensively with the injustices of the previous regime. 
Ploch’s (2011:3) analysis is useful in explaining how this process functioned: 
Many former officials from the Ratsiraka government were subsequently tried and sentenced on 
charges of corruption or political abuses. The court cases were viewed by many as a signal that 
the Ravalomanana administration was serious about addressing past political abuses and had 
consolidated political power (Ploch, 2011:3). 
The concept of sustainable development was at the centre of Ravalomanana’s social policy. In 
March 2006, he unrolled his Madagascar Action Plan (MAP). MAP was largely designed to 
alleviate poverty and ensure that the Madagascar responded to the challenges of globalisation 
through the following standards: 
 creating a more accountable and responsive government  
 upgrading or revamping public infrastructure 
 uplifting rural communities from poverty and unemployment    
 fighting HIV/AIDS 
 cherishing the environment (Marcus, 2006:4). 
As a result, MAP had a positive impact and was able to improve the lives of impoverished 
citizens in Madagascar. In 2006, the state of Madagascar moved from 146 to 143 – out of 177 – 
on the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (UNDP HDI). 
Moreover, the UNDP awarded Madagascar 26 on its Gross Domestic Product-Human 
Development Index (GDP-HDI) score, “as opposed to a 24 in 2005, indicating an improvement 
in human development in comparison to overall GDP” (Marcus, 2006:4). In the area of public 
works, Ravalomanana’s administration managed to build close to 2000 classrooms, upgraded 
public infrastructure and built new hospitals
50
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Economically, Ravalomanana stimulated development and growth through liberalising the 
economy. In 2004, he sold state owned firms such as Air Madagascar and the railways company 
to German and South African investors. The World Bank was pleased with Ravalomanana’s 
economic policy and in 2004, the global financial body decided to cancel US$ 2 billion worth of 
sovereign debt. In later years, the global financial institution provided Madagascar with US$ 1 
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billion worth of aid. Ravalomanana’s liberal policies attracted “high profile investment projects” 
which included the building of a US$ 800 million titanium oxide mine by the Australian 
company Rio Tinto (Ploch, 2009:7). In addition, Ravalomanana’s market led economy invited 
the South Korean company, Daewoo, to invest millions in Madagascar’s corn and palm oil 
industry.  Precede  
In matters relating to foreign affairs, Ravalomanana’s government cultivated bilateral relations 
with significant global players such as the US, Germany, Austria, Canada and China with the 
aim of reducing Madagascar’s reliance on traditional trading partners such as France and the 
European Union. Ravalomanana’s liberal posture made him a natural ally of the United States 
(Marcus, 2006:2). In 2007, the US government provided Madagascar with close to US$ 58.2 
million worth of aid, which was channelled towards healthcare programmes such as the 
government’s malaria initiative, aimed at reducing Malaria deaths by 50% (Ploch, 2009:8). On 6 
April 2006, the German President, Horst Köhler, visited Madagascar. This was the first time that 
any German President had visited Madagascar. Köhler was impressed about the state of 
development in Madagascar and mentioned that it was “heading unequivocally in the right 
direction and pledged to continue to grow trade ties” (Marcus, 2006:2). 
Although Ravalomanana was marginally better than Ratsiraka in terms of governing, he was still 
an autocrat who limited political participation in Madagascar. This phenomenon manifested itself 
in the 2006 Presidential elections (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012:8).  Observers point out that the 
government prevented the return of one veteran politician, Pierrot Rajaonarivelo, in order to 
stop him from running against Ravalomanana in the elections. Rajaonarivelo had previously 
served as Deputy Prime Minister under the regime of Ratsiraka and had also been the National 
Secretary of AREMA in the 1990s. The government warned Rajaonarivelo that if he returned, he 
risked arrest because of the corruption accusations levelled against him by Ravalomanana and 
his cohorts. There were cases of political intimidation too, that included the closing down of 
opposition headquarters in Tamatave and the arrest of opposition candidates. Issues around the 
ballot system and poor administration stunted political participation during the country’s 
legislative elections. In this regard, candidates were required to pay for and distribute their own 
ballots, with the possibility of reimbursement if they managed to acquire at least 10% of the 
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votes. This system was designed to block illegible candidates, but ended up marginalizing those 
with limited financial means (Bachelard and Marcus, 2011:4). 
Patronage and corruption were dominant features of Ravalomanana’s regime. Marcus (2004:4) 
reveals that Ravalomanana’s close associates and the “top brass” of his ruling TIM party were 
the people who were empowered economically during his regime. Heriniaina Razafimahefa, the 
treasure of TIM, was also the Managing Director of Ravalomanana’s company, Tiko as well as 
Chairperson of Air Madagascar. Another beneficiary included Patrick Ramiaramanana, who 
held an executive position in Tiko and later became the mayor of Antananarivo. In 2002, as 
further signs of patronage and corruption manifested themselves when the government awarded 
Tiko the sole rights to large advertising space in the municipal stadium (Marcus, 2004:4b).  
A major turning point in Ravalomanana’s rule came in December 2008 when he decided to shut 
down the television station VIVA, owned by Andry Rajoelina. Days after Ravalomanana did so, 
Rajoelina issued an ultimatum that demanded press freedom and civil liberties. The ultimatum 
also demanded that the government reopen this TV station by the 13 of January 2009 (Ploch and 
Cook, 2012:9). However, Rajoelina’s ultimatum fell on deaf ears. On 17 January 2009 he 
decided to intensify his campaign by organising a national rally in Antananarivo that was aimed 
at challenging the authoritarian tendencies of President Ravalomanana. Nearly 30 000 people 
attended Rajoelina’s rally, most of them from the ranks of the civil society, media and opposition 
parties.  
Chaos ensued as protestors destroyed property owned by Ravalomanana and a mob of angry 
protestors razed public property such as the state radio station and municipal buildings (Ploch 
and Cook, 2012:10). Ravalomanana’s response was harsh and on 3 February 2009, he issued an 
arrest warrant and fired Rajoelina from his position as mayor of Antananarivo.  
On 7 February 2009, the Presidential Guard opened fire on peaceful protesters marching outside 
the Presidential Palace.  Thirty-one people died and close to 200 people were injured (Bachelard 
and Marcus, 2011:4). 
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5.4 The 2009 military coup and the rise of Andry Rajoelina 
The political situation exploded on 17 March 2009 after the Army forced President Marc 
Ravalomanana to resign. In addition, the army also coerced him to sign an order that dissolved 
the government (Amnesty International, 2010:8). The order gave the national army full rights to 
govern Madagascar and also granted it the right to chart a democratic dispensation through the 
following actions:  
 Organising a national conference to discuss and draft possible amendments to the 
constitution  
 Preparing a review of the electoral code 
 Preparing a law on political parties  
 Organising elections within the next 24 months. (Amnesty International, 2010:8) 
These events raise a question at this point for the researcher: what motivated the military to stage 
a coup in Madagascar? The democratic governance-stability theory, discussed in chapter three 
sheds light on this question. To recap, the democratic stability theory postulates that coups are 
likely to occur in a political environment characterised by corruption and weak administrative 
structures that dispenses patronage to loyal constituencies (Nogma, 2004:89). It was against this 
background that Madagascar experienced the coup. Ravalomanana, it was said, “systematically 
weakened opposition” by jailing leaders of other political movements and imposing tougher laws 
that limited freedom of speech (Maunganidze, 2009:3). The military was dissatisfied with the 
prevailing situation and on 16 March 2009 seized control of the Presidential Palace and the 
central bank. Finally, on 17 March 2009 Ravalomanana announced that he would be stepping 
down as President (Ploch, 2009:3).    
Immediately after the coup, the military leaders transferred all executive power to civilian 
authorities and appointed Andry Rajoelina as the new President of Madagascar. Article 2 of the 
decree, drafted by the military after the coup formally recognised Rajoelina’s role, stating that 
“the duties and attributions of the President of the Republic shall be exercised by Rajoelina for a 
maximum period of 24 months” (Amnesty International, 2010:8). Rajoelina, on the other hand, 
was eager to cement his position as the new Head of State and on 18 March 2009, he wrote to the 
High Constitutional Court asking them to recognise the decree issued by the military directorate.  
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The court endorsed the decree and declared that Rajoelina had the right to exercise all executive 
powers. The incoming President wasted no time in asserting his authority. Shortly after the High 
Constitutional Court endorsed his Presidency, Rajoelina declared a state of emergency and 
suspended the Senate and the National Assembly (Amnesty International, 2010:8). 
In the months that followed, Rajoelina worked towards forming a government. His efforts paid 
off later on in March 2009 after he announced that he would organise his government under the 
High Transitional Authority (HTA). The HTA was largely made up of 44 members most of 
whom came from various political organisations and different ethnic groups. One of the key 
political figures who served in Rajoelina’s government included Monja Roindefo Zafitsimivalo 
who was appointed as the new Prime Minister (Marcus, 2009:1).  
Ironically, Rajoelina’s regime was characterised by the same authoritarian tendencies that 
prevailed during the rule of Ravalomanana, with the police force and security agencies being 
used to target those who opposed Rajoelina’s rule. These victims often included members of 
parliament, senators and lawyers (Amnesty International 2010:8) and arbitrary arrests were 
carried out against journalists and leaders of the civil society movements.  
Rajoelina also used the judicial system for the purposes of purging his opponents. On 28 August 
2011, Ravalomanana, together with other top officials who had served in his regime, were 
sentenced “in absentia” to life imprisonment and hard labour. This judgment was politically 
motivated and in the main aimed at discouraging Ravalomanana from returning to Madagascar 
(IDASA, 2011:3)
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Civilians too, were not spared the wrath of the regime and on 20 April 2009, security forces 
opened fire on unarmed protestors, killing two civilians while injuring scores of people during a 
public protest (Amnesty International, 2010:14). On 29 April 2009, the police opened fire on a 
group of civilians accused of throwing stones at the police and burning the national flag.  
Rajolian’s despotic power contributed towards eroding democratic values. The paper published 
by the International Crisis Group (2010:7) describes the nefarious practices that stunted the 
development of democracy in Madagascar: 
                                                          
51
   Ravalomana left for exile on 30 March 2009. 
103 
 
Since Andry Rajoelina took power in March 2009 and dissolved the assemblies, there are no 
democratic checks on government. Small groups of individuals close to the presidency conduct 
affairs of state and short-circuit institutional decision-making mechanisms. Decisions are taken by 
a small number of people composed of official or informal advisers of the president and a few 
ministers. Several members of this group have very limited political experience and are neither 
technocrats nor elected politicians.  
Rajoelina tightened his grip on power by amending the Constitution. For instance, on 17 
November 2010, he organised a national referendum. The referendum was aimed at changing the 
minimum age of a President from 40 to 35 to accommodate his age (Rajoelina was 35 years old). 
Furthermore, the referendum entrenched Rajoelina’s absolute rule by adding Article 166 “which 
allowed him to him to stay in power until the presidential election takes place, but it does not set 
a deadline for those elections” (Bachelard, and Marcus, 2011:3).  
Marcus (2009:1) contends that the political crisis created a tremendous economic shock: 
Since Rajoelina took over form Ravalomanana, foreign aid has dropped significantly. Furthermore, imports 
have declined by 22% and close to 220,000 people have lost their jobs. In addition, Petroleum and 
Chemical products have fallen by 15% and economic growth in 2009 stood at a disappointing 0.6%. The 
political crisis has also deepened poverty and inequality.  It is reported that poverty in Madagascar has 
increased sharply from 68.7% to 75.6% in 2010. The situation is also exacerbated by rising food prices. For 
example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that commodity prices deteriorated by 3 points on 
trade balances and the Malagasy economy shrank by 2% 2009 to 2010.  
 
5.5 AU and SADC responses   
The AU was quick to respond to the coup in Madagascar. At first, the continental body 
condemned it. Moreover, the AU issued a communiqué that urged the instigators of the coup “to 
comply with the provisions of the Malagasy constitution on interim arrangements in the event of 
a resignation” (AU, 2009b). The key provisions that the AU referred to were in Article 52 of the 
Malagasy Constitution, which stated that in the event where the post of the presidency became 
vacant, the election of the new president should take place within 60 days (Madagascar, 1992). 
On 20 March 2009, the 181
st 
Meeting of the PSC passed a resolution that imposed diplomatic 
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sanctions on the regime of Rajoelina. These diplomatic sanctions suspended Madagascar from 
the policy structures of the AU (AU, 2009b). 
However, the perpetrators of the coup were quick to defend their actions. Days after the military 
instigated the coup, the Malagasy Prime Minister, who was installed by the military, Monja 
Roindefo, declared that the coup was carried out for the purposes of protecting Madagascar 
against totalitarian rule (Eriksson, 2010:62).  
On 30 March 2009, SADC convened an Extraordinary Summit of Heads of States and 
Government in Swaziland. In this meeting, SADC member states condemned the coup and 
refused to recognise Rajoelina as the President of Madagascar. More importantly, the regional 
body suspended Madagascar from its policy structures and its organs “until the return of the 
country to constitutional normalcy” (SADC, 2009a). 
Soon thereafter, the AU together with the international community spearheaded the formation of 
the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M). The group was composed of the AU, 
SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Organisation 
International de la Francophonie (OIF), the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council 
and the European Union (Ploch and Cook, 2012:12). Primarily, the ICG-M was tasked with the 
responsibility of finding a common solution for the political crisis in Madagascar. The ICG-M 
held its inaugural meeting on 30 April 2009 in Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. During 
this meeting, the ICG-M encouraged the head of the AU commission at that time, Jean Ping, to 
intensify efforts at restoring constitutional rule in Madagascar (ICG-M, 2009a).  
On the 20 June 2009, SADC convened an Extraordinary Summit at the Head of State level and 
appointed the former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, as the head of the SADC 
mediation team in Madagascar (Cawthra, 2010:20). 
The ICG-M held its second consultative meeting on 22 June 2009. In the course of it, the ICG-M 
mandated that the AU hold a meeting with all the warring factions, the Chefs de File, “in order to 
reach a consensual solution for a rapid return to constitutional order” (ICG-M, 2009b)52. 
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In pursuit of the decision taken in the second consultative meeting of the ICG-M, the said Chefs 
de File held a meeting in Maputo on 5-9 August 2009 under the auspices of the AU, was chaired 
by Joaquim Chissano, assisted by special envoys of the AU, the OIF and the UN (AU 2010a). 
Primarily, this meeting attempted to identify points of agreement and disagreement and explored 
ways of finding a solution to the impasse in Madagascar. The decisions made by the Chefs de 
File in this meeting, culminated in the signing of the Maputo Agreement that produced the 
following outcomes:   
 An agreement on the cancellations of convictions related to the events of 2002 in 
Madagascar 
 An agreement on the case of President Ravalomanana for repealing his sentence to life in 
prison for ordering the killing of 40 peaceful protestors  
 An agreement on the cancellation of convictions against political figures, civil and 
military under Ravalomanana 
 Participants also agreed on the length of the transition period, which should not go 
beyond 15 months from the date of the signing of the agreement in Maputo 
 Parties agreed that the transition would end with the holding of credible elections under 
international supervision, leading to the establishment of stable democratic institutions in 
Madagascar 
 The Parties agreed on transitional institutions, amnesty, national reconciliation, the status 
of former leaders, constitutional reforms and national reconciliation  
 Parties also agreed on establishing a Government of National Unity headed by a 
consensus Prime Minister, 3 Deputy Prime Ministers and 28 ministers (SADC, 2009b).  
SADC welcomed the move made by the political camps and urged the political actors to support 
the objectives and the agreements signed at the Maputo Summit (SADC, 2009b).  
The events that unfolded after this meeting had implications for the mediation process. On 3 
September 2009 the three camps of the Chefs de File, Ravalomanana, Zafy and Ratsiraka, 
attempted to weaken Rajoelina’s rule by calling on the army to overthrow the government. As a 
consequence, Rajoelina responded by forming a Transitional Government without the 
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participation of the three other camps (Ravalomanana, Zafy and Ratsiraka) (Zounmenou, 2009b: 
73).  
The AU and the Ravalomanana camp did not welcome the move carried out by Rajoelina. On 10 
September 2009, the PSC convened its 202
nd
 meeting to discuss a solution towards solving the 
quandary. The PSC expressed its “deep concern about this development and stressed that the 
Maputo Agreement remained the consensual framework for a peaceful exit” (AU, 2010a). 
Furthermore, the PSC called on the Chefs de File to “resume dialogue with other political 
movements for inclusive and peaceful implementation of the Charter and the Transition 
Agreements signed in Maputo” (AU, 2010a). In addition, the PSC urged the perpetrators of the 
coup to restore constitutional rule within a period not exceeding 15 months.  
On 6 October 2009, the ICG-M convened its third consultative meeting in Antananarivo. The 
AU Chairperson Jean Ping chaired the meeting. In this gathering, ICG-M endorsed the following 
decisions: that President Andry Rajoelina could remain as the head of the Transitional 
government if he did not contest power in the upcoming elections (Cawthra, 2010:15). The ICG-
M also endorsed the proposal that the post of Vice President of the transitional government had 
to be filled by Dr. Emmanuel Rakotovahiny of the Zafy led camp.  
Subsequently, the Chefs de File held their third meeting under the auspices of the AU in Addis 
Ababa on 3-7 of November, 2009 and on this occasion, they adopted “the Additional Act to the 
Charter of the Transition” also known as the Addis Ababa Additional Act (AU, 2010a). The 
Additional Act introduced the appointment of two Vice Presidents from the Ravalomanana and 
the Zafy camp. The Act additionally went on to endorse Eugène Mangalaza as the Prime 
Minister of the transitional government, and also assigned six Ministerial posts to each of the 
four political camps with the remaining seven posts allocated to other political stakeholders in 
Madagascar (AU, 2010a). The adoption of this mechanism indicated that the leaders of 
Madagascar had reached consensus on the main leadership posts (Cawthra, 2010:15).  
In the event, the PSC welcomed the signing of the Additional Act and urged the four political 
stakeholders to finalize the appointment of the representatives mentioned in the Charter. The 
PSC also requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to spearhead the formation of the 
monitoring mechanism. The council further requested that the Chairperson of the AU 
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Commission work collectively with other stakeholders (such as the EU, the UNDP and the IOF) 
to develop a framework to assess Madagascar’s electoral needs (AU, 2009b).     
In the months that followed, President Guebuza Armando Emilio of Mozambique, in his capacity 
as President of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, together with 
the SADC chief negotiator Joaquim Chissano, invited the Chefs de File to a meeting in Maputo. 
The aim of this meeting was to resolve the outstanding issues. However, President Andry 
Rajoelina declined the invitation to participate in these talks mainly because they were not 
conducted under the auspices of the AU. In this gathering, the three political camps of the Chefs 
de File appointed a Government of National Unity without the consent of Andry Rajoelina 
(Cawthra, 2010:15). However, Rajoelina retaliated by dismissing the consensus Prime Minister 
Eugène Mangalaza, preventing the return of some members of the Chefs de File (Ravalomanana 
and Zafy) and pledging to hold  parliamentary elections without the participation of the Chefs de 
File. In addition, Rajoelina went on to reject any further involvement by the international 
community (Cawthra, 2010:15).  
Likewise, the AU PSC, which held its 211
th
 meeting on 7 December 2009, warned that the move 
could jeopardise the progress achieved by the four political groups in ending the political crisis 
in Madagascar (Press Statement of the 211
th
 meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 2009). 
Moreover, the PSC called on all the political actors in Madagascar to “demonstrate the required 
political will to resolve the current impasse in strict compliance with the Maputo Agreements 
and the Additional Act of Addis Ababa” (Press Statement of the 211th meeting of the Peace and 
Security Council, 2009).  
The ICG-M convened its 4th consultative meeting during the period 4-7 January 2010. Initially, 
the aim of this meeting was to “re-launch a process for a way out of the crisis” (ICG-M, 2010c). 
In this regard, officials attending the consultative meeting of the ICG-M “reaffirmed validity of 
the Maputo Agreements and the Addis Ababa Additional Act” and urged the political 
movements in Madagascar: 
To conclude expeditiously the full agreement on a transitional arrangement, building on what 
they had already agreed to in the Maputo Agreements of 8 and 9 August 2009 and the Addis 
Ababa Additional Act of 6 November 2009, duly negotiated and signed by the four Leaders of the 
political camps in Madagascar (ICG-M, 2010c).  
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In matters relating to a peaceful transition, representatives of the ICG-M counselled that: the 
transition should be as short as possible; that elections should be organised in a free and 
transparent manner. Lastly, the ICG-M advised transitional authorities to “agree on the timetable 
and conditions for supervision of the elections” (ICG-M, 2010c). 
In this regard, the events that occurred after the 4th consultative meeting of the ICG-M indicated 
that the AU and its partners were ready to adopt stronger measures in the form of targeted 
sanctions such as visa denials, travel bans etcetera against the regime of Rajoelina. The adoption 
of tougher measures, against Rajoelian and his allies was witnessed at the 5th Consultative 
Meeting of the ICG-M which was took place on 18 February 2010 in Addis Ababa. On this 
occasion, representatives called on the AU, SADC and the international community to 
implement targeted sanctions such as visa denials, travel bans, asset freezing, against Rajoelina 
and his government (ICG-M, 2010d).     
In the light of the prevailing political crisis, the SADC Double Troika Summit of Heads of State 
and Government, held in Maputo on 14 January 2010, maintained that Madagascar should be 
suspended from SADC structures until constitutional rule was restored (SADC, 2010a). 
Eventually, the decisions of SADC and the ICG-M were entertained in the 216
th
 meeting of the 
PSC that took place on 19 February 2010 in Addis Ababa (AU, 2010b). In this respect, the PSC 
resolved that unless Rajoelina’s regime implemented the Maputo Agreements and the Addis 
Ababa Additional Act by the 17 March 2010, the AU would impose the following measures:     
 Travel ban against all members of the institutions set up by the de facto authorities born 
out of the unconstitutional change and all other individual members of the Rajoelina 
camp whose actions impede the AU and SADC efforts to restore constitutional order.  
 The freezing of funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the President, 
ministers and government officials who support the maintenance of the unconstitutional 
status quo in Madagascar. This also included individuals and entities that impeded AU 
and SADC efforts to restore constitutional order (AU, 2010b).  
In addition, the AU went on to lobby the international community to support its decision in 
imposing sanctions on Madagascar. However, the AU failed to see this through and this point is 
addressed in greater length in the following section. The continental organisation also warned its 
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partners to refrain from any activity that might undermine the decisions of the AU in relation to 
the unconstitutional change in Madagascar (AU, 2010b). 
These above-mentioned sanctions were formally imposed by the PSC on 17 March 2010 against 
Rajoelina. It is clear from the utterances in paragraph 4 of the Communiqué of the 221
st
  meeting 
of the PSC that the sanctions regime consisted of a mixture of targeted or smart sanctions and 
diplomatic sanctions. Mostly, the smart sanctions in this case included the freezing of funds and 
other financial assets and economic resources that belonged to Rajoelina and his close aides. The 
relevant component of the diplomatic sanctions read as follows: “diplomatic isolation, against 
Mr. Andry Nirina Rajoelina” (AU, 2010b). 
SADC continued to push its diplomatic campaign and on 30 April 2010, the regional body 
convened discussions with the political actors of Madagascar. The discussions aimed at ending 
the stalemate in Madagascar. The meeting was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, and was 
facilitated by President Jacob Zuma. Other top officials who attended the meeting included 
SADC’s Executive Secretary Augusto Salomao and the Chairperson of the AU Commission Jean 
Ping. The four political camps of the Chefs de File (Marc Ravalomanana, Albert Zafy, Didier 
Ratsiraka and Andry Rajoelina) were also present at the talks (Peace and Security Council 
Report, 2010). The leaders of the four political camps agreed to establish a consensual and 
inclusive transitional government. However, the meeting was unable to produce a clear outcome 
on electoral and amnesty processes. The chief negotiator of the political crisis, Joaquim 
Chissano, noted that this gathering was unable to “resolve the timing of the elections and the 
granting of amnesty for alleged crimes committed in the lead up to Ravalomanana’s removal” 
(Peace and Security Council Report, 2010).  
The events that unfolded after the SADC meeting proved the political crisis in Madagascar was 
becoming progressively insoluble: days after the Johannesburg talks were concluded, Rajoelina 
continued with his unilateral approach and pronounced that he would be forming a government 
without the participation of other political camps. He further announced that technocrats, 
members of the civil society and representatives of the army would compose his neutral 
government (Peace and Security Council Report, 2010). 
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However, SADC adopted a lenient position with regard to these actions. It merely rebuked 
Rajoelina for threatening to implement such measures. While addressing the media on 14 May 
2010, SADC’s chief negotiator Joaquim Chissano, warned that “unilateralism is unacceptable” 
(AFP, 4 May 2010) and went on to remind the political stakeholders of the commitments they 
had made before the international community and the Malagasy people. 
From 16 August to 17 August 2010, SADC convened a Summit of Heads of State and 
Government in Windhoek, Namibia.  Concerning the political crisis in Madagascar, the summit 
resolved that:  
SADC, the African Union and the wider international community should lend their political, 
technical, material and financial support to the process of the mediation process (SADC, 2010b). 
In February 2011, Leonard Simao (who was an assistant of Chissano’s in the SADC mediation 
process)   presented the Chefs de File with a document titled the Roadmap of Ending the Crisis 
in Madagascar (Nathan, 2013:6). The Roadmap proposed that Andry Rajoelina would be the 
President of the Transition and that he should appoint a consensual Prime Minister. Other critical 
proposals spelled out in the roadmap included: the formation of a transitional government of 
national unity, offering unconditional amnesty to those who committed inhumane acts and the 
hosting of national elections that would be supervised by the international community (Lunn, 
2012:4). Rajoelina accepted the Roadmap and declared that he supported it.   
However, because of paragraph 20 of the Roadmap which stated that “Ravalomanana cannot 
return to Madagascar until a favourable political and security environment was established”, the 
Chefs de File were not in full support of the Roadmap (Kotzé, 2013:10). They also rejected the 
Roadmap because they had not been adequately consulted; because it gave Rajoelina too much 
power during the transition, permitted him to contest elections and legitimised the coup (Nathan, 
2013:6).  
On 31 March 2011, SADC convened a summit of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation that took place in Livingstone in Zambia. On this occasion, delegates received a 
report from Chissano which recommended that SADC should endorse the Roadmap and that it 
should be recommended to the international community (Kotzé, 2013:11). The summit was not 
in support of the notion propagated by the Roadmap that Rajoelina should be the President of the 
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Transition. This sentiment was captured in paragraph 15 of the SADC Communiqué which stated 
that: 
The Extraordinary Summit does not recognize Mr. Rajoelina as President of Madagascar as his 
appointment did not only violate the constitution of Madagascar and democratic principles, but 
also violated the core principles of and values of the SADC Treaty, the African Union 
Constitutive Act and the United Nations Charter (SADC, 2011).  
On 20 and 21 June 2011 SADC held an Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and 
Government in Johannesburg, South Africa. On this occasion, “a number of decisions were taken 
that constituted amendments to the Roadmap” (Kotzé, 2013:12). These decisions were captured 
as follows: 
 The Summit endorsed the Roadmap to bring Madagascar into constitutional normalcy 
presented by the SADC mediator on Madagascar after affecting the necessary 
amendments 
 Summit also urged the High Transition Authority  (HTA) to allow Malagasy people in 
exile for political reasons to be allowed to return unconditionally to the country including 
Mr. Ravalomanana  
 The Summit urged the HTA to enact and urgently develop all outstanding legal 
instruments to ensure the political freedom of all Malagasy in the inclusive process 
leading to free fair and credible elections (SADC, 2011).  
The decisions taken by SADC were discussed by the AU in the 283
rd
 meeting of the PSC. In this 
meeting, the PSC requested that the “Roadmap be amended accordingly and be fully consistent 
with the relevant decisions and instruments of the AU and SADC” (AU, 2011). The PSC also 
counselled that the AU Commission and SADC Secretariat establish a joint presence in 
Madagascar to monitor the evolution of the situation and facilitate the implementation of the 
Roadmap; to be done in close coordination with the AU partners that included the IOF, EU and 
the Indian Ocean Commission (AU, 2011). 
In August 2011, South Africa assumed the position of Chairperson of the SADC Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, taking over from Zambia. “The South African 
Deputy Minister of International Relations, Marius Fransman acted most of the time in that 
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ministerial level at that capacity” (Kotzé, 2013:14). Under the leadership of Fransman, SADC 
was able to amend the Roadmap in accordance with the decisions taken at the Extraordinary 
Summit. For example, Fansman amended paragraph 20 of the Roadmap to read as follows: “the 
HTA shall allow all Malagasy citizens in exile for political reasons to return to the country 
unconditionally, including Mr. Marc Ravalomanana” (Kotzé, 2013:14). Fransman also added the 
following paragraphs to the Roadmap: 
The HTA shall provide security and safety to all Malagasy returnees. The HTA shall urgently 
develop and enact necessary legal instruments, including an amnesty law to ensure the political 
freedom of all Malagasy in the inclusive process leading to free fair and credible elections (Kotze, 
2013:14). 
On 17 September 2011, all the political stakeholders except for the Ratsiraka faction signed the 
revised Roadmap. Those who signed up to the Roadmap agreed to: 
 Create a new, inclusive and consensual transitional government of national unity and 
attendant institutions of transition to govern Madagascar and to oversee the holding of 
internationally supervised, free-and-fair elections within a year  
 Create a balance of power between the contesting parties in Madagascar, which can be 
defined as the eight (8) mouvances (parties) recognising Rajoelina; and the three major 
political mouvances of President Ravalomanana and those of former presidents Didier 
Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy  
 Participating in the transition in good faith, creating an atmosphere of peace and security 
for all the Malagasy people, to avoid impeding the transition process and to maintain a 
constructive and patriotic attitude with a view to advancing the transition 
 Allowing the unconditional return of all exiles including President Marc Ravalomanana 
and granting of blanket amnesty with certain exclusions (Ravalomanana, 2012:12). 
On 15 October 2011, the SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ Troika visited Madagascar. 
The purpose of the visit was to hold discussions with the political stakeholders who had signed 
the SADC Roadmap (Press Statement of the SADC Organ Troika, 2011). On this occasion, the 
Troika urged all the political actors in Madagascar, including those who were still in exile, to 
abide by the decisions set out in the Roadmap. The Troika also called on Rajoelina to refrain 
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from undertaking unilateral actions that would abjure the agreements contained in the roadmap. 
Furthermore, the political stakeholders signed an Agreement on the Implementation Framework 
of the roadmap for ending the political impasse in Madagascar. The critical elements of this 
agreement included: the appointment of a consensual Prime Minister by 1 November 2011 and 
the appointment of the representatives of Transitional Government and Transitional Parliament 
by 17 November 2011. Lastly, the agreement prescribed that the legislative authority should 
ratify the First Act of Parliament that establishes a new National Independent Electoral 
Commission by 30 November 2011 (Press Statement of the SADC Organ Troika, 2011). 
Once again, the diplomatic talks continued to take centre stage and on 8 December 2011, the AU 
PSC convened its 303rd meeting in Addis Ababa. In this context, the PSC requested the 
international community and AU partners to assist Malagasy transitional authorities in 
implementing the Roadmap. The type of assistance was mainly technical and required the 
international community to sponsor the election process in Madagascar (AU, 2011).  
Finally, the year 2011 closed off with the 6
th
 Consultative meeting of the ICG-M. This took place 
on 8 December 2011 in Addis Ababa. In this gathering, AU partners that included the EU, the 
OIF, the UN, the COMESA etcetera agreed to pledge financial, technical and logistical resources 
towards the electoral processes in Madagascar (ICG-M, 2011). 
Many reforms aimed at restoring constitutional rule in Madagascar took place after the 
international community made this pledge.  On 10 March 2012, authorities in Madagascar 
created an Independent Electoral Commission. The body comprised 10 representatives from the 
civil society, with 9 representatives from each political party, an appeals court judge and two 
representatives from Rajoelina’s administration. In April 2012, Parliament passed an Amnesty 
Law that protected some representatives of the previous regime from facing persecution (Ploch 
and Cook, 2012:3).  
In January 2014, Presidential elections were held in Madagascar and Henry Martial 
Rakotoarimanana was elected to the position of Head of State. However, Ravalomanana could 
not take part in the elections mainly because some political actors, more especially from 
Rajoelina refused to grant him entry into Madagascar (Bloomberg. 14 January 2014).  
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5.6 Analysis of the factors that derailed success of the AU sanction policy in Madagascar 
The AU sanction policy has failed to restore constitutional rule in Madagascar, thus permitting 
Rajoelina to act in a way that violates principles spelled out in the agreements brokered by 
SADC. This may be explained by the following factors.  
 
5.6.1 SADC contravenes AU principles  
The first factor that continues to derail progress in Madagascar lies in the fact that some of the 
decisions taken by SADC contradict AU principles. The SADC Roadmap clause that recognises 
Rajoelina as the President of the Transitional Government is contrary to Article 25 of the AU 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which states that: “the perpetrators of an 
unconstitutional change shall not be allowed to participate in the elections held to restore 
democratic order or hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their state” 
(AU, 2007 and Nibashaka, 2012:3). Neglecting this Article strengthened Rajoelina’s position 
and diminished the prospects of forming a transitional government made up of candidates from 
the ranks of the Chefs de File. On 28 October 2011, Rajoelina appointed Omer Beriziky as prime 
minister, “without the consent of opposition parties as required by the Roadmap” (IDASA, 
2011:4).  The Ravalomanana camp and opposition parties criticised the move and issued public 
statements which claimed that Beriziky’s appointment was illegal. Consequently, the decision 
adopted by SADC to recognize Rajoelina undermines the AU sanctions policy and this has made 
it difficult for international organisations to adopt a common position towards Madagascar. In 
turn, this has generated a situation whereby Rajoelina is exploiting these divisions and has 
continued to enact decisions that do not include the other political stakeholders such as 
Ravalomanana, Zafy and Ratsiraka.  
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5.6.2 Conflicting Interests  
The conflicting interests of various actors also diminished the prospects of finding a common 
ground to solve the political impasse in Madagascar and some international organisations such as 
the EU have followed the leadership of South Africa on this matter. The EU has done so in that it 
has played a neutral role because it is committed to resolving the political impasse in 
Madagascar without showing any sense of favour for Rajoelina or for Ravalomana (Cawthra, 
2010:19). France, as Madagascar’s former colonial muster, is eager to maintain economic and 
political interests and has thrown its weight behind Rajoelina, largely to keep Madagascar within 
its sphere of influence (Lanz and Gasser, 2013:14). For example, on 18 December 2012, France 
allowed Rajoelina to travel to Paris to meet with its Foreign Minister. Additionally, France 
played an instrumental role in advising the heads of security at Antananarivo Airport to deny 
Ravalomanana access from entering Madagascar (All Africa, 26 January 2012). On the other 
hand, Ravalomanana enjoys the support of Swaziland and Zimbabwe. When Swaziland held the 
Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in April 2009, it 
proposed the option instituting military action in order to restore the rule of Marc Ravalomanana 
to member states, with Zimbabwe sharing the same sentiment. For instance, in June 2009, when 
President Mugabe was elected as the chairperson of the Common Market for East and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), he issued a statement that stated that COMESA “supports SADC’s efforts to 
restore constitutional rule in Madagascar by examining all options including the possibility of 
military intervention” (Nathan, 2013:11). Thus, it might be supposed that these two states, that 
are governed in an undemocratic manner, proposed military action because they were concerned 
that they might be overthrown in a similar fashion; a concept supported by King Mswati of 
Swaziland’s warning the “army personnel not to emulate the Malagasy soldiers who participated 
in the dethroning of their country’s president” (Nathan, 2013:11).     
SADC officials are also responsible for perpetuating the lack of progress in Madagascar: 
Chissano’s mediation assistant and former Mozambican Foreign Minister, Leonard Simao, 
voiced opinions that do not favour a consensual government. In 2011, Simao stated that the 
Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy camps should not be included in the transitional government 
of Madagascar (Kotzé, 2012:13) and this has led Ravalomanana’s camp to accuse the mediation 
team of the following: 
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The SADC mediation team, in particular Leonard Simao, is biased towards the illegal regime. He 
is making public statements about the process and decisions taken by SADC that are not in line 
with the communicated decisions of the SADC Heads of States (Ravalomanana quoted in Kotzé, 
2013:13). 
Conflicting interests were also fuelled by internal divisions between SADC structures, such as 
the Extraordinary Summits of the Heads of State and Government and the SADC mediation 
team. These divisions surfaced at the SADC Summit of the Extraordinary Heads of State that 
took place on 31 Mach 2011. On this occasion, the SADC Heads of State refused to endorse the 
Roadmap drafted by the chief mediator, Jacquim Chissano. The Roadmap was rejected because 
of paragraph 20 which stated that “Ravalomanana could not return to Madagascar before a 
favourable political and security environment was established” (Kotzé, 2013:10). As a result, the 
Summit shifted the responsibility of the mediation to the Troika of the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation. The Troika mediators, who led by the South African Deputy 
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Marius Fransman, side-lined Chissano and 
later amended Paragraph 20 of the Roadmap to read as follows: “HTA shall allow all Malagasy 
citizens in exile for political reasons to return to country unconditionally, including Mr. Marc 
Ravalomanana” (Kotzé, 2013:14). Thus, these internal divisions hampered the SADC’s 
mediation efforts and made the regional body look incompetent, out of touch and at loggerheads 
with its own mediators (Nathan, 2013:6). 
 
5.6.3 Lack of Political will  
A lack of political will, especially from some members of the Chefs de File, has hampered the 
restoration of political order in Madagascar. In the early days of the political crisis, Zafy, 
Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana attempted to weaken the regime of the HTA by calling on 
Rajoelina to surrender his authority and position to the Prime Minister. This had far-reaching 
consequences for the mediation process and prompted the AU and the UN to withdraw the 
diplomatic staff from their mediation efforts, citing a lack of political will by the above 
mentioned parties as the reason (Zounmenou, 2009b:74). The UN and the AU were thus 
hindered in their duty of mobilising global support for the mediation process. However, instead 
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of suspending their mediation efforts, they could have held Zafy and Ratsiraka to account and to 
order, bringing pressure to bear for them to honour the agreement.   
The ICG-M meetings also highlighted this lack of commitment in that it only held six meetings 
within a period of three years whereas the ICG-G held nine sessions in a single year, the period 
January to December 2009 (Cawthra, 2010:19).   
Another facet that continues to derail progress in Madagascar relates to the lack of political will 
on the part of Rajoelina to abide by the decisions highlighted in the SADC Roadmap. The report 
prepared by Ravalomanana (2012:11) mentions that Rajoelina’s regime has violated the latter in 
two respects. The first violation of the SADC Roadmap reads as follows:  
Attempts to deny President Ravalomanana the right to unconditional return to Madagascar to 
contest the election (Roadmap Clause 20) by falsely alleging that he is somehow complicit in 
crimes against humanity and thus does qualify for the Clause 18 Amnesty in the Roadmap 
(Ravalomanana, 2012:11). 
On 22 January 2012, Ravalomanana boarded a flight to his native land. However, the former 
President was unable to land when authorities blocked the air space over Antananarivo Airport 
(Lunn, 2012:5). On 14 April 2012, transitional authorities passed an Amnesty Bill. However, it 
still excluded Ravalomanana from its provisions by mentioning that anyone who had committed 
a murder could not be covered by the bill (Lunn 2012:5). 
Furthermore Rajoelina has abjured the principles set out in the Roadmap by threatening to 
prosecute Ravalomanana on cases of crimes against humanity and threatening to apply for his 
extradition. In addition, President Rajoelina has stated that he is not willing to accept the 
unconditional return of President Ravalomanana as provided for in paragraph 20 of the 
Roadmap, and added that President Ravalomanana will only be allowed to return after 
Madagascar goes to the polls (Ravalomanana, 2012:21). 
The other challenge that confronts the mediation process is the issue of domestic actors that 
continue to support the regime of Rajoelina. The military is an important player in this case. In 
2010, the military maintained that it did not want to seize power for itself and would not 
acknowledge anyone besides Rajoelina as the head of the transitional government. In particular, 
the military has gone on to state that it will be opposed to any action that seeks to replace 
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Rajoelina as the President of this government (Cawthra, 2010:18).  Thus, Rajoelina has been 
able to undermine the mediation efforts of SADC because he perceives SADC as an institution 
which is dominated by Anglophone states that do not have the best interests of Madagascar at 
heart. Furthermore, Rajoelina went on to state that the mediation process, initiated by SADC, is 
not his idea. He further proclaimed that if SADC calls him to a meeting he will refuse to attend 
(Kotzé, 2013:9). It is therefore clear that Rajoelina has no faith in SADC, arguably, because of 
its contradictory behaviour towards his regime and thus has been emboldened to defy SADC 
while it has failed to take decisive action against him.   
 
5.6.4 SADC’s lack of experience in conflict resolution  
Another factor that may help to explain the failure of the AU sanctions policy in Madagascar is 
that SADC has inadequate experience in dealing with coups in the region. This lack of 
experience may be attributed to the fact that the region has been least affected (in Africa) by 
coups, experiencing the relatively low number of four coups (as indicated in Table 5 in chapter 
three) in the period 1975-2009. Thus, this situation resulted in SADC investing little time and 
effort in developing instruments required to resolve coups in the region and in this manner 
ending up recognising Rajeolina as the head of the transitional government (Zounmenou, 2009b: 
73).  
However, this was not the case in Guinea. The knowledge and experience, of conflict resolution, 
that was accumulated by ECOWAS played a crucial role in restoring constitutional order in 
Guinea. They helped the regional body to deploy its tools of conflict resolution that allowed 
ECOWAS to respond in practical ways. For example, the regional body invoked Article 45 of 
the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to suspend Guinea from its policy structures. 
To add, ECOWAS also used the very same Article to prohibit members of the CNDD from 
participating in the national elections (Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, 2001).  
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5.6.5 The geographical position 
The geographical position of Madagascar may have generated a lack of political will on the part 
of SADC to respond with a sense of urgency towards the coup in Madagascar. Although it is 
located in the region of Southern African, Madagascar is an island state and it does not share any 
border with any African state. Thus, the lack of urgency may stem from the fact that the crisis in 
Madagascar will not spill over to neighbouring states (Zounmenou, 2009b: 78).  
In Guinea, however, regional and international organisations responded with a sense of urgency 
mainly because Guinea is a landlocked state that is located in a politically volatile region of West 
Africa. Thus, failure to respond with a sense of urgency would have caused serious problems for 
the region. It would have prompted Guinean citizens to flee their county and seek refuge in 
fragile neighbouring states such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. Consequently, this influx of 
foreigners into these fragile states would have perpetuated poverty and unemployment 
(Conciliation Resources, 2012:8).      
 
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the pitfalls of the AU sanction policy regarding coups in Madagascar. 
As a background, it first examined the post-colonial history of Madagascar and described each of 
the periods of rule by Philbert Tsiranana, Didier Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana. This 
chapter also discussed the rise of Andry Rajoelina and pointed out that the Rajoelina regime has 
acted in a manner that violates human rights; his prevention of political change by side-lining his 
opponents from mainstream politics and refusing to implement the transitional modalities 
proposed by SADC.    
The responses of the AU and SADC to the coup were examined, revealing that the AU and 
SADC responded to the coup by imposing sanctions on the regime of Andry Rajoelina. However, 
these sanctions have not yet managed to restore normality in Madagascar, which may be 
attributed to several factors. Firstly, SADC failed to restore political order in Madagascar 
because it has itself contravened AU principles. The specific challenge in this regard lies in the 
fact that the Roadmap that was drafted by SADC recognises Rajoelina as the legitimate President 
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of the Transition. This, however, is not in line with Article 25 of the AU Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance, which states that perpetrators of a coup shall not hold any position of 
responsibility in their state. Secondly, conflicting interests that arise from the internal divisions 
between SADC structures and the mediation team have hampered the restoration of normality in 
Madagascar. Other elements that continue to derail progress are conflicting interests between 
South Africa, France, Zimbabwe and Swaziland. Thirdly, progress has stalled because of the 
absence of genuine political will on the part of the four major political stakeholders. Fourthly, 
SADC’s lack of experience has also contributed towards slowing down progress and may be 
explained by the fact that SADC has invested little time in developing tools and instruments that 
will allow it to respond effectively to coups. Sixth and finally, the geographical position of 
Madagascar has permitted actors a lack of urgency because Madagascar is an island state that 
does not share any borders with any other state in the SADC region. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
This dissertation set out to assess the efficacy of the AU sanction policies with regard to 
addressing the problems brought about by coups and how to create stability in affected states. By 
conducting such an assessment, this dissertation set out to answer the following question:  Why 
is the AU, as a continental body, able to succeed in implementing its sanctions policy in some 
cases, in this case Guinea, and fail in others, in this case Madagascar?  
The success of the AU sanction policy in Guinea may be attributed to the fact that both the AU 
and ECOWAS responded to the coup based on existing sanction policies. The sanction policy 
articulated by the AU was largely taken from the AU Constitutive Act, Protocol relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, Lomé Declaration (also known as the 
Declaration on the Framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes in Government) 
and the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.  
These policies point to a wide range of principles and collective values, including respect for 
democratic practices. More importantly, the policies prescribe the type of action that the AU 
should follow when encountering a situation of unconstitutional change. 
Equally, ECOWAS responded to the coup in Guinea based on its own sanctions policy. In this 
regard, it is important to mention that ECOWAS used the Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance not only as an instrument of condemnation but also as a mechanism of imposing 
sanctions against the military regime in Guinea. The regional body also went to the extent of 
imposing diplomatic sanctions in accordance with Article 45 of this Protocol.   
This line of action was not witnessed in the case of Madagascar, and the failure of the AU 
sanctions policy was evident, largely as a result of SADC not yet having developed its own 
sanctions policy that prescribes the kind of action that SADC should adopt when confronted with 
a coup in the region. This raises the question: why has SADC failed to develop a normative 
framework? 
The answer to the above question may be explained by the fact that Southern Africa has been 
least affected by the phenomenon of coups, having only experienced four successful coups 
during the period 1972-2009 (as indicated Table 5 in chapter three), compared with West Africa 
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which has experienced forty two successful coups over the period 1962 to 2012. The 
preponderance of coups (as indicated in Table 1 in chapter three) in West Africa prompted 
ECOWAS to develop a sanction policy allowing it to respond to coups effectively. This was 
different in the case of SADC. Hence, one finds that in the case of Madagascar, SADC acted 
outside the scope of the AU sanction policies and consequently recognised Rajeolina as the head 
of the transitional government.  
The success of the AU sanctions policy in Guinea is also attributable to the fact that the two 
organisations (AU and ECOWAS) managed to provide effective leadership by coordinating their 
efforts and sharing responsibilities. This aspect was demonstrated by the fact that the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping and the Chairperson of the ECOWAS 
Commission, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, jointly chaired the meetings of the ICG-G. This was 
important because it allowed the AU and ECOWAS to communicate their shared message, 
rejecting the coup in Guinea. In both theory and practice, this reflects that the workings of the 
AU sanction policy in Guinea are anchored in the theory of collective security because it was 
coordinating with international bodies.  
In Madagascar, however, conflicting interests between various actors diminished the prospects of 
the AU coordinating with its partners in finding a common solution to the problem. France, as a 
former colonial power, has thrown in its support for Rajoelina because it does not want to shift 
Madagascar from its sphere of influence. On the other hand, the political leaders of Zimbabwe 
and Swaziland have shown support for Rajoelina.  The divisions between the mediation and 
SADC structures also fuel competing interests. In this regard, the mediation team that was led by 
Chissano has moderated a position that is contrary to the SADC decisions. As a result, SADC 
shifted the responsibility for the mediation to the Troika of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security Cooperation.  
In the case of Madagascar, the AU sanctions regime, particularly the part that refers to travel 
bans and visa denials, has been ineffective because it has not received the support of some 
powerful states. For example, the travel ban on Rajoelina was violated on 18 December 2012 
when he was allowed to travel to Paris (France) to meet with the French Foreign Minister.  
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In Guinea, the AU sanction policy succeeded because the AU and ECOWAS managed to 
mobilise support for their sanction regime. This was done through circulating the list of the 
individuals who had to be sanctioned by the UN, the OIF, the USA, France and the EU. The 
above- mentioned actors responded to the call of the AU by imposing travel sanctions, visa 
denials and asset freezing on the members of the CNDD.  
The failure of the AU sanction policies towards Madagascar may be attributed to the following 
factors: the Roadmap that was brokered by SADC mediators gave Rajoelina an opportunity to 
prevent political change by their recognising him as the legitimate president of the Transitional 
Government. For example, some political actors, who mainly hail from Ravalomanana’s 
factions, have been denied an opportunity of participating in the transitional processes. In 
addition, Rajoelina’s administration has continuously denied former President Marc 
Ravalomanana entry into the country. However, this was not the case in Guinea, where the 
Minister’s cabinet was mainly made up of 34 Ministers, 24 of whom were civilians while the 
remaining 10 were chosen from the ranks of the army. 
The situation in Guinea proves that the AU succeeded because actors had a genuine political will 
to resolve the crisis. The head of the CNDD, General Sekouba Konaté, who succeeded Camara, 
committed himself to acknowledging the principles spelled out in the Joint Declaration of 
Ouagadougou. In the days that followed, he formed a transitional government composed of both 
civilians and the military.  
ECOWAS and the AU also dedicated much time in resolving the impasse. It is probable that the 
reasons behind the strong political will stemmed from the fact that actors wanted to prevent 
Guinea from sliding into a state of ethnic conflict or civil war which would have destabilised the 
region of West Africa. However, this was not the case in Madagascar. As mentioned, the lack of 
urgency stems from the fact that Madagascar is an island state. This reinforced the notion that the 
domestic political upheaval in Madagascar would not have the same devastating consequences 
for the SADC region.   
An absence of a genuine political will on the part of Rajoelina to implement SADC agreements 
has diminished the possibilities of forming a consensual government in Madagascar. This may be 
explained by the fact that Rajoelina views the SADC mediation efforts as having no impact on 
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his regime. Rajoelina moreover believes that the SADC frameworks which are geared to forming 
a consensual government are aimed at weakening his regime. Hence, he has been defiant 
regarding the call made by SADC to include the other three members in the transitional 
government of Madagascar. Rajoelina is also defiant towards SADC because he knows that there 
is no sustained action on the part of the regional body to sanction his regime.  
Some domestic actors have contributed towards the failure of the AU sanction policy in 
Madagascar. Senior military officials have repeatedly maintained that they will continue to 
support Rajoelina and resist international action that seeks to remove Rajoelina from his 
position.  
In Guinea, the domestic actors such as trade unions, political parties and the civil society proved 
to be in support of restoring constitutional rule, thus directly contributing to the success of the 
AU sanction policy. They agreed with AU and ECOWAS decisions that condemned and isolated 
the regime of the CNDD. Domestic actors were in support of the plan that sought to establish a 
transitional government in Guinea.  
The ICG-G was instrumental in the success of the AU sanctions policy in Guinea precisely 
because it demonstrated a level of commitment in solving the crisis. It held nine sessions 
between January and December 2009. However, this was not the case in Madagascar. The 
meetings of the ICG-M were often marred by a lack of urgency. In addition, these were less 
frequent because the ICG-M only held six sessions from 2009-2011.  
It appears that the role of ECOWAS with regard to the situation in Guinea was clearly defined by 
Article 25 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Hence, it was clear from the 
onset that the policy of ECOWAS was focused on creating a permanent dialogue with CNDD, 
forcing the military regime to comply with the election schedule as well as prohibiting members 
of the junta from participating in the elections. However, SADC did not play a clearly defined 
role in Madagascar. Instead of prohibiting Rajoelina from leading the transitional government, 
SADC should have found a way of mobilising international support for its sanctions regime 
against Rajoelina. 
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